What does Attachment Games and Ceasefire Protocols conclude, in numbers, about “The Echo: an Exact Markov Chain for Tit for Tat under Noise”?
Answer: Chapters 1 and 2 show where the echo comes from and compute the safe window of forgiveness: at an implementation noise of 0.05 the forgiveness probability should lie between 0.0437 and 0.2811, since too little traps a couple in the echo and too much invites exploitation; at a noise of 0.10 the window closes, and it is misreading that must come down.
Scope of the numbers: Its parameters are illustrative, and all calculations are generated by its programs. The parts on founder couples are not individual business advice.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.05, 0.10
| self-play: share of rounds in mutual C, and payoff per round | |||
| rule | eps=0.01 P(CC) pay | eps=0.05 P(CC) pay | eps=0.10 P(CC) pay |
| ALLC | 0.980 2.990 | 0.902 2.947 | 0.810 2.890 |
| TFT | 0.250 2.250 | 0.250 2.250 | 0.250 2.250 |
| GTFT 1/3 | 0.943 2.970 | 0.766 2.859 | 0.617 2.740 |
| WSLS | 0.961 2.951 | 0.817 2.776 | 0.666 2.602 |
| GRIM | 0.005 1.040 | 0.025 1.192 | 0.050 1.370 |
| ALLD | 0.000 1.030 | 0.003 1.147 | 0.010 1.290 |
| max payoff R = 3; at eps = 0.05 GRIM keeps few rounds in CC, | |||
| TFT sits at 0.25 for any eps, GTFT and WSLS stay well above. |
Show the full program
# Chapter 1. p13: six memory-one rules playing themselves under noise.
# Model: the exact four-state chain of p11 (payoffs T=5, R=3, P=1,
# S=0; each move flipped with probability eps). A rule is the vector
# of cooperation probabilities after CC, CD, DC, DD (own move first).
# GRIM never forgives a defection, the formal twin of a cold war;
# GTFT forgives a defection with probability 1/3; WSLS repeats a move
# that paid R or T and switches after S or P. eps is illustrative.
from fractions import Fraction as F
from functools import reduce
from operator import add
T, R, P, S = 5, 3, 1, 0
PAY = [R, S, T, P]
SWAP = [0, 2, 1, 3]
RULES = [("ALLC", [1, 1, 1, 1]), ("TFT", [1, 0, 1, 0]),
("GTFT 1/3", [1, F(1, 3), 1, F(1, 3)]), ("WSLS", [1, 0, 0, 1]),
("GRIM", [1, 0, 0, 0]), ("ALLD", [0, 0, 0, 0])]
def fsum_exact(xs):
return reduce(add, xs, F(0))
def noisy(p, e):
return (1 - e) * p + e * (1 - p)
def chain(s1, s2, e):
rows = []
for k in range(4):
a = noisy(F(s1[k]), e)
b = noisy(F(s2[SWAP[k]]), e)
rows.append([a * b, a * (1 - b), (1 - a) * b, (1 - a) * (1 - b)])
return rows
def solve(a, y):
n = len(y)
m = [row[:] + [y[i]] for i, row in enumerate(a)]
for k in range(n):
piv = next(r for r in range(k, n) if m[r][k] != 0)
m[k], m[piv] = m[piv], m[k]
for r in range(n):
if r != k and m[r][k] != 0:
f = m[r][k] / m[k][k]
m[r] = [x - f * z for x, z in zip(m[r], m[k])]
return [m[i][n] / m[i][i] for i in range(n)]
def stationary(mat):
n = len(mat)
a = [[mat[j][i] - (1 if i == j else 0) for j in range(n)]
for i in range(n)]
a[-1] = [F(1)] * n
return solve(a, [F(0)] * (n - 1) + [F(1)])
EPS = (F(1, 100), F(1, 20), F(1, 10))
print("self-play: share of rounds in mutual C, and payoff per round")
print("rule " + "".join(" eps=%.2f P(CC) pay" % float(e)
for e in EPS)[1:])
for name, rule in RULES:
cells = []
for e in EPS:
pi = stationary(chain(rule, rule, e))
pay = fsum_exact(p * v for p, v in zip(pi, PAY))
cells.append(" %10.3f %5.3f" % (float(pi[0]), float(pay)))
print("%-9s" % name + "".join(cells))
print("max payoff R = 3; at eps = 0.05 GRIM keeps few rounds in CC,")
print("TFT sits at 0.25 for any eps, GTFT and WSLS stay well above.")Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Attachment Games and Ceasefire Protocols in Intimate Partnerships: Repeated Non-Zero-Sum Games, Emotion-Decay Equations and Ending Cold Wars between Founder Couples (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 1: The Echo: an Exact Markov Chain for Tit for Tat under Noise. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-285 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026285,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Attachment Games and Ceasefire Protocols in Intimate Partnerships: Repeated Non-Zero-Sum Games, Emotion-Decay Equations and Ending Cold Wars between Founder Couples},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 2 · A Safe Dose of Forgiveness: Generous Tit for Tat and the Invasion Window
- Chapter 3 · Attachment as Parameters: Misreading, Forgiveness and the Demand-Withdraw Loop
- Chapter 4 · Emotion-Decay Equations: Coupling, Cooling Times and Two Attractors
- Chapter 5 · The Structure of a Ceasefire: Pause Length, a Named Return and the Shadow of the Future
- Chapter 6 · Founder Couples: Two Boards at Once
- Chapter 7 · Classical Sources: Repaying Grievance with Uprightness, and Seneca on Anger
- Chapter 8 · Closing the Loop: a Ceasefire Card Signed by Both Partners, and a Plan to Refute It