What does Extra Entries, Extra Layers conclude, in numbers, about “Classical Sources East and West: "The Great Road Is Very Smooth, yet People Love the Byways" and Pigou's Two Roads”?
Answer: Program p71 writes "the great road is very smooth, yet the people love byways" as Pigou's two roads: as long as anyone uses the main road, the byway is squeezed until it is exactly as slow, and those who take it gain nothing; the optimal split could lower the average from 10.000 to 9.000. The ancient description of behaviour is right; its moral attribution of the cause can be refuted by the model. Program p72 tests Knight's criticism of Pigou: when the main road is uncongested, the owner's toll of 4.000 is exactly the optimal toll; when the main road congests too, the owner raises his toll to 6.500 and the average, 11.440, stays above the optimal 11.143. The last chapter turns these models into a loop an owner can execute: how can one run, without harming customers, an experiment that could actually overturn this book?
Scope of the numbers: Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (21 programs), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 11.143, 11.440, 4.000, 6.500, 9.000
| broad-road slope c | share: free | best | owner | | owner toll | best toll | |
| 0 | 0.500 | 0.250 | 0.250 | | | 4.000 | 4.000 |
| 2 | 0.556 | 0.333 | 0.278 | | | 5.000 | 4.000 |
| 5 | 0.619 | 0.429 | 0.310 | | | 6.500 | 4.000 |
| 10 | 0.692 | 0.538 | 0.346 | | | 9.000 | 4.000 |
| c = 5: average time free 11.905, owner 11.440, best 11.143 | ||||||
| c = 0: owner toll 4 equals the best toll 4: True |
Show the full program
# Chapter 7. p72: Knight (1924) answered Pigou (1920): if the narrow,
# good road had an owner, the owner's own toll would produce the ideal
# split with no tax. Check it in exact fractions, then add congestion to
# the broad road too and see where the claim stops holding.
# Narrow road a + b x, broad road R + c (1 - x), demand 1, x = share on
# the narrow road; the owner maximises toll * x. Values illustrative.
from fractions import Fraction as F
def cases(a, b, R, c):
x_ue = min(F(1), (R + c - a) / (b + c))
x_so = min(F(1), (R + 2 * c - a) / (2 * (b + c)))
tau_own = (R + c - a) / 2 # argmax of tau * x(tau)
x_own = (R + c - a - tau_own) / (b + c)
# the one toll on the narrow road that yields the best split:
# its marginal damage minus the broad road's
tau_pig = b * x_so - c * (1 - x_so)
def avg(x):
return x * (a + b * x) + (1 - x) * (R + c * (1 - x))
return x_ue, x_so, x_own, tau_own, tau_pig, avg
print("broad-road slope c share: free best owner |"
" owner toll best toll")
for c in (F(0), F(2), F(5), F(10)):
x_ue, x_so, x_own, t_own, t_pig, avg = cases(F(2), F(16), F(10), c)
print(" %3s %5.3f %5.3f %5.3f |"
" %6.3f %6.3f"
% (c, float(x_ue), float(x_so), float(x_own), float(t_own),
float(t_pig)))
print()
x_ue, x_so, x_own, t_own, t_pig, avg = cases(F(2), F(16), F(10), F(5))
print("c = 5: average time free %.3f, owner %.3f, best %.3f"
% (float(avg(x_ue)), float(avg(x_own)), float(avg(x_so))))
x_ue, x_so, x_own, t_own, t_pig, avg = cases(F(2), F(16), F(10), F(0))
print("c = 0: owner toll %s equals the best toll %s: %s"
% (t_own, t_pig, t_own == t_pig))Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Braess's Paradox and Wardrop Equilibrium: When One More Purchase Entry or One More Coordination Layer Slows Everyone Down (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 7: Classical Sources East and West: "The Great Road Is Very Smooth, yet People Love the Byways" and Pigou's Two Roads. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-246 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026246,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Braess's Paradox and Wardrop Equilibrium: When One More Purchase Entry or One More Coordination Layer Slows Everyone Down},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · Two Principles: Wardrop Equilibrium, and How a "One-Tap" Entry Makes Every Buyer Wait Four Minutes Longer
- Chapter 2 · The Main Argument: the Demand Window of Braess's Paradox and the Limits of the Four-Thirds Ceiling
- Chapter 3 · Frank and Wolfe in the Standard Library: Equilibrium, Optimum and the Relative Gap
- Chapter 4 · Purchase Entries: a Funnel Network, Elastic Orders and an Audit that Closes Entries One at a Time
- Chapter 5 · Coordination Layers: the More Efficient a Pure Relay, the Slower Every Request
- Chapter 6 · The Opposing Evidence: How Common the Paradox Is, How Much Buyers Know, and How Many New Customers a New Entry Brings
- Chapter 8 · Closing the Loop: Whole-Block Switchback Tests for Entries, an Audit of Organisational Layers, and a Pre-Registered Protocol