What does No Perfect Arbiter conclude, in numbers, about “The Lexicographic Priority Arbiter: Which Axiom It Gives Up and What It Buys”?
Answer: Chapter 5 audits the lexicographic priority and graded rules and illustrates the Gibbard and Satterthwaite theorem with a census of manipulation: with four options Borda is manipulable in a share of 0.5122 of profiles, the priority rule in none.
Scope of the numbers: Reviewer names and parameters are illustrative, all calculations are generated by the book's programs, and the book is general business analysis, not business advice. Chapter 6 builds a scenario of conflicting kit refusal codes with illustrative rule names, computes deadlock risks and recommends a hybrid rule that vetoes first and then compares grades in written priority order.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.5122
| 3 options, 216 profiles | |
| plurality manipulable | 36 share 0.1667 |
| Borda manipulable | 51 share 0.2361 |
| Black manipulable | 24 share 0.1111 |
| priority manipulable | 0 share 0.0000 |
| 4 options, 13,824 profiles | |
| plurality manipulable | 4,068 share 0.2943 |
| Borda manipulable | 7,080 share 0.5122 |
| Black manipulable | 3,816 share 0.2760 |
| priority manipulable | 0 share 0.0000 |
Show the full program
# Chapter 5. p52: who can game the panel? (Gibbard 1973; Satterthwaite
# 1975). Every rule here picks one winner; ties go to the alphabetically
# first option. A profile is manipulable if some reviewer, by reporting
# a false ranking, gets a winner she truly prefers. Exact census over
# all profiles of 3 reviewers with 3 options (216) and 4 options
# (13,824). The theorem says only a dictatorship, or a rule with at
# most two possible winners, is immune once there are 3 or more
# options; the priority rule below is such a dictatorship.
import itertools
from fractions import Fraction
def scores(prof, w):
s = {}
for o in prof:
for pos, c in enumerate(o):
s[c] = s.get(c, 0) + w[pos]
return s
def pick(s):
return min(s, key=lambda c: (-s[c], c))
def plurality(prof):
m = len(prof[0])
return pick(scores(prof, [1] + [0] * (m - 1)))
def borda(prof):
m = len(prof[0])
return pick(scores(prof, list(range(m - 1, -1, -1))))
def black(prof):
opts = prof[0]
for x in opts:
if all(2 * len([o for o in prof if o.index(x) < o.index(y)])
> len(prof) for y in opts if y != x):
return x
return borda(prof)
def priority(prof):
return prof[0][0]
def manipulable(rule, prof, orders):
w = rule(prof)
for i, true in enumerate(prof):
for lie in orders:
if lie == true:
continue
alt = list(prof)
alt[i] = lie
if true.index(rule(alt)) < true.index(w):
return True
return False
if __name__ == "__main__":
for opts in ("ABC", "ABCD"):
orders = ["".join(p) for p in itertools.permutations(opts)]
profs = list(itertools.product(orders, repeat=3))
print("{} options, {:,} profiles".format(len(opts), len(profs)))
for name, rule in (("plurality", plurality), ("Borda", borda),
("Black", black), ("priority", priority)):
k = 0
for pr in profs:
if manipulable(rule, pr, orders):
k += 1
print(" {:<9} manipulable {:>6,} share {:.4f}".format(
name, k, float(Fraction(k, len(profs)))))Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Arrow's Impossibility Theorem and the Aggregation of Multiple Reviewers: Why No Perfect Arbiter Exists When Kit Refusal Codes Conflict (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 5: The Lexicographic Priority Arbiter: Which Axiom It Gives Up and What It Buys. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-310 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026310,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Arrow's Impossibility Theorem and the Aggregation of Multiple Reviewers: Why No Perfect Arbiter Exists When Kit Refusal Codes Conflict},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · Four Axioms and an Empty Table: Arrow's Theorem Enumerated for Three Reviewers and Three Options
- Chapter 2 · The Exact Probability of a Condorcet Cycle: 216 Profiles, Panel Size and the Number of Options
- Chapter 3 · The Borda Count and Irrelevant Options: Twenty-One Electors, Decoys and Spoilers
- Chapter 4 · Single-Peaked Preferences and Value Restriction: When Cycles Disappear
- Chapter 6 · Conflicting Kit Refusal Codes: an Illustrative Scenario, Deadlock Risk and the Priority Order
- Chapter 7 · Eastern and Western Sources Examined: First Grader, Review Grader and Arbiter in the Song History, and Borda's Equal Steps
- Chapter 8 · Closing the Loop: Turning Multi-Reviewer Verdicts in the Kits into an Explicit Priority, with a Pre-Registered Plan of Refutation