关于「回声报复:噪音下一报还一报的精确马尔可夫链」,《依恋博弈与停火协议》给出的定量结论是什么?

结论:第一、二章说明回声从哪里来,并算出宽恕的安全窗口:执行噪音为 0.05 时,宽恕概率应在 0.0437 与 0.2811 之间,太少困在回声里,太多被占便宜;噪音到 0.10 时窗口关闭,此时该降低的是误读。

数据口径:书中参数均为示意,全部计算由书中程序生成。 本书不是心理咨询、医疗或法律建议,不宣称任何改变关系或身心状况的效果,也不写任何操控、冷暴力或情感勒索技巧;遇到家庭暴力、威胁、自伤风险或严重心理困扰,请立即联系当地紧急求助渠道与专业机构。

English version

对照数据表

下表数字由本章 Python 程序原样打印,可重新运行复现。 程序只用 Python 标准库与结论吻合的打印值: 0.05, 0.10

self-play: share of rounds in mutual C, and payoff per round
ruleeps=0.01 P(CC) payeps=0.05 P(CC) payeps=0.10 P(CC) pay
ALLC0.980 2.9900.902 2.9470.810 2.890
TFT0.250 2.2500.250 2.2500.250 2.250
GTFT 1/30.943 2.9700.766 2.8590.617 2.740
WSLS0.961 2.9510.817 2.7760.666 2.602
GRIM0.005 1.0400.025 1.1920.050 1.370
ALLD0.000 1.0300.003 1.1470.010 1.290
max payoff R = 3; at eps = 0.05 GRIM keeps few rounds in CC,
TFT sits at 0.25 for any eps, GTFT and WSLS stay well above.
查看完整验算程序
# Chapter 1. p13: six memory-one rules playing themselves under noise.
# Model: the exact four-state chain of p11 (payoffs T=5, R=3, P=1,
# S=0; each move flipped with probability eps). A rule is the vector
# of cooperation probabilities after CC, CD, DC, DD (own move first).
# GRIM never forgives a defection, the formal twin of a cold war;
# GTFT forgives a defection with probability 1/3; WSLS repeats a move
# that paid R or T and switches after S or P. eps is illustrative.
from fractions import Fraction as F
from functools import reduce
from operator import add

T, R, P, S = 5, 3, 1, 0
PAY = [R, S, T, P]
SWAP = [0, 2, 1, 3]
RULES = [("ALLC", [1, 1, 1, 1]), ("TFT", [1, 0, 1, 0]),
         ("GTFT 1/3", [1, F(1, 3), 1, F(1, 3)]), ("WSLS", [1, 0, 0, 1]),
         ("GRIM", [1, 0, 0, 0]), ("ALLD", [0, 0, 0, 0])]


def fsum_exact(xs):
    return reduce(add, xs, F(0))


def noisy(p, e):
    return (1 - e) * p + e * (1 - p)


def chain(s1, s2, e):
    rows = []
    for k in range(4):
        a = noisy(F(s1[k]), e)
        b = noisy(F(s2[SWAP[k]]), e)
        rows.append([a * b, a * (1 - b), (1 - a) * b, (1 - a) * (1 - b)])
    return rows


def solve(a, y):
    n = len(y)
    m = [row[:] + [y[i]] for i, row in enumerate(a)]
    for k in range(n):
        piv = next(r for r in range(k, n) if m[r][k] != 0)
        m[k], m[piv] = m[piv], m[k]
        for r in range(n):
            if r != k and m[r][k] != 0:
                f = m[r][k] / m[k][k]
                m[r] = [x - f * z for x, z in zip(m[r], m[k])]
    return [m[i][n] / m[i][i] for i in range(n)]


def stationary(mat):
    n = len(mat)
    a = [[mat[j][i] - (1 if i == j else 0) for j in range(n)]
         for i in range(n)]
    a[-1] = [F(1)] * n
    return solve(a, [F(0)] * (n - 1) + [F(1)])


EPS = (F(1, 100), F(1, 20), F(1, 10))
print("self-play: share of rounds in mutual C, and payoff per round")
print("rule       " + "".join("  eps=%.2f P(CC) pay" % float(e)
                              for e in EPS)[1:])
for name, rule in RULES:
    cells = []
    for e in EPS:
        pi = stationary(chain(rule, rule, e))
        pay = fsum_exact(p * v for p, v in zip(pi, PAY))
        cells.append("    %10.3f %5.3f" % (float(pi[0]), float(pay)))
    print("%-9s" % name + "".join(cells))
print("max payoff R = 3; at eps = 0.05 GRIM keeps few rounds in CC,")
print("TFT sits at 0.25 for any eps, GTFT and WSLS stay well above.")

唯一数据源与引用

范雅福(Fan, Y.). (2026). 《亲密关系依恋博弈与冲突停火协议、重复非零和博弈情绪衰减方程与创业伴侣冷战破局母典》第 1 章「回声报复:噪音下一报还一报的精确马尔可夫链」(版本 1.0.0). 5D Library. DOI 待发布

DOI 待发布 · 专著页正式发布后上线(本站暂无专著页) · 5DL-B-285 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026285,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Attachment Games and Ceasefire Protocols in Intimate Partnerships: Repeated Non-Zero-Sum Games, Emotion-Decay Equations and Ending Cold Wars between Founder Couples},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  note      = {DOI pending}
}

本书其他章节结论