关于「东西方原典考辨:以直报怨与塞涅卡论愤怒」,《依恋博弈与停火协议》给出的定量结论是什么?

结论:第七章考辨《论语·宪问》的「以直报怨」与塞涅卡《论愤怒》:三种回应规则的平均收益依次是 2.076、2.286 与 2.344。

数据口径:书中参数均为示意,全部计算由书中程序生成。 本书不是心理咨询、医疗或法律建议,不宣称任何改变关系或身心状况的效果,也不写任何操控、冷暴力或情感勒索技巧;遇到家庭暴力、威胁、自伤风险或严重心理困扰,请立即联系当地紧急求助渠道与专业机构。

English version

对照数据表

下表数字由本章 Python 程序原样打印,可重新运行复现。 程序只用 Python 标准库与结论吻合的打印值: 2.076, 2.286, 2.344

payoff per round to the row rule, eps0.05 (max R = 3)
row rule ALLC TFT g1/4 WSLS ALLD mean
kindness ALLC2.947 2.810 2.845 1.575 0.203 2.076
grievance TFT3.035 2.250 2.792 2.250 1.100 2.286
upright g1/4 3.013 2.649 2.822 2.359 0.876 2.344
what an exploiter (ALLD) earns from each row rule:
ALLD vs kindness ALLC4.702
ALLD vs grievance TFT1.325
ALLD vs upright g1/4 2.170
查看完整验算程序
# Chapter 7. p71: three readings of Analects 14 as response rules.
# Model: the exact chain of p11 (T=5, R=3, P=1, S=0, eps = 0.05).
# "Repay grievance with kindness" is read as unconditional
# cooperation (ALLC); "repay grievance with grievance" as tit for tat;
# "repay grievance with uprightness" as a measured answer that
# retaliates but forgives a defection with probability 1/4, inside
# the window found in p21 at this noise. Each rule meets each of five
# partners. The mapping of a classical maxim to a rule is the
# author's reading, offered as a testable caricature.
import math
from fractions import Fraction as F
from functools import reduce
from operator import add

T, R, P, S = 5, 3, 1, 0
PAY = [R, S, T, P]
SWAP = [0, 2, 1, 3]
E = F(1, 20)
ROWS = [("kindness ALLC", [1, 1, 1, 1]), ("grievance TFT", [1, 0, 1, 0]),
        ("upright g=1/4", [1, F(1, 4), 1, F(1, 4)])]
COLS = [("ALLC", [1, 1, 1, 1]), ("TFT", [1, 0, 1, 0]),
        ("g=1/4", [1, F(1, 4), 1, F(1, 4)]), ("WSLS", [1, 0, 0, 1]),
        ("ALLD", [0, 0, 0, 0])]


def fsum_exact(xs):
    return reduce(add, xs, F(0))


def noisy(p, e):
    return (1 - e) * p + e * (1 - p)


def chain(s1, s2, e):
    rows = []
    for k in range(4):
        a = noisy(F(s1[k]), e)
        b = noisy(F(s2[SWAP[k]]), e)
        rows.append([a * b, a * (1 - b), (1 - a) * b, (1 - a) * (1 - b)])
    return rows


def solve(a, y):
    n = len(y)
    m = [row[:] + [y[i]] for i, row in enumerate(a)]
    for k in range(n):
        piv = next(r for r in range(k, n) if m[r][k] != 0)
        m[k], m[piv] = m[piv], m[k]
        for r in range(n):
            if r != k and m[r][k] != 0:
                f = m[r][k] / m[k][k]
                m[r] = [x - f * z for x, z in zip(m[r], m[k])]
    return [m[i][n] / m[i][i] for i in range(n)]


def stationary(mat):
    n = len(mat)
    a = [[mat[j][i] - (1 if i == j else 0) for j in range(n)]
         for i in range(n)]
    a[-1] = [F(1)] * n
    return solve(a, [F(0)] * (n - 1) + [F(1)])


def pay(a, b):
    pi = stationary(chain(a, b, E))
    return float(fsum_exact(p * v for p, v in zip(pi, PAY)))


print("payoff per round to the row rule, eps = 0.05 (max R = 3)")
print("row rule        " + "".join("%8s" % n for n, _ in COLS)
      + "    mean")
for name, rule in ROWS:
    vals = [pay(rule, c) for _, c in COLS]
    mean = math.fsum(vals) / len(vals)
    print("%-15s " % name + "".join("%8.3f" % v for v in vals)
          + "%8.3f" % mean)
print("what an exploiter (ALLD) earns from each row rule:")
for name, rule in ROWS:
    print("  ALLD vs %-15s %6.3f" % (name, pay([0, 0, 0, 0], rule)))

唯一数据源与引用

范雅福(Fan, Y.). (2026). 《亲密关系依恋博弈与冲突停火协议、重复非零和博弈情绪衰减方程与创业伴侣冷战破局母典》第 7 章「东西方原典考辨:以直报怨与塞涅卡论愤怒」(版本 1.0.0). 5D Library. DOI 待发布

DOI 待发布 · 专著页正式发布后上线(本站暂无专著页) · 5DL-B-285 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026285,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Attachment Games and Ceasefire Protocols in Intimate Partnerships: Repeated Non-Zero-Sum Games, Emotion-Decay Equations and Ending Cold Wars between Founder Couples},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  note      = {DOI pending}
}

本书其他章节结论