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第三章 互买条款:信息与现金不对等时谁获益

条款及其承诺

两位对等合伙人之间的股东协议,许多都有一条互买条款,常称为「霰弹枪条款」或「俄罗斯轮盘条款」:任何一方都可以为公司的一半报一个价,另一方必须在这个价格上要么买、要么卖。因为报价的人不知道对方会选哪个方向,这条款似乎能逼出诚实的价格。关于合伙解散的经济学显示,这只在特殊条件下成立 (Cramton et al. 1987; McAfee 1992),而关于「德州枪战」条款的实验发现,人们并不按简单的理论去玩 (Brooks et al. 2010)。

私人估值

p05 让应答方对整个公司的估值只有应答方自己知道,均匀分布在 0 到 1 之间。报价方为一半报价 pp;应答方的估值超过 2p2p 就买,否则就卖。报价方的期望收益是 (1−2p)p+2p(vO−p)(1-2p)p + 2p(v_O – p),在 p*=(1+2vO)/8p^* = (1 + 2v_O)/8 时最大。

推导

# Chapter 3. p05: The shotgun (Russian roulette) clause. Two 50 / 50
# partners. The offerer O names a price p for half the firm; the
# responder R must either buy O's half at p or sell R's half at p.
# R values the whole firm at v_R, uniform on 0 to 1, known only to R;
# O values it at v_O. R buys if v_R - p > p, that is v_R > 2 p. O's
# expected payoff is
#   (1 - 2p) p + 2p (v_O - p)   =>   best p* = (1 + 2 v_O) / 8,
# against the "honest" price v_O / 2. O shades toward the middle; R,
# who chooses after seeing p, gains on average.
def o_payoff(p, vo):
    q = min(1.0, 2 * p)              # chance R sells
    return (1 - q) * p + q * (vo - p)

def r_payoff(p):
    # E max(v_R - p, p) over v_R ~ U(0, 1)
    k = min(1.0, 2 * p)
    return k * p + (1 - k * k) / 2 - p * (1 - k)

if __name__ == "__main__":
    print("   v_O    p*      honest v_O/2   O at p*   O at honest   R at p*")
    for vo in (0.2, 0.5, 0.8):
        ps = (1 + 2 * vo) / 8
        print("   {:.1f}   {:.4f}   {:12.4f}   {:7.4f}   {:11.4f}   {:7.4f}"
              .format(vo, ps, vo / 2, o_payoff(ps, vo), o_payoff(vo / 2, vo),
                      r_payoff(ps)))
    print("   R's value of half the firm on average: {:.4f}".format(0.25))
#    v_O    p*      honest v_O/2   O at p*   O at honest   R at p*
#    0.2   0.1750         0.1000    0.1225        0.1000    0.3862
#    0.5   0.2500         0.2500    0.2500        0.2500    0.3750
#    0.8   0.3250         0.4000    0.4225        0.4000    0.3862
#    R's value of half the firm on average: 0.2500

对公司估值 0.5、即平均值的报价方,报出诚实的 0.2500。但估值 0.2 的报价方报 0.1750 而不是 0.1000,估值 0.8 的报 0.3250 而不是 0.4000:两者都向中间压,而且都比诚实报价得到更多(0.1225 对 0.1000,0.4225 对 0.4000)。看到价格之后才选择的应答方,预期得到 0.3750 至 0.3862,远高于公司一半的平均价值 0.2500。这个条款奖励的是做选择的人,而不是报价的人;懂得这一点的合伙人会等对方先扣扳机。

报价方的期望收益与所报价格,标出最佳价格(p05)。

现金不对等

这个条款的承诺还假定任何一方都付得起。p06 让双方都知道公司值 1,但应答方最多只能筹到预算 bb。

推导

# Chapter 3. p06: When the responder cannot pay. Same clause as p05,
# but both partners know the firm is worth 1 and R can raise at most
# a budget b to buy O's half. If p > b, R cannot buy and must sell at
# p, so O names p just above b (here b + 0.01) whenever that is below
# the fair 0.5. R's loss against the fair price, by budget. Then the
# "Texas shootout" variant: sealed bids, the higher bidder buys at its
# own bid; a cash-poor R can bid at most b, so O bids b + 0.01 too.
# A clause with a financing period (R may raise money for 90 days at
# a cost of 5% of the amount) removes most of the gap.
if __name__ == "__main__":
    print("   R's budget b   O's price   R's loss vs fair 0.5"
          "   loss with financing")
    for b in (0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5):
        p = min(0.5, b + 0.01)
        loss = 0.5 - p
        fin = 0.0 if b >= 0.5 else 0.05 * 0.5
        print("   {:12.1f}   {:9.2f}   {:20.2f}   {:21.3f}".format(
            b, p, loss, fin))
    print("   Texas shootout with b = 0.2: O buys at {:.2f}".format(0.21))
#    R's budget b   O's price   R's loss vs fair 0.5   loss with financing
#             0.1        0.11                   0.39                   0.025
#             0.2        0.21                   0.29                   0.025
#             0.3        0.31                   0.19                   0.025
#             0.4        0.41                   0.09                   0.025
#             0.5        0.50                   0.00                   0.000
#    Texas shootout with b = 0.2: O buys at 0.21

如果应答方只能筹到 0.1,报价方就报 0.11,在这个价格上应答方买不起,只能卖;相对于公平的 0.5,应答方损失 0.39。预算为 0.2 时损失 0.29,为 0.4 时 0.09。密封报价的德州枪战也没有帮助:缺现金的合伙人最多只能出 0.2,对方以 0.21 买下。若有一段融资期,让应答方可以用 90 天付出一定成本去筹钱,损失就降到融资成本,例子里是 0.025。在财力不对等的合伙里,除非附带这样的融资期或估值下限,这条款是较富一方的武器。

假说 · 尚未验证

作者的诠释(尚未验证): 在依互买条款解决的纠纷中,融资能力较强的一方较常启动条款,并取得低于独立估值的价格。什么会证明它错: 在一项对有独立估值的已解决互买纠纷的预先登记研究中,当启动方融资能力较强时,其价格相对于估值并不更低。

小结

在私人估值下,报价方向中间压价,做选择的一方获益;在现金不对等时,较富的合伙人可以报出较穷一方无法接住的低价。互买条款需要融资期或估值下限,才能兑现它的承诺。

参考文献

Brooks, Richard R. W., Claudia M. Landeo, and Kathryn E. Spier. 2010. “Trigger Happy or Gun Shy? Dissolving Common-Value Partnerships with Texas Shootouts.” The RAND Journal of Economics 41 (4): 649 to 673.
Cramton, Peter, Robert Gibbons, and Paul Klemperer. 1987. “Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently.” Econometrica 55 (3): 615 to 632.
McAfee, R. Preston. 1992. “Amicable Divorce: Dissolving a Partnership with Simple Mechanisms.” Journal of Economic Theory 56 (2): 266 to 293.

Fan, Y. (2026). Shareholder Free-Riding Games, Dynamic Vesting Mechanisms and Defection Early-Warning Models: Moral-Hazard Equity Dilution, Shotgun Buy-Sell Clauses and Behavioral Divergence Signals [股东搭便车博弈、动态股权成熟与背刺早期预警模型] (Version 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090243 · Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).