关于「东西方原典考辨:「大道甚夷,而民好径」与庇古的两条路」,《入口加法与协同层的均衡代价》给出的定量结论是什么?
结论:程序 p71 把「大道甚夷,而民好径」写成庇古形状的两条路:只要还有人走大路,小路就被挤到与大路一样慢,走小路的人一无所获;最优分流能把平均从 10.000 降到 9.000。古人对行为的描述是对的,对原因的道德归因可以被模型反驳。程序 p72 检验了奈特对庇古的批评:大路不拥挤时,所有者的通行费 4.000 恰好是最优通行费;大路也拥挤时,所有者把通行费抬到 6.500,平均 11.440,仍高于最优的 11.143。最后一章要把这些模型变成一个经营者可以执行的闭环:怎样在不伤害顾客的前提下,做一次真正能推翻本书的实验?
数据口径:书中参数为示意;全部计算由书中程序生成;本书是非个人化经营建议,任何删入口、撤协同层的生产变更须由主事者人工复核放行。 书中以标注框区分已发表的证据、可运行的 Python 计算(21 段程序)、原典与作者的假说。
对照数据表
下表数字由本章 Python 程序原样打印,可重新运行复现。 程序只用 Python 标准库与结论吻合的打印值: 11.143, 11.440, 4.000, 6.500, 9.000
| broad-road slope c | share: free | best | owner | | owner toll | best toll | |
| 0 | 0.500 | 0.250 | 0.250 | | | 4.000 | 4.000 |
| 2 | 0.556 | 0.333 | 0.278 | | | 5.000 | 4.000 |
| 5 | 0.619 | 0.429 | 0.310 | | | 6.500 | 4.000 |
| 10 | 0.692 | 0.538 | 0.346 | | | 9.000 | 4.000 |
| c = 5: average time free 11.905, owner 11.440, best 11.143 | ||||||
| c = 0: owner toll 4 equals the best toll 4: True |
查看完整验算程序
# Chapter 7. p72: Knight (1924) answered Pigou (1920): if the narrow,
# good road had an owner, the owner's own toll would produce the ideal
# split with no tax. Check it in exact fractions, then add congestion to
# the broad road too and see where the claim stops holding.
# Narrow road a + b x, broad road R + c (1 - x), demand 1, x = share on
# the narrow road; the owner maximises toll * x. Values illustrative.
from fractions import Fraction as F
def cases(a, b, R, c):
x_ue = min(F(1), (R + c - a) / (b + c))
x_so = min(F(1), (R + 2 * c - a) / (2 * (b + c)))
tau_own = (R + c - a) / 2 # argmax of tau * x(tau)
x_own = (R + c - a - tau_own) / (b + c)
# the one toll on the narrow road that yields the best split:
# its marginal damage minus the broad road's
tau_pig = b * x_so - c * (1 - x_so)
def avg(x):
return x * (a + b * x) + (1 - x) * (R + c * (1 - x))
return x_ue, x_so, x_own, tau_own, tau_pig, avg
print("broad-road slope c share: free best owner |"
" owner toll best toll")
for c in (F(0), F(2), F(5), F(10)):
x_ue, x_so, x_own, t_own, t_pig, avg = cases(F(2), F(16), F(10), c)
print(" %3s %5.3f %5.3f %5.3f |"
" %6.3f %6.3f"
% (c, float(x_ue), float(x_so), float(x_own), float(t_own),
float(t_pig)))
print()
x_ue, x_so, x_own, t_own, t_pig, avg = cases(F(2), F(16), F(10), F(5))
print("c = 5: average time free %.3f, owner %.3f, best %.3f"
% (float(avg(x_ue)), float(avg(x_own)), float(avg(x_so))))
x_ue, x_so, x_own, t_own, t_pig, avg = cases(F(2), F(16), F(10), F(0))
print("c = 0: owner toll %s equals the best toll %s: %s"
% (t_own, t_pig, t_own == t_pig))唯一数据源与引用
范雅福(Fan, Y.). (2026). 《布雷斯悖论瓦德罗普均衡、购买入口加法反效与协同层级的无秩序代价母典》第 7 章「东西方原典考辨:「大道甚夷,而民好径」与庇古的两条路」(版本 1.0.0). 5D Library. DOI 待发布
DOI 待发布 · 专著页正式发布后上线(本站暂无专著页) · 5DL-B-246 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026246,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Braess's Paradox and Wardrop Equilibrium: When One More Purchase Entry or One More Coordination Layer Slows Everyone Down},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}