关于「宽恕的安全剂量:宽恕型以牙还牙与入侵窗口」,《依恋博弈与停火协议》给出的定量结论是什么?
结论:宽恕有一个安全窗口。在 eps 为 0.05 的噪音下,宽恕概率应在 0.0437 与 0.2811 之间:太少会被困在回声里,连交替者都守不住;太多会被交替者和无条件背叛者占便宜。噪音越大,窗口越窄,到 eps 为 0.10 时窗口关闭,此时该降低的是误读,而不是调整宽恕。演化模拟复现了「一报还一报开路、宽恕型接班」的四幕,最终占比最大的策略是 (0.988, 0.433)。收益表改变安全剂量:「狠话甜」时上限只有 1/6。下一章要问的是:依恋研究里的焦虑与回避,能不能写成这些参数?
数据口径:书中参数均为示意,全部计算由书中程序生成。 本书不是心理咨询、医疗或法律建议,不宣称任何改变关系或身心状况的效果,也不写任何操控、冷暴力或情感勒索技巧;遇到家庭暴力、威胁、自伤风险或严重心理困扰,请立即联系当地紧急求助渠道与专业机构。
对照数据表
下表数字由本章 Python 程序原样打印,可重新运行复现。 程序只用 Python 标准库与结论吻合的打印值: 0.0437, 0.05, 0.10, 0.2811
| eps | 0.05; GTFT(g) residents against two entrants |
| g P(CC) self pay self ALLD vs G ALT vs G invaded by | |
| 0.000 | 0.250 2.250 1.325 2.453 ALT |
| 0.100 | 0.543 2.668 1.663 2.590 none |
| 0.200 | 0.675 2.790 2.001 2.727 none |
| 0.250 | 0.716 2.822 2.170 2.796 none |
| 0.300 | 0.748 2.847 2.338 2.864 ALT |
| 0.333 | 0.766 2.859 2.451 2.910 ALT |
| 0.400 | 0.794 2.879 2.676 3.002 ALT |
| 0.500 | 0.826 2.901 3.014 3.139 ALLD+ALT |
| 0.700 | 0.868 2.927 3.689 3.413 ALLD+ALT |
| 1.000 | 0.902 2.947 4.702 3.825 ALLD+ALT |
| largest g safe from ALLD at eps | 0.05: 0.4646 (noise-free 0.5) |
| largest g safe from ALT at eps | 0.05: 0.2811 (noise-free 0.3333) |
| smallest g safe from ALT at eps | 0.05: 0.0437 (noise-free 0) |
| safe forgiveness window by noise (grid of 1/100, then bisection) | |
| eps 0.01: g from 0.008 to 0.325 | |
| eps 0.02: g from 0.016 to 0.316 | |
| eps 0.05: g from 0.044 to 0.281 | |
| eps 0.08: g from 0.087 to 0.227 | |
| eps 0.10: empty |
查看完整验算程序
# Chapter 2. p21: how much forgiveness, generosity sweep at eps = 0.05.
# Model: the exact chain of p11 with payoffs T=5, R=3, P=1, S=0. GTFT
# with generosity g cooperates after a partner's C and, after a D,
# still cooperates with probability g. For each g we report the payoff
# of GTFT against itself and of two entrants against it: a pure
# defector (ALLD) and an alternator (ALT: C after own D, D after own
# C). An entrant invades when its payoff beats the residents' own.
# Molander's (1985) noise-free bound is g* = min(1 - (T-R)/(R-S),
# (R-P)/(T-P)) = min(1/3, 1/2): ALT sets the first term, ALLD the
# second. g is illustrative.
from fractions import Fraction as F
from functools import reduce
from operator import add
T, R, P, S = 5, 3, 1, 0
PAY = [R, S, T, P]
SWAP = [0, 2, 1, 3]
def fsum_exact(xs):
return reduce(add, xs, F(0))
def noisy(p, e):
return (1 - e) * p + e * (1 - p)
def chain(s1, s2, e):
rows = []
for k in range(4):
a = noisy(F(s1[k]), e)
b = noisy(F(s2[SWAP[k]]), e)
rows.append([a * b, a * (1 - b), (1 - a) * b, (1 - a) * (1 - b)])
return rows
def solve(a, y):
n = len(y)
m = [row[:] + [y[i]] for i, row in enumerate(a)]
for k in range(n):
piv = next(r for r in range(k, n) if m[r][k] != 0)
m[k], m[piv] = m[piv], m[k]
for r in range(n):
if r != k and m[r][k] != 0:
f = m[r][k] / m[k][k]
m[r] = [x - f * z for x, z in zip(m[r], m[k])]
return [m[i][n] / m[i][i] for i in range(n)]
def stationary(mat):
n = len(mat)
a = [[mat[j][i] - (1 if i == j else 0) for j in range(n)]
for i in range(n)]
a[-1] = [F(1)] * n
return solve(a, [F(0)] * (n - 1) + [F(1)])
def pay(s1, s2, e):
pi = stationary(chain(s1, s2, e))
return fsum_exact(p * v for p, v in zip(pi, PAY)), pi
E = F(1, 20)
ALLD = [0, 0, 0, 0]
ALT = [0, 0, 1, 1]
print("eps = 0.05; GTFT(g) residents against two entrants")
print(" g P(CC) self pay self ALLD vs G ALT vs G invaded by")
for g in (F(0), F(1, 10), F(1, 5), F(1, 4), F(3, 10), F(1, 3),
F(2, 5), F(1, 2), F(7, 10), F(1)):
rule = [1, g, 1, g]
ps, pi = pay(rule, rule, E)
pd, _ = pay(ALLD, rule, E)
pa, _ = pay(ALT, rule, E)
who = [n for n, v in (("ALLD", pd), ("ALT", pa)) if v > ps]
print("%5.3f %10.3f %8.3f %9.3f %8.3f %10s"
% (float(g), float(pi[0]), float(ps), float(pd), float(pa),
"+".join(who) if who else "none"))
def bound(entrant, lo=F(0), hi=F(1), rising=True):
# bisect the g at which the entrant stops (or starts) winning
for _ in range(40):
mid = (lo + hi) / 2
rule = [1, mid, 1, mid]
pe, _ = pay(entrant, rule, E)
ps, _ = pay(rule, rule, E)
if (pe > ps) == rising:
hi = mid
else:
lo = mid
return float(lo)
print("largest g safe from ALLD at eps = 0.05: %.4f (noise-free 0.5)"
% bound(ALLD))
print("largest g safe from ALT at eps = 0.05: %.4f (noise-free %.4f)"
% (bound(ALT, F(1, 5), F(1)), 1 / 3))
print("smallest g safe from ALT at eps = 0.05: %.4f (noise-free 0)"
% bound(ALT, F(0), F(1, 5), False))
def safe(g, e):
rule = [1, g, 1, g]
own = pay(rule, rule, e)[0]
return pay(ALT, rule, e)[0] <= own and pay(ALLD, rule, e)[0] <= own
print("safe forgiveness window by noise (grid of 1/100, then bisection)")
for e in (F(1, 100), F(1, 50), F(1, 20), F(2, 25), F(1, 10)):
ok = [i for i in range(101) if safe(F(i, 100), e)]
if not ok:
print(" eps %.2f: empty" % float(e))
continue
ends = []
for i, j in ((ok[0], ok[0] - 1), (ok[-1], ok[-1] + 1)):
lo, hi = F(i, 100), F(j, 100)
for _ in range(30):
mid = (lo + hi) / 2
lo, hi = (mid, hi) if safe(mid, e) else (lo, mid)
ends.append(float(lo))
print(" eps %.2f: g from %.3f to %.3f" % (float(e), ends[0], ends[1]))唯一数据源与引用
范雅福(Fan, Y.). (2026). 《亲密关系依恋博弈与冲突停火协议、重复非零和博弈情绪衰减方程与创业伴侣冷战破局母典》第 2 章「宽恕的安全剂量:宽恕型以牙还牙与入侵窗口」(版本 1.0.0). 5D Library. DOI 待发布
DOI 待发布 · 专著页正式发布后上线(本站暂无专著页) · 5DL-B-285 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026285,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Attachment Games and Ceasefire Protocols in Intimate Partnerships: Repeated Non-Zero-Sum Games, Emotion-Decay Equations and Ending Cold Wars between Founder Couples},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}