What does No Perfect Arbiter conclude, in numbers, about “The Borda Count and Irrelevant Options: Twenty-One Electors, Decoys and Spoilers”?
Answer: Chapter 3 recomputes Borda's twenty-one electors and finds a spoiler in a share of 0.2604 of profiles with three reviewers and four options.
Scope of the numbers: Reviewer names and parameters are illustrative, all calculations are generated by the book's programs, and the book is general business analysis, not business advice. Chapter 6 builds a scenario of conflicting kit refusal codes with illustrative rule names, computes deadlock risks and recommends a hybrid rule that vetoes first and then compares grades in written priority order.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.2604
| 3 reviewers, 4 options | 13,824 profiles |
| Borda : decided 13,824 spoilable 3,600 share 0.2604 | |
| plurality: decided 13,824 spoilable | 0 share 0.0000 |
| Condorcet: decided 12,288 spoilable | 0 share 0.0000 |
| 5 reviewers, 3 options | 7,776 profiles |
| Borda : decided | 7,776 spoilable 1,020 share 0.1312 |
| plurality: decided | 7,776 spoilable 2,880 share 0.3704 |
| Condorcet: decided | 7,236 spoilable 0 share 0.0000 |
| a Condorcet winner survives any deletion of a rival |
Show the full program
# Chapter 3. p33: how often does deleting a losing option change the
# winner? Exact census over all 24 ** 3 = 13,824 profiles of 3
# reviewers ranking 4 options, and all 6 ** 5 = 7,776 profiles of 5
# reviewers ranking 3 options (impartial culture weights). For each
# rule we take the set of tied winners; a profile is "spoilable" if
# deleting some option outside that set changes the set. The Condorcet
# winner, where one exists, is checked the same way.
import itertools
from fractions import Fraction
def restrict(prof, keep):
return [tuple(c for c in o if c in keep) for o in prof]
def winners_borda(prof):
m = len(prof[0])
s = {}
for o in prof:
for pos, c in enumerate(o):
s[c] = s.get(c, 0) + m - 1 - pos
top = max(s.values())
return frozenset(c for c in s if s[c] == top)
def winners_plurality(prof):
s = {c: 0 for c in prof[0]}
for o in prof:
s[o[0]] += 1
top = max(s.values())
return frozenset(c for c in s if s[c] == top)
def condorcet(prof):
opts = prof[0]
for x in opts:
if all(2 * len([o for o in prof if o.index(x) < o.index(y)])
> len(prof) for y in opts if y != x):
return frozenset([x])
return None
def spoilable(rule, prof):
w = rule(prof)
if w is None:
return None
opts = prof[0]
for d in opts:
if d in w:
continue
keep = [c for c in opts if c != d]
if rule(restrict(prof, keep)) != w:
return True
return False
if __name__ == "__main__":
for n, opts in ((3, "ABCD"), (5, "ABC")):
orders = list(itertools.permutations(opts))
profs = list(itertools.product(orders, repeat=n))
print("{} reviewers, {} options: {:,} profiles".format(
n, len(opts), len(profs)))
for name, rule in (("Borda", winners_borda),
("plurality", winners_plurality),
("Condorcet", condorcet)):
hit = have = 0
for pr in profs:
r = spoilable(rule, pr)
if r is None:
continue
have += 1
if r:
hit += 1
f = Fraction(hit, have)
print(" {:<9}: decided {:>6,} spoilable {:>5,} share"
" {:.4f}".format(name, have, hit, float(f)))
print("a Condorcet winner survives any deletion of a rival")Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Arrow's Impossibility Theorem and the Aggregation of Multiple Reviewers: Why No Perfect Arbiter Exists When Kit Refusal Codes Conflict (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 3: The Borda Count and Irrelevant Options: Twenty-One Electors, Decoys and Spoilers. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-310 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026310,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Arrow's Impossibility Theorem and the Aggregation of Multiple Reviewers: Why No Perfect Arbiter Exists When Kit Refusal Codes Conflict},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · Four Axioms and an Empty Table: Arrow's Theorem Enumerated for Three Reviewers and Three Options
- Chapter 2 · The Exact Probability of a Condorcet Cycle: 216 Profiles, Panel Size and the Number of Options
- Chapter 4 · Single-Peaked Preferences and Value Restriction: When Cycles Disappear
- Chapter 5 · The Lexicographic Priority Arbiter: Which Axiom It Gives Up and What It Buys
- Chapter 6 · Conflicting Kit Refusal Codes: an Illustrative Scenario, Deadlock Risk and the Priority Order
- Chapter 7 · Eastern and Western Sources Examined: First Grader, Review Grader and Arbiter in the Song History, and Borda's Equal Steps
- Chapter 8 · Closing the Loop: Turning Multi-Reviewer Verdicts in the Kits into an Explicit Priority, with a Pre-Registered Plan of Refutation