关于「反方证据:悖论有多常见、买家知道多少、新入口带来多少新客」,《入口加法与协同层的均衡代价》给出的定量结论是什么?
结论:第六章陈列反方证据:随机网络里新链路有害的比例只有 0.020 到 0.084,买家信息越模糊害处越小,新入口带来约 10.0 % 新客即可扭亏。
数据口径:书中参数为示意;全部计算由书中程序生成;本书是非个人化经营建议,任何删入口、撤协同层的生产变更须由主事者人工复核放行。 书中以标注框区分已发表的证据、可运行的 Python 计算(21 段程序)、原典与作者的假说。
对照数据表
下表数字由本章 Python 程序原样打印,可重新运行复现。 程序只用 Python 标准库与结论吻合的打印值: 0.020, 0.084
| 4000 random Braess-shaped networks per scheme | |||||
| shortcut fixed wait | hurts | helps | no change | hurt|changed | worst |
| 0..50 | 0.020 | 0.108 | 0.872 | 0.155 | 1.0572 |
| 0..5 | 0.084 | 0.301 | 0.615 | 0.218 | 1.0938 |
| ceiling for affine waits: 4/3 = 1.3333 |
查看完整验算程序
# Chapter 6. p61: how often does a new link hurt? Draw 4000 random
# four-node networks of Braess's shape (s-v, v-t, s-w, w-t, plus the
# candidate v-w) with affine waits a + b x, integer a in 0..50, b in
# 0..10, demand in 1..10 (an illustrative sampling scheme, not the one
# of Steinberg and Zangwill 1983). Equilibria are solved exactly in
# fractions by testing every support of the three routes.
import itertools
import random
from fractions import Fraction as F
PATHS = [(0, 1), (2, 3), (0, 4, 3)]
def solve(eqs):
# Gauss-Jordan on a square system of Fractions; None if singular
n = len(eqs)
m = [row[:] for row in eqs]
for c in range(n):
p = next((r for r in range(c, n) if m[r][c] != 0), None)
if p is None:
return None
m[c], m[p] = m[p], m[c]
for r in range(n):
if r != c and m[r][c] != 0:
f = m[r][c] / m[c][c]
m[r] = [x - f * y for x, y in zip(m[r], m[c])]
return [m[r][n] / m[r][r] for r in range(n)]
def equilibrium(a, b, d, paths):
np_ = len(paths)
for r in range(1, np_ + 1):
for sup in itertools.combinations(range(np_), r):
# unknowns: flows on sup, then common cost lam
eqs = []
for p in sup:
row = []
for q in sup:
row.append(F(0) + b_shared(b, paths[p], paths[q]))
const = F(0)
for e in paths[p]:
const += a[e]
eqs.append(row + [F(-1), -const])
eqs.append([F(1)] * r + [F(0), F(d)])
sol = solve(eqs)
if sol is None or min(sol[:r]) < 0:
continue
f = [F(0)] * np_
for p, v in zip(sup, sol[:r]):
f[p] = v
lam = sol[r]
ok = True
for p in range(np_):
if p not in sup and path_cost(a, b, f, paths, p) < lam:
ok = False
if ok:
return lam
return None
def b_shared(b, p, q):
return sum_ints(b[e] for e in p if e in q)
def sum_ints(it):
t = 0
for v in it:
t += v
return t
def path_cost(a, b, f, paths, p):
c = F(0)
for e in paths[p]:
x = F(0)
for q, fq in enumerate(f):
if e in paths[q]:
x += fq
c += a[e] + b[e] * x
return c
def scheme(rng, top):
worse = better = same = used = worse_used = 0
worst = F(1)
for _ in range(4000):
a = [rng.randint(0, 50) for _ in range(4)] + [rng.randint(0, top)]
b = [rng.randint(0, 10) for _ in range(5)]
d = rng.randint(1, 10)
c0 = equilibrium(a, b, d, PATHS[:2])
c1 = equilibrium(a, b, d, PATHS)
if c1 > c0:
worse += 1
elif c1 < c0:
better += 1
else:
same += 1
if c1 != c0:
used += 1
worse_used += c1 > c0
if c0 > 0 and c1 / c0 > worst:
worst = c1 / c0
return worse, better, same, used, worse_used, worst
rng = random.Random(20261113)
print("4000 random Braess-shaped networks per scheme")
print("shortcut fixed wait hurts helps no change hurt|changed worst")
for top in (50, 5):
w, b_, s, u, wu, worst = scheme(rng, top)
print(" 0..%-2d %.3f %.3f %.3f %.3f %.4f"
% (top, w / 4000, b_ / 4000, s / 4000, wu / u, float(worst)))
print("ceiling for affine waits: 4/3 = %.4f" % (4 / 3))唯一数据源与引用
范雅福(Fan, Y.). (2026). 《布雷斯悖论瓦德罗普均衡、购买入口加法反效与协同层级的无秩序代价母典》第 6 章「反方证据:悖论有多常见、买家知道多少、新入口带来多少新客」(版本 1.0.0). 5D Library. DOI 待发布
DOI 待发布 · 专著页正式发布后上线(本站暂无专著页) · 5DL-B-246 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026246,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Braess's Paradox and Wardrop Equilibrium: When One More Purchase Entry or One More Coordination Layer Slows Everyone Down},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}