5D Library › 股东搭便车博弈、动态股权成熟与背刺早期预警模型 · English
第一章 努力无法核实时的搭便车
团队问题
几个人一起生产,又没有人看得出每个人贡献了多少时,每个人都会倾向于让别人多干。阿尔奇安与德姆塞茨认为这正是企业要有负责监督的所有者的原因 (Alchian and Demsetz 1972);霍姆斯特罗姆证明,在个人努力无法核实的团队里,任何恰好把产出分完的规则都不能让每个人得到正确的激励 (Holmström 1982)。持有固定均等股份的联合创始人,正是这样的团队。
p01 写出最简单的版本。每位创始人选择努力 ,成本 ;公司价值为 。持股 的创始人每多付出一单位努力得到 ,于是选择 ,而使创造价值最大的努力对每个人都是 。
推导
# Chapter 1. p01: Free riding when effort cannot be verified. N founders
# each choose effort e_i at cost c e_i^2 / 2; the firm's value is
# theta * (e_1 + ... + e_N). Founder i owns share s_i and so chooses
# e_i = s_i theta / c (Nash), while the value-maximising effort is
# theta / c for everyone. Efficiency = value created net of effort cost,
# relative to the first best. theta = c = 1. Equal splits for N = 1 to
# 5, and some unequal splits for N = 2.
def efficiency(shares):
es = [s for s in shares] # e_i = s_i theta / c
w = sum(es) - sum(e * e for e in es) / 2
fb = len(shares) - len(shares) / 2
return w / fb
if __name__ == "__main__":
print(" founders N equal shares efficiency (2N - 1) / N^2")
for n in range(1, 6):
print(" {:10d} {:12.3f} {:10.3f} {:14.3f}".format(
n, 1 / n, efficiency([1 / n] * n), (2 * n - 1) / n ** 2))
print(" two founders, unequal splits")
for a in (0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.9):
print(" {:.1f} / {:.1f} efficiency {:.3f}".format(
a, 1 - a, efficiency([a, 1 - a])))
# founders N equal shares efficiency (2N - 1) / N^2
# 1 1.000 1.000 1.000
# 2 0.500 0.750 0.750
# 3 0.333 0.556 0.556
# 4 0.250 0.438 0.438
# 5 0.200 0.360 0.360
# two founders, unequal splits
# 0.5 / 0.5 efficiency 0.750
# 0.6 / 0.4 efficiency 0.740
# 0.7 / 0.3 efficiency 0.710
# 0.9 / 0.1 efficiency 0.590均分时效率是 :两位创始人 0.750,三位 0.556,四位 0.438,五位 0.360。创始人能力相同时,不均分也没有帮助:六四分是 0.740,七三分 0.710,九一分只有 0.590,因为小股东努力的下降超过大股东努力的上升。这个损失不是哪一方的品德问题,而是努力看不见、回报被分享时每个人的自然做法。
霍姆斯特罗姆的团队目标
霍姆斯特罗姆的出路是:只有当产出达到最优水平时才把份额付给团队,没达到时由团队以外的人(通常是投资人)留下产出。在没有噪声的世界里,全力努力就成为均衡:谁松懈,谁就毁掉自己的份额。p02 给产出加上噪声。
推导
# Chapter 1. p02: A group target with noisy output. Holmstrom showed
# that a rule paying the team its shares only if output reaches a
# target can restore first-best effort, but someone outside the team
# (an investor, the "budget breaker") must keep the output when the
# target is missed. Two founders, theta = c = 1: output
# Y = e_1 + e_2 + noise (sd sigma). Each founder gets Y / 2 if Y >= 2
# (the first-best output), else nothing. Symmetric Nash efforts are the
# fixed points of the best response on a grid (step 0.0025, within one
# step). Reported:
# the highest one, the chance the target is missed although both make
# that effort, and the share of expected output the founders forfeit.
from math import erf, exp, pi, sqrt
def Phi(x):
return 0.5 * (1 + erf(x / sqrt(2)))
def phi(x):
return exp(-x * x / 2) / sqrt(2 * pi)
def paid(mu, sigma, t=2.0):
# E[Y 1{Y >= t}] for Y ~ normal(mu, sigma)
if sigma == 0:
return mu if mu >= t - 1e-9 else 0.0
z = (t - mu) / sigma
return mu * (1 - Phi(z)) + sigma * phi(z)
GRID = [i / 400 for i in range(0, 601)]
def best(other, sigma):
return max(GRID, key=lambda e: 0.5 * paid(e + other, sigma) - e * e / 2)
def equilibria(sigma):
return [e for e in GRID if abs(best(e, sigma) - e) <= 0.0025]
if __name__ == "__main__":
print(" noise sd effort target missed output forfeited"
" efficiency")
for sigma in (0.0, 0.1, 0.3, 0.6):
e = max(equilibria(sigma))
mu = 2 * e
miss = (0.0 if mu >= 2 else 1.0) if sigma == 0 else \
1 - Phi((mu - 2) / sigma)
lost = 1 - paid(mu, sigma) / mu
print(" {:8.1f} {:6.3f} {:13.3f} {:16.3f} {:10.3f}".format(
sigma, e, miss, lost, 2 * e - e * e))
print(" equal shares, no target: effort 0.500, efficiency 0.750")
print(" zero effort is also an equilibrium at sd 0.0: {}".format(
0.0 in equilibria(0.0)))
# noise sd effort target missed output forfeited efficiency
# 0.0 1.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
# 0.1 1.097 0.026 0.023 0.990
# 0.3 1.165 0.136 0.108 0.973
# 0.6 0.005 1.000 0.902 0.010
# equal shares, no target: effort 0.500, efficiency 0.750
# zero effort is also an equilibrium at sd 0.0: True没有噪声时,这条规则恢复全力努力(效率 1.000),不过零努力也是一个均衡。噪声小时(标准差 0.1),创始人为了确保达标,各自努力 1.097,超过最优,仍有 0.026 的机会达不到;效率 0.990。噪声为 0.3 时,各自努力 1.165,有 0.136 的机会达不到,损失预期产出的 0.108,效率 0.973。噪声为 0.6 时,好的均衡消失:目标太不确定,努力保证不了它,创始人干脆放弃,效率跌到 0.010,远低于单纯均分的 0.750。集体惩罚对能掌控结果的团队是有力的工具,对不能掌控结果的团队则很危险。
假说 · 尚未验证
作者的诠释(尚未验证): 在创始人持有固定均等股份的初创公司里,创始人自报的工作时数与产出,低于股权与业绩挂钩的创始人,而且差距随创始人人数增加而扩大。什么会证明它错: 在一项对可比初创公司的预先登记调查中,把公司阶段与融资固定之后,创始人的努力与股权结构无关,或者差距不随创始人人数增加。
小结
努力无法核实时,固定均分让两位创始人损失四分之一的价值,人数越多损失越大;调整比例没有帮助。如果结果主要取决于努力,团队目标可以恢复努力;但在大噪声下,它可能把努力摧毁。
参考文献
Fan, Y. (2026). Shareholder Free-Riding Games, Dynamic Vesting Mechanisms and Defection Early-Warning Models: Moral-Hazard Equity Dilution, Shotgun Buy-Sell Clauses and Behavioral Divergence Signals [股东搭便车博弈、动态股权成熟与背刺早期预警模型] (Version 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090243 · Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).