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Chapter 3. The Shotgun Clause: Who Gains When Information and Cash Are Unequal

The clause and its promise

Many shareholder agreements between two equal partners contain a buy-sell clause, often called a shotgun or Russian roulette clause: either partner may name a price for half the firm, and the other must then either buy at that price or sell at it. Because the person naming the price does not know which way the other will choose, the clause seems to force an honest price. The economics of dissolving partnerships shows that this is true only under special conditions (Cramton et al. 1987; McAfee 1992), and experiments with “Texas shootouts” find that people do not play them as the simple theory says (Brooks et al. 2010).

Private values

p05 lets the responder’s value of the whole firm be known only to the responder, spread evenly between 0 and 1. The offerer names a price pp for half; the responder buys if their value exceeds 2p2p and sells otherwise. The offerer’s expected payoff is (1−2p)p+2p(vO−p)(1-2p)p + 2p(v_O – p), which is largest at p*=(1+2vO)/8p^* = (1 + 2v_O)/8.

Calculation

# Chapter 3. p05: The shotgun (Russian roulette) clause. Two 50 / 50
# partners. The offerer O names a price p for half the firm; the
# responder R must either buy O's half at p or sell R's half at p.
# R values the whole firm at v_R, uniform on 0 to 1, known only to R;
# O values it at v_O. R buys if v_R - p > p, that is v_R > 2 p. O's
# expected payoff is
#   (1 - 2p) p + 2p (v_O - p)   =>   best p* = (1 + 2 v_O) / 8,
# against the "honest" price v_O / 2. O shades toward the middle; R,
# who chooses after seeing p, gains on average.
def o_payoff(p, vo):
    q = min(1.0, 2 * p)              # chance R sells
    return (1 - q) * p + q * (vo - p)

def r_payoff(p):
    # E max(v_R - p, p) over v_R ~ U(0, 1)
    k = min(1.0, 2 * p)
    return k * p + (1 - k * k) / 2 - p * (1 - k)

if __name__ == "__main__":
    print("   v_O    p*      honest v_O/2   O at p*   O at honest   R at p*")
    for vo in (0.2, 0.5, 0.8):
        ps = (1 + 2 * vo) / 8
        print("   {:.1f}   {:.4f}   {:12.4f}   {:7.4f}   {:11.4f}   {:7.4f}"
              .format(vo, ps, vo / 2, o_payoff(ps, vo), o_payoff(vo / 2, vo),
                      r_payoff(ps)))
    print("   R's value of half the firm on average: {:.4f}".format(0.25))
#    v_O    p*      honest v_O/2   O at p*   O at honest   R at p*
#    0.2   0.1750         0.1000    0.1225        0.1000    0.3862
#    0.5   0.2500         0.2500    0.2500        0.2500    0.3750
#    0.8   0.3250         0.4000    0.4225        0.4000    0.3862
#    R's value of half the firm on average: 0.2500

An offerer who values the firm at 0.5, the average, names the honest price 0.2500. But an offerer who values it at 0.2 names 0.1750 instead of 0.1000, and one who values it at 0.8 names 0.3250 instead of 0.4000: both shade toward the middle, and both do better than with the honest price (0.1225 against 0.1000, and 0.4225 against 0.4000). The responder, who chooses after seeing the price, expects 0.3750 to 0.3862, well above the 0.2500 that half the firm is worth on average. The clause rewards the one who chooses, not the one who names; partners who know this will wait for the other to trigger it.

The offerer’s expected payoff by the price named, with the best price marked (p05).

Unequal cash

The promise of the clause also assumes that either partner can pay. p06 keeps the value of the firm known to both (worth 1) but lets the responder raise at most a budget bb.

Calculation

# Chapter 3. p06: When the responder cannot pay. Same clause as p05,
# but both partners know the firm is worth 1 and R can raise at most
# a budget b to buy O's half. If p > b, R cannot buy and must sell at
# p, so O names p just above b (here b + 0.01) whenever that is below
# the fair 0.5. R's loss against the fair price, by budget. Then the
# "Texas shootout" variant: sealed bids, the higher bidder buys at its
# own bid; a cash-poor R can bid at most b, so O bids b + 0.01 too.
# A clause with a financing period (R may raise money for 90 days at
# a cost of 5% of the amount) removes most of the gap.
if __name__ == "__main__":
    print("   R's budget b   O's price   R's loss vs fair 0.5"
          "   loss with financing")
    for b in (0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5):
        p = min(0.5, b + 0.01)
        loss = 0.5 - p
        fin = 0.0 if b >= 0.5 else 0.05 * 0.5
        print("   {:12.1f}   {:9.2f}   {:20.2f}   {:21.3f}".format(
            b, p, loss, fin))
    print("   Texas shootout with b = 0.2: O buys at {:.2f}".format(0.21))
#    R's budget b   O's price   R's loss vs fair 0.5   loss with financing
#             0.1        0.11                   0.39                   0.025
#             0.2        0.21                   0.29                   0.025
#             0.3        0.31                   0.19                   0.025
#             0.4        0.41                   0.09                   0.025
#             0.5        0.50                   0.00                   0.000
#    Texas shootout with b = 0.2: O buys at 0.21

If the responder can raise only 0.1, the offerer names 0.11, a price at which the responder cannot buy and must sell; the responder loses 0.39 against the fair 0.5. With a budget of 0.2 the loss is 0.29, and with 0.4 it is 0.09. A sealed-bid Texas shootout does not help: the cash-poor partner can bid at most 0.2, and the other buys at 0.21. A financing period, in which the responder may raise money for 90 days at a cost, reduces the loss to the cost of finance, 0.025 in the example. In a partnership of unequal wealth, the clause is a weapon for the richer side unless it comes with such a period or a valuation floor.

Hypothesis · not established

The author’s interpretation (not yet tested): in disputes under shotgun clauses, the partner with greater access to finance triggers the clause more often and obtains prices below independent valuations. What would show it wrong: in a pre-registered study of resolved buy-sell disputes with independent valuations, the triggering party’s price is no lower relative to valuation when that party has the greater access to finance.

Summary

With private values the price-setter shades toward the middle and the chooser gains; with unequal cash the richer partner can name a low price that the poorer cannot meet. A shotgun clause needs a financing period or a valuation floor to keep its promise.

References

Brooks, Richard R. W., Claudia M. Landeo, and Kathryn E. Spier. 2010. “Trigger Happy or Gun Shy? Dissolving Common-Value Partnerships with Texas Shootouts.” The RAND Journal of Economics 41 (4): 649 to 673.
Cramton, Peter, Robert Gibbons, and Paul Klemperer. 1987. “Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently.” Econometrica 55 (3): 615 to 632.
McAfee, R. Preston. 1992. “Amicable Divorce: Dissolving a Partnership with Simple Mechanisms.” Journal of Economic Theory 56 (2): 266 to 293.

Fan, Y. (2026). Shareholder Free-Riding Games, Dynamic Vesting Mechanisms and Defection Early-Warning Models: Moral-Hazard Equity Dilution, Shotgun Buy-Sell Clauses and Behavioral Divergence Signals [股东搭便车博弈、动态股权成熟与背刺早期预警模型] (Version 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090243 · Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).