关于「门槛博弈的均衡清单:退款承诺到底改变了什么」,《保证合约与预售成团》给出的定量结论是什么?

结论:第一章精确枚举五人门槛博弈:能开工的均衡所占比例在不退规则下为 0.909,在退款规则下为 0.625;在对称混合均衡中,退款清除了开工概率为 0.2161 的低均衡,剩余均衡的开工概率为 0.8256。

数据口径:书中参数为示意;全部计算由书中程序生成。

English version

对照数据表

下表数字由本章 Python 程序原样打印,可重新运行复现。 程序只用 Python 标准库与结论吻合的打印值: 0.625, 0.909

N5 K = 3 V = 10 C = 4 profiles = 32
rule pledgers NE count batch made
keep0 1 no
keep3 10 yes
refund0 1 no
refund1 5 no
refund3 10 yes
keep equilibria 11, batch made in 10, share 0.909
refund equilibria 16, batch made in 10, share 0.625
refund adds equilibria with 1 pledger: refunded pledgers
lose nothing, so a lone pledger has no reason to withdraw
查看完整验算程序
# Chapter 1. p11: every pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of a small
# threshold game, with and without a refund when the threshold fails.
# Model (Palfrey and Rosenthal 1984 type): N buyers each decide to
# pledge (cost C) or not; the batch is made iff at least K pledge, and
# then every buyer, pledger or not, gets value V (the batch exists and
# later buyers can free-ride on it). Rule "keep": a failed pledge is
# lost. Rule "refund": a failed pledge is returned in full.
# Parameters are illustrative: N = 5, K = 3, V = 10, C = 4.
# Exact enumeration of all 2 ** N profiles; standard library only.
import itertools

N, K, V, C = 5, 3, 10, 4


def payoff(mine, others, rule):
    made = mine + others >= K
    if mine:
        if made:
            return V - C
        return 0 if rule == "refund" else -C
    return V if made else 0


def is_nash(prof, rule):
    k = len([x for x in prof if x])
    for x in prof:
        others = k - x
        now = payoff(x, others, rule)
        dev = payoff(1 - x, others, rule)
        if dev > now:
            return False
    return True


def table(rule):
    found = {}
    for prof in itertools.product((0, 1), repeat=N):
        if is_nash(prof, rule):
            k = len([x for x in prof if x])
            found[k] = found.get(k, 0) + 1
    return found


if __name__ == "__main__":
    print("N = {}  K = {}  V = {}  C = {}  profiles = {}".format(
        N, K, V, C, 2 ** N))
    print("rule    pledgers  NE count  batch made")
    tot = {}
    for rule in ("keep", "refund"):
        f = table(rule)
        for k in sorted(f):
            print("{:7s} {:8d} {:9d}  {}".format(
                rule, k, f[k], "yes" if k >= K else "no"))
        good = len([1 for k in f for _ in range(f[k]) if k >= K])
        allne = len([1 for k in f for _ in range(f[k])])
        tot[rule] = (good, allne)
    for rule in ("keep", "refund"):
        g, a = tot[rule]
        print("{:7s} equilibria {:2d}, batch made in {:2d}, share {:.3f}"
              .format(rule, a, g, g / a))
    print("refund adds equilibria with 1 pledger: refunded pledgers")
    print("lose nothing, so a lone pledger has no reason to withdraw")

唯一数据源与引用

范雅福(Fan, Y.). (2026). 《保证合约预售成团阈值、退款承诺与公共品搭便车均衡母典》第 1 章「门槛博弈的均衡清单:退款承诺到底改变了什么」(版本 1.0.0). 5D Library. DOI 待发布

DOI 待发布 · 专著页正式发布后上线(本站暂无专著页) · 5DL-B-316 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026316,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Assurance Contracts and Pre-Sale Group Thresholds: Refund Promises and Free-Riding Equilibria in Public Goods},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  note      = {DOI pending}
}

本书其他章节结论