关于「反方证据:悖论有多常见、买家知道多少、新入口带来多少新客」,《入口加法与协同层的均衡代价》给出的定量结论是什么?

结论:第六章陈列反方证据:随机网络里新链路有害的比例只有 0.020 到 0.084,买家信息越模糊害处越小,新入口带来约 10.0 % 新客即可扭亏。

数据口径:书中参数为示意;全部计算由书中程序生成;本书是非个人化经营建议,任何删入口、撤协同层的生产变更须由主事者人工复核放行。 书中以标注框区分已发表的证据、可运行的 Python 计算(21 段程序)、原典与作者的假说。

English version

对照数据表

下表数字由本章 Python 程序原样打印,可重新运行复现。 程序只用 Python 标准库与结论吻合的打印值: 0.020, 0.084

4000 random Braess-shaped networks per scheme
shortcut fixed waithurtshelpsno changehurt|changedworst
0..500.0200.1080.8720.1551.0572
0..50.0840.3010.6150.2181.0938
ceiling for affine waits: 4/3 = 1.3333
查看完整验算程序
# Chapter 6. p61: how often does a new link hurt? Draw 4000 random
# four-node networks of Braess's shape (s-v, v-t, s-w, w-t, plus the
# candidate v-w) with affine waits a + b x, integer a in 0..50, b in
# 0..10, demand in 1..10 (an illustrative sampling scheme, not the one
# of Steinberg and Zangwill 1983). Equilibria are solved exactly in
# fractions by testing every support of the three routes.
import itertools
import random
from fractions import Fraction as F

PATHS = [(0, 1), (2, 3), (0, 4, 3)]


def solve(eqs):
    # Gauss-Jordan on a square system of Fractions; None if singular
    n = len(eqs)
    m = [row[:] for row in eqs]
    for c in range(n):
        p = next((r for r in range(c, n) if m[r][c] != 0), None)
        if p is None:
            return None
        m[c], m[p] = m[p], m[c]
        for r in range(n):
            if r != c and m[r][c] != 0:
                f = m[r][c] / m[c][c]
                m[r] = [x - f * y for x, y in zip(m[r], m[c])]
    return [m[r][n] / m[r][r] for r in range(n)]


def equilibrium(a, b, d, paths):
    np_ = len(paths)
    for r in range(1, np_ + 1):
        for sup in itertools.combinations(range(np_), r):
            # unknowns: flows on sup, then common cost lam
            eqs = []
            for p in sup:
                row = []
                for q in sup:
                    row.append(F(0) + b_shared(b, paths[p], paths[q]))
                const = F(0)
                for e in paths[p]:
                    const += a[e]
                eqs.append(row + [F(-1), -const])
            eqs.append([F(1)] * r + [F(0), F(d)])
            sol = solve(eqs)
            if sol is None or min(sol[:r]) < 0:
                continue
            f = [F(0)] * np_
            for p, v in zip(sup, sol[:r]):
                f[p] = v
            lam = sol[r]
            ok = True
            for p in range(np_):
                if p not in sup and path_cost(a, b, f, paths, p) < lam:
                    ok = False
            if ok:
                return lam
    return None


def b_shared(b, p, q):
    return sum_ints(b[e] for e in p if e in q)


def sum_ints(it):
    t = 0
    for v in it:
        t += v
    return t


def path_cost(a, b, f, paths, p):
    c = F(0)
    for e in paths[p]:
        x = F(0)
        for q, fq in enumerate(f):
            if e in paths[q]:
                x += fq
        c += a[e] + b[e] * x
    return c


def scheme(rng, top):
    worse = better = same = used = worse_used = 0
    worst = F(1)
    for _ in range(4000):
        a = [rng.randint(0, 50) for _ in range(4)] + [rng.randint(0, top)]
        b = [rng.randint(0, 10) for _ in range(5)]
        d = rng.randint(1, 10)
        c0 = equilibrium(a, b, d, PATHS[:2])
        c1 = equilibrium(a, b, d, PATHS)
        if c1 > c0:
            worse += 1
        elif c1 < c0:
            better += 1
        else:
            same += 1
        if c1 != c0:
            used += 1
            worse_used += c1 > c0
        if c0 > 0 and c1 / c0 > worst:
            worst = c1 / c0
    return worse, better, same, used, worse_used, worst


rng = random.Random(20261113)
print("4000 random Braess-shaped networks per scheme")
print("shortcut fixed wait  hurts   helps   no change  hurt|changed  worst")
for top in (50, 5):
    w, b_, s, u, wu, worst = scheme(rng, top)
    print("   0..%-2d            %.3f   %.3f    %.3f       %.3f    %.4f"
          % (top, w / 4000, b_ / 4000, s / 4000, wu / u, float(worst)))
print("ceiling for affine waits: 4/3 = %.4f" % (4 / 3))

唯一数据源与引用

范雅福(Fan, Y.). (2026). 《布雷斯悖论瓦德罗普均衡、购买入口加法反效与协同层级的无秩序代价母典》第 6 章「反方证据:悖论有多常见、买家知道多少、新入口带来多少新客」(版本 1.0.0). 5D Library. DOI 待发布

DOI 待发布 · 专著页正式发布后上线(本站暂无专著页) · 5DL-B-246 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026246,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Braess's Paradox and Wardrop Equilibrium: When One More Purchase Entry or One More Coordination Layer Slows Everyone Down},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  note      = {DOI pending}
}

本书其他章节结论