What does Assurance Contracts and Pre-Sales conclude, in numbers, about “The Equilibrium List of a Threshold Game: What a Refund Promise Actually Changes”?

Answer: Chapter 1 enumerates a five-person threshold game exactly: the share of equilibria that lead to production is 0.909 under the keep rule and 0.625 under the refund rule; in symmetric mixed equilibrium the refund removes the low equilibrium with a chance of production of 0.2161, and the remaining equilibrium has a chance of 0.8256.

Scope of the numbers: Parameters are illustrative; all calculations are generated by the book's programs. The book is general analysis, not individualised business or legal advice.

中文版

Data table

The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.625, 0.909

N5 K = 3 V = 10 C = 4 profiles = 32
rule pledgers NE count batch made
keep0 1 no
keep3 10 yes
refund0 1 no
refund1 5 no
refund3 10 yes
keep equilibria 11, batch made in 10, share 0.909
refund equilibria 16, batch made in 10, share 0.625
refund adds equilibria with 1 pledger: refunded pledgers
lose nothing, so a lone pledger has no reason to withdraw
Show the full program
# Chapter 1. p11: every pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of a small
# threshold game, with and without a refund when the threshold fails.
# Model (Palfrey and Rosenthal 1984 type): N buyers each decide to
# pledge (cost C) or not; the batch is made iff at least K pledge, and
# then every buyer, pledger or not, gets value V (the batch exists and
# later buyers can free-ride on it). Rule "keep": a failed pledge is
# lost. Rule "refund": a failed pledge is returned in full.
# Parameters are illustrative: N = 5, K = 3, V = 10, C = 4.
# Exact enumeration of all 2 ** N profiles; standard library only.
import itertools

N, K, V, C = 5, 3, 10, 4


def payoff(mine, others, rule):
    made = mine + others >= K
    if mine:
        if made:
            return V - C
        return 0 if rule == "refund" else -C
    return V if made else 0


def is_nash(prof, rule):
    k = len([x for x in prof if x])
    for x in prof:
        others = k - x
        now = payoff(x, others, rule)
        dev = payoff(1 - x, others, rule)
        if dev > now:
            return False
    return True


def table(rule):
    found = {}
    for prof in itertools.product((0, 1), repeat=N):
        if is_nash(prof, rule):
            k = len([x for x in prof if x])
            found[k] = found.get(k, 0) + 1
    return found


if __name__ == "__main__":
    print("N = {}  K = {}  V = {}  C = {}  profiles = {}".format(
        N, K, V, C, 2 ** N))
    print("rule    pledgers  NE count  batch made")
    tot = {}
    for rule in ("keep", "refund"):
        f = table(rule)
        for k in sorted(f):
            print("{:7s} {:8d} {:9d}  {}".format(
                rule, k, f[k], "yes" if k >= K else "no"))
        good = len([1 for k in f for _ in range(f[k]) if k >= K])
        allne = len([1 for k in f for _ in range(f[k])])
        tot[rule] = (good, allne)
    for rule in ("keep", "refund"):
        g, a = tot[rule]
        print("{:7s} equilibria {:2d}, batch made in {:2d}, share {:.3f}"
              .format(rule, a, g, g / a))
    print("refund adds equilibria with 1 pledger: refunded pledgers")
    print("lose nothing, so a lone pledger has no reason to withdraw")

Single source and citation

Fan, Y. (2026). Assurance Contracts and Pre-Sale Group Thresholds: Refund Promises and Free-Riding Equilibria in Public Goods (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 1: The Equilibrium List of a Threshold Game: What a Refund Promise Actually Changes. 5D Library. DOI pending

DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-316 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026316,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Assurance Contracts and Pre-Sale Group Thresholds: Refund Promises and Free-Riding Equilibria in Public Goods},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  note      = {DOI pending}
}

Other chapter answers in this book