关于「两条原则:瓦德罗普均衡与「一键直达」让每位买家多等四分钟」,《入口加法与协同层的均衡代价》给出的定量结论是什么?
结论:瓦德罗普第一原则描述买家各自选路的结果,第二原则描述平均等待最短的结果。程序 p11 显示,一条拥挤的快车道在用户均衡下被用到与标准结账一样慢,平均 10.000 分钟,而最优分流只需 7.500,比值 1.3333。程序 p12 显示,一个零成本的「一键直达」入口让每位买家从 12 分钟变成 16 分钟,没有人能单独换路变快。下一章回到布雷斯的原始网络,追问一个更尖锐的问题:在什么样的需求下,新入口才会伤人?
数据口径:书中参数为示意;全部计算由书中程序生成;本书是非个人化经营建议,任何删入口、撤协同层的生产变更须由主事者人工复核放行。 书中以标注框区分已发表的证据、可运行的 Python 计算(21 段程序)、原典与作者的假说。
对照数据表
下表数字由本章 Python 程序原样打印,可重新运行复现。 程序只用 Python 标准库与结论吻合的打印值: 1.3333, 10.000, 7.500
| share on fast lane, minutes on each entry, average minutes | |
| share fast lane standard average | |
| 0 | 0.000 10.000 10.000 |
| 1/4 | 2.500 10.000 8.125 |
| 1/2 | 5.000 10.000 7.500 |
| 3/4 | 7.500 10.000 8.125 |
| 1 | 10.000 10.000 10.000 |
| Wardrop 1 (each buyer for himself): share 1 | |
| 1 | 10.000 10.000 10.000 <- user equilibrium |
| Wardrop 2 (least average wait): share 1/2 | |
| 1/2 | 5.000 10.000 7.500 <- system optimum |
| ratio of averages | 4/3 = 1.3333 |
| fast-lane users in the optimum wait 5, standard users 10 |
查看完整验算程序
# Chapter 1. p11: two purchase entries in exact fractions - where buyers
# settle on their own (Wardrop's first principle) and where the average
# wait is least (his second principle).
# Model (illustrative, Pigou's two-road shape): one hundred buyers an
# hour (demand normalised to 1). The standard checkout always takes
# 10 minutes. The fast lane is a human order desk whose wait is
# 10 * s minutes when a share s of buyers uses it.
from fractions import Fraction as F
T_STD = F(10)
SLOPE = F(10)
def wait_fast(s):
return SLOPE * s
def average(s):
return s * wait_fast(s) + (1 - s) * T_STD
def show(s, tag=""):
line = (" %5s %7.3f %8.3f %8.3f %s"
% (str(s), float(wait_fast(s)), float(T_STD),
float(average(s)), tag))
print(line.rstrip())
print("share on fast lane, minutes on each entry, average minutes")
print(" share fast lane standard average")
for k in range(5):
show(F(k, 4))
# Wardrop 1: every used entry has the same wait, none used is shorter.
# The fast lane is never slower than 10 until s = 1, so all take it.
s_ue = min(F(1), T_STD / SLOPE)
# Wardrop 2: minimise s * 10 s + (1 - s) * 10; derivative 20 s - 10 = 0
s_so = (T_STD / SLOPE) / 2
print()
print("Wardrop 1 (each buyer for himself): share %s" % s_ue)
show(s_ue, "<- user equilibrium")
print("Wardrop 2 (least average wait): share %s" % s_so)
show(s_so, "<- system optimum")
poa = average(s_ue) / average(s_so)
print("ratio of averages = %s = %.4f" % (poa, float(poa)))
print("fast-lane users in the optimum wait %s, standard users %s"
% (wait_fast(s_so), T_STD))唯一数据源与引用
范雅福(Fan, Y.). (2026). 《布雷斯悖论瓦德罗普均衡、购买入口加法反效与协同层级的无秩序代价母典》第 1 章「两条原则:瓦德罗普均衡与「一键直达」让每位买家多等四分钟」(版本 1.0.0). 5D Library. DOI 待发布
DOI 待发布 · 专著页正式发布后上线(本站暂无专著页) · 5DL-B-246 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026246,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Braess's Paradox and Wardrop Equilibrium: When One More Purchase Entry or One More Coordination Layer Slows Everyone Down},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}