5D Library › 股东搭便车博弈、动态股权成熟与背刺早期预警模型 · English
第四章 沙普利值与贡献的漂移
每位创始人加了什么
如果股权应当跟着贡献走,就必须定义贡献。沙普利值为任何一种「群体可以创造价值」的博弈下了定义:它把每个参与者在所有可能的到场顺序中的边际贡献平均起来 (Shapley 1953)。p07 把它用于三位创始人:一位带来技术,一位带来销售渠道,一位带来资金与牌照。各个群体独自能创造的价值都是示意。
推导
# Chapter 4. p07: Shapley value of three founders. A = technology,
# B = sales channel, C = capital and licences. v(S) is the yearly value
# a coalition S could create on its own (illustrative): alone A 2, B 1,
# C 0; AB 8, AC 5, BC 3; ABC 12. The Shapley value averages each
# founder's marginal contribution over all orders of arrival. It is
# compared with an equal split and with a split by capital put in
# (A 10%, B 10%, C 80%).
from itertools import permutations
V = {"": 0, "A": 2, "B": 1, "C": 0, "AB": 8, "AC": 5, "BC": 3, "ABC": 12}
def key(s):
return "".join(sorted(s))
def shapley(v, players="ABC"):
out = {p: 0.0 for p in players}
orders = list(permutations(players))
for order in orders:
have = ""
for p in order:
out[p] += v[key(have + p)] - v[key(have)]
have += p
return {p: x / len(orders) for p, x in out.items()}
if __name__ == "__main__":
sh = shapley(V)
total = V["ABC"]
print(" founder Shapley share equal by capital")
for p, cap in zip("ABC", (0.10, 0.10, 0.80)):
print(" {:7} {:7.3f} {:5.3f} {:5.3f} {:10.3f}".format(
p, sh[p], sh[p] / total, 1 / 3, cap))
core = all(sum(sh[p] for p in s) >= V[key(s)] - 1e-9
for s in ("A", "B", "C", "AB", "AC", "BC"))
print(" Shapley split is in the core: {}".format(core))
print(" AB alone could make {} > A + B under capital split {:.1f}"
.format(V["AB"], 0.2 * total))
# founder Shapley share equal by capital
# A 5.667 0.472 0.333 0.100
# B 4.167 0.347 0.333 0.100
# C 2.167 0.181 0.333 0.800
# Shapley split is in the core: True
# AB alone could make 8 > A + B under capital split 2.4沙普利值给技术创始人 12 单位中的 5.667(份额 0.472),销售创始人 4.167(0.347),资金创始人 2.167(0.181)。均分给每人 0.333,按出资分则给资金创始人 0.800。沙普利分配位于核心之中:没有任何群体离开会更好。按出资分配则不然:两位干活的创始人自己就能创造 8,却只分到公司价值的 2.4。资金创始人的钱有分量,但在这个博弈里,它的贡献小于另外两人的工作,而且通常可以作为投资来定价,而不是作为创始人股权。
观察漂移
如果有一位创始人悄悄撤出,同样的算术能否用作早期预警?p08 每个季度带噪声地测量每个群体的价值,并让创始人 C 从第 5 季度起撤出自己一半的贡献,使 C 的真实份额从 0.181 降到 0.111。
推导
# Chapter 4. p08: Watching contributions drift. Each quarter the value
# of every coalition is measured with noise (each v(S) times a
# lognormal factor, log-sd 0.25). From quarter 5 on, founder C quietly
# withdraws half of C's contribution: every v(S) containing C loses
# 1.5. C's Shapley share is recomputed each quarter; the alarm sounds
# when C's share averaged over the last k quarters falls 0.05 below its
# average in quarters 1 to 4. How long until it sounds, and how often
# it sounds by quarter 12 when nothing has changed? 4,000 runs, seed 93.
import random
from math import exp
from itertools import permutations
BASE = {"A": 2, "B": 1, "C": 0, "AB": 8, "AC": 5, "BC": 3, "ABC": 12}
def shapley_c(v):
tot = 0.0
for order in permutations("ABC"):
have = ""
for p in order:
if p == "C":
k1 = "".join(sorted(have + "C"))
tot += v[k1] - (v["".join(sorted(have))] if have else 0)
have += p
return tot / 6 / v["ABC"]
def quarter(rng, q, change=True):
v = {}
for s, x in BASE.items():
x = x - (1.5 if change and q >= 5 and "C" in s and x >= 1.5
else 0)
v[s] = x * exp(rng.gauss(0, 0.25))
return shapley_c(v)
def run(rng, k, change=True):
shares = [quarter(rng, q, change) for q in range(1, 13)]
base = sum(shares[:4]) / 4
for q in range(4 + k, 13):
if sum(shares[q - k:q]) / k < base - 0.05:
return q, shares
return None, shares
if __name__ == "__main__":
rng = random.Random(93)
print(" true C share: before {:.3f}, after {:.3f}".format(
shapley_c({s: x for s, x in BASE.items()}),
shapley_c({s: x - (1.5 if "C" in s and x >= 1.5 else 0)
for s, x in BASE.items()})))
print(" window k alarm by q8 by q12 median q false alarm")
for k in (1, 2, 4):
qs = [run(rng, k)[0] for _ in range(4000)]
hit = sorted(q for q in qs if q is not None)
med = hit[len(hit) // 2] if hit else 0
fa = sum(1 for _ in range(4000) if run(rng, k, False)[0]) / 4000
print(" {:8d} {:11.3f} {:6.3f} {:8d} {:11.3f}".format(
k, sum(1 for q in qs if q and q <= 8) / 4000,
len(hit) / 4000, med, fa))
# true C share: before 0.181, after 0.111
# window k alarm by q8 by q12 median q false alarm
# 1 0.922 0.981 5 0.823
# 2 0.827 0.942 6 0.593
# 4 0.649 0.846 8 0.358把每个季度与前四个季度比较的警报,在 C 真的撤出的情形中,到第 8 季度有 0.922 会响。但在什么都没有改变的情形中,到第 12 季度也有 0.823 会响。取两个季度平均,误报降到 0.593;取四个季度,降到 0.358,而到第 8 季度的发现率降到 0.649。实测贡献太嘈杂,不足以指控任何人;它适合用来讨论股权分配,而不能作为恶意的证据。
假说 · 尚未验证
作者的诠释(尚未验证): 以沙普利值等明确的贡献方法确定股权的创始团队,日后为股权分配发生的争议,少于按默认均分的团队。什么会证明它错: 在一项对创始团队的预先登记调查中,把团队人数与融资固定之后,确定股权的方法与日后的争议无关。
小结
沙普利值把「股权应当跟着贡献走」变成可以计算的分配,在例子里它与均分、按出资分都大不相同。但作为贡献变化的监测器,它太嘈杂:它的警报大多会是假的。
参考文献
Fan, Y. (2026). Shareholder Free-Riding Games, Dynamic Vesting Mechanisms and Defection Early-Warning Models: Moral-Hazard Equity Dilution, Shotgun Buy-Sell Clauses and Behavioral Divergence Signals [股东搭便车博弈、动态股权成熟与背刺早期预警模型] (Version 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090243 · Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).