5D Library › 股东搭便车博弈、动态股权成熟与背刺早期预警模型 · English

第二章 股权成熟:它修补什么、不修补什么

死股

初创公司里常见的故事是:一位联合创始人干了几个月就走,却留着公司的一半。瓦瑟曼对创始人的研究记录了早期股权分配常常很快谈定、后来又常常惹出麻烦 (Wasserman 2012)。带悬崖期的成熟机制是标准答案:股份在四年里按月赚得,第一年结束前一股也赚不到。p03 在联合创始人有四分之一机会于两年内离开的情形下,把它与静态股份比较。

推导

# Chapter 2. p03: Dead equity. Two founders split 50 / 50. Founder B
# leaves in month m with chance 0.25 spread evenly over the first 24
# months (else B stays four years). With static shares B keeps 50%
# whatever m is. With four-year vesting and a one-year cliff, B keeps
# nothing before month 12 and m / 48 of the 50% afterwards (the firm
# buys back the rest at cost). A replacement needs 15% of the firm
# for the remaining time. 100,000 draws, seed 93.
import random

def one(rng, vesting):
    if rng.random() >= 0.25:
        return None
    m = rng.uniform(0, 24)
    if not vesting:
        return 0.50
    return 0.0 if m < 12 else 0.50 * m / 48

if __name__ == "__main__":
    rng = random.Random(93)
    for vesting in (False, True):
        out = [one(rng, vesting) for _ in range(100000)]
        left = [x for x in out if x is not None]
        dead = sum(left) / len(left)
        lab = "4-year vesting, 1-year cliff" if vesting else "static 50 / 50"
        print("   {}".format(lab))
        print("     share of founders who leave early: {:.3f}".format(
            len(left) / len(out)))
        print("     equity held by a departed founder (mean): {:.3f}".format(
            dead))
        print("     active owners' share after a 15% hire: {:.3f}".format(
            (1 - dead) * 0.85))
    print("   leaver in month 11: keeps {:.3f}; month 13: {:.3f}".format(
        0.0, 0.50 * 13 / 48))
#    static 50 / 50
#      share of founders who leave early: 0.251
#      equity held by a departed founder (mean): 0.500
#      active owners' share after a 15% hire: 0.425
#    4-year vesting, 1-year cliff
#      share of founders who leave early: 0.248
#      equity held by a departed founder (mean): 0.094
#      active owners' share after a 15% hire: 0.770
#    leaver in month 11: keeps 0.000; month 13: 0.135

静态股份下,无论哪个月离开,离开的创始人都持有公司的 0.500。如果随后需要给接替者公司的 15%,在职的所有者只剩 0.425。成熟机制下,离开的创始人平均只持有 0.094,同样招人之后在职所有者保有 0.770。悬崖期在第一年末前后造成很大差别:第 11 个月离开的创始人保有 0.000,第 13 个月离开的保有公司的 0.135。

留任不等于努力

成熟机制也能恢复努力吗?p04 把两件事分开:创始人是否留下,以及留下时有多努力。创始人 B 的外部报价在四年里逐步上升;当报价超过留下的价值时 B 就离开,而在成熟机制下,留下的价值包括离开时会失去的未成熟股份。

推导

# Chapter 2. p04: What vesting fixes and what it does not. Founder B's
# outside offer grows from 0.5 to 2.0 units a month over 48 months
# (B's own salary is 0.5). B leaves when the offer exceeds the value of
# staying: salary plus the shares B would forfeit by leaving, spread
# over the months left. The firm gains 1 unit of value for each month
# both founders stay. Under static shares B forfeits nothing; under
# vesting B forfeits the unvested part of a stake worth 30 units at
# exit. While B stays, effort is still that of a 50% owner (p01
# efficiency 0.750), so vesting can repair retention but not effort.
def months_stayed(vesting, stake=30.0):
    for t in range(48):
        offer = 0.5 + 1.5 * t / 47
        if vesting:
            vested = 0.0 if t < 12 else t / 48
            forfeit = stake * (1 - vested)
        else:
            forfeit = 0.0
        stay = 0.5 + forfeit / (48 - t)
        if offer > stay:
            return t
    return 48

if __name__ == "__main__":
    print("   rule                 months B stays   joint months / 48")
    for lab, v in (("static 50 / 50", False), ("vesting", True)):
        m = months_stayed(v)
        print("   {:<20} {:14d}   {:17.3f}".format(lab, m, m / 48))
    for stake in (10.0, 60.0):
        m = months_stayed(True, stake)
        print("   vesting, stake {:4.0f}   {:14d}   {:17.3f}".format(
            stake, m, m / 48))
    s, v = months_stayed(False) / 48, months_stayed(True) / 48
    print("   value created, retention x effort: static {:.3f},"
          " vesting {:.3f}".format(s * 0.75, v * 0.75))
#    rule                 months B stays   joint months / 48
#    static 50 / 50                    1               0.021
#    vesting                          20               0.417
#    vesting, stake   10                8               0.167
#    vesting, stake   60               40               0.833
#    value created, retention x effort: static 0.016, vesting 0.312

静态股份下 B 离开时什么也不失去,外部报价一超过薪水,第 1 个月就走;两位创始人一起工作的时间只有计划的 0.021。成熟机制下 B 留 20 个月(计划时间的 0.417),效果取决于股份值多少:股份值 10 时留 8 个月,值 60 时留 40 个月。但 B 留下期间仍只拥有自己产出的一半,所以努力仍是第一章的水平(效率 0.750)。两者相乘,创造的价值从全额的 0.016 提高到 0.312。成熟机制修补了留任问题的大部分,却完全没有修补努力问题;后者需要第一章与第四章的工具。

B 的外部报价,以及静态股份与成熟机制下留下的价值(p04)。

假说 · 尚未验证

作者的诠释(尚未验证): 采用创始人股权成熟机制的初创公司,创始人早期离开的情形减少,但创始人在职期间的努力指标没有变化。什么会证明它错: 在一项对采用成熟机制前后的初创公司的预先登记比较中,离开率没有下降,或者创始人的努力与留任一样提高。

小结

成熟机制消除了大部分死股,让创始人留得更久,悬崖期在第 12 个月前后决定很多事。它不改变创始人留下时有多努力;那仍是团队问题。

参考文献

Wasserman, Noam. 2012. The Founder’s Dilemmas: Anticipating and Avoiding the Pitfalls That Can Sink a Startup. Princeton University Press.

Fan, Y. (2026). Shareholder Free-Riding Games, Dynamic Vesting Mechanisms and Defection Early-Warning Models: Moral-Hazard Equity Dilution, Shotgun Buy-Sell Clauses and Behavioral Divergence Signals [股东搭便车博弈、动态股权成熟与背刺早期预警模型] (Version 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090243 · Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).