关于「回声报复:噪音下一报还一报的精确马尔可夫链」,《依恋博弈与停火协议》给出的定量结论是什么?
结论:第一、二章说明回声从哪里来,并算出宽恕的安全窗口:执行噪音为 0.05 时,宽恕概率应在 0.0437 与 0.2811 之间,太少困在回声里,太多被占便宜;噪音到 0.10 时窗口关闭,此时该降低的是误读。
数据口径:书中参数均为示意,全部计算由书中程序生成。 本书不是心理咨询、医疗或法律建议,不宣称任何改变关系或身心状况的效果,也不写任何操控、冷暴力或情感勒索技巧;遇到家庭暴力、威胁、自伤风险或严重心理困扰,请立即联系当地紧急求助渠道与专业机构。
对照数据表
下表数字由本章 Python 程序原样打印,可重新运行复现。 程序只用 Python 标准库与结论吻合的打印值: 0.05, 0.10
| self-play: share of rounds in mutual C, and payoff per round | |||
| rule | eps=0.01 P(CC) pay | eps=0.05 P(CC) pay | eps=0.10 P(CC) pay |
| ALLC | 0.980 2.990 | 0.902 2.947 | 0.810 2.890 |
| TFT | 0.250 2.250 | 0.250 2.250 | 0.250 2.250 |
| GTFT 1/3 | 0.943 2.970 | 0.766 2.859 | 0.617 2.740 |
| WSLS | 0.961 2.951 | 0.817 2.776 | 0.666 2.602 |
| GRIM | 0.005 1.040 | 0.025 1.192 | 0.050 1.370 |
| ALLD | 0.000 1.030 | 0.003 1.147 | 0.010 1.290 |
| max payoff R = 3; at eps = 0.05 GRIM keeps few rounds in CC, | |||
| TFT sits at 0.25 for any eps, GTFT and WSLS stay well above. |
查看完整验算程序
# Chapter 1. p13: six memory-one rules playing themselves under noise.
# Model: the exact four-state chain of p11 (payoffs T=5, R=3, P=1,
# S=0; each move flipped with probability eps). A rule is the vector
# of cooperation probabilities after CC, CD, DC, DD (own move first).
# GRIM never forgives a defection, the formal twin of a cold war;
# GTFT forgives a defection with probability 1/3; WSLS repeats a move
# that paid R or T and switches after S or P. eps is illustrative.
from fractions import Fraction as F
from functools import reduce
from operator import add
T, R, P, S = 5, 3, 1, 0
PAY = [R, S, T, P]
SWAP = [0, 2, 1, 3]
RULES = [("ALLC", [1, 1, 1, 1]), ("TFT", [1, 0, 1, 0]),
("GTFT 1/3", [1, F(1, 3), 1, F(1, 3)]), ("WSLS", [1, 0, 0, 1]),
("GRIM", [1, 0, 0, 0]), ("ALLD", [0, 0, 0, 0])]
def fsum_exact(xs):
return reduce(add, xs, F(0))
def noisy(p, e):
return (1 - e) * p + e * (1 - p)
def chain(s1, s2, e):
rows = []
for k in range(4):
a = noisy(F(s1[k]), e)
b = noisy(F(s2[SWAP[k]]), e)
rows.append([a * b, a * (1 - b), (1 - a) * b, (1 - a) * (1 - b)])
return rows
def solve(a, y):
n = len(y)
m = [row[:] + [y[i]] for i, row in enumerate(a)]
for k in range(n):
piv = next(r for r in range(k, n) if m[r][k] != 0)
m[k], m[piv] = m[piv], m[k]
for r in range(n):
if r != k and m[r][k] != 0:
f = m[r][k] / m[k][k]
m[r] = [x - f * z for x, z in zip(m[r], m[k])]
return [m[i][n] / m[i][i] for i in range(n)]
def stationary(mat):
n = len(mat)
a = [[mat[j][i] - (1 if i == j else 0) for j in range(n)]
for i in range(n)]
a[-1] = [F(1)] * n
return solve(a, [F(0)] * (n - 1) + [F(1)])
EPS = (F(1, 100), F(1, 20), F(1, 10))
print("self-play: share of rounds in mutual C, and payoff per round")
print("rule " + "".join(" eps=%.2f P(CC) pay" % float(e)
for e in EPS)[1:])
for name, rule in RULES:
cells = []
for e in EPS:
pi = stationary(chain(rule, rule, e))
pay = fsum_exact(p * v for p, v in zip(pi, PAY))
cells.append(" %10.3f %5.3f" % (float(pi[0]), float(pay)))
print("%-9s" % name + "".join(cells))
print("max payoff R = 3; at eps = 0.05 GRIM keeps few rounds in CC,")
print("TFT sits at 0.25 for any eps, GTFT and WSLS stay well above.")唯一数据源与引用
范雅福(Fan, Y.). (2026). 《亲密关系依恋博弈与冲突停火协议、重复非零和博弈情绪衰减方程与创业伴侣冷战破局母典》第 1 章「回声报复:噪音下一报还一报的精确马尔可夫链」(版本 1.0.0). 5D Library. DOI 待发布
DOI 待发布 · 专著页正式发布后上线(本站暂无专著页) · 5DL-B-285 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026285,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Attachment Games and Ceasefire Protocols in Intimate Partnerships: Repeated Non-Zero-Sum Games, Emotion-Decay Equations and Ending Cold Wars between Founder Couples},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}