What does Assurance Contracts and Pre-Sales conclude, in numbers, about “The Equilibrium List of a Threshold Game: What a Refund Promise Actually Changes”?
Answer: Chapter 1 enumerates a five-person threshold game exactly: the share of equilibria that lead to production is 0.909 under the keep rule and 0.625 under the refund rule; in symmetric mixed equilibrium the refund removes the low equilibrium with a chance of production of 0.2161, and the remaining equilibrium has a chance of 0.8256.
Scope of the numbers: Parameters are illustrative; all calculations are generated by the book's programs. The book is general analysis, not individualised business or legal advice.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.625, 0.909
| N | 5 K = 3 V = 10 C = 4 profiles = 32 |
| rule pledgers NE count batch made | |
| keep | 0 1 no |
| keep | 3 10 yes |
| refund | 0 1 no |
| refund | 1 5 no |
| refund | 3 10 yes |
| keep equilibria 11, batch made in 10, share 0.909 | |
| refund equilibria 16, batch made in 10, share 0.625 | |
| refund adds equilibria with 1 pledger: refunded pledgers | |
| lose nothing, so a lone pledger has no reason to withdraw |
Show the full program
# Chapter 1. p11: every pure-strategy Nash equilibrium of a small
# threshold game, with and without a refund when the threshold fails.
# Model (Palfrey and Rosenthal 1984 type): N buyers each decide to
# pledge (cost C) or not; the batch is made iff at least K pledge, and
# then every buyer, pledger or not, gets value V (the batch exists and
# later buyers can free-ride on it). Rule "keep": a failed pledge is
# lost. Rule "refund": a failed pledge is returned in full.
# Parameters are illustrative: N = 5, K = 3, V = 10, C = 4.
# Exact enumeration of all 2 ** N profiles; standard library only.
import itertools
N, K, V, C = 5, 3, 10, 4
def payoff(mine, others, rule):
made = mine + others >= K
if mine:
if made:
return V - C
return 0 if rule == "refund" else -C
return V if made else 0
def is_nash(prof, rule):
k = len([x for x in prof if x])
for x in prof:
others = k - x
now = payoff(x, others, rule)
dev = payoff(1 - x, others, rule)
if dev > now:
return False
return True
def table(rule):
found = {}
for prof in itertools.product((0, 1), repeat=N):
if is_nash(prof, rule):
k = len([x for x in prof if x])
found[k] = found.get(k, 0) + 1
return found
if __name__ == "__main__":
print("N = {} K = {} V = {} C = {} profiles = {}".format(
N, K, V, C, 2 ** N))
print("rule pledgers NE count batch made")
tot = {}
for rule in ("keep", "refund"):
f = table(rule)
for k in sorted(f):
print("{:7s} {:8d} {:9d} {}".format(
rule, k, f[k], "yes" if k >= K else "no"))
good = len([1 for k in f for _ in range(f[k]) if k >= K])
allne = len([1 for k in f for _ in range(f[k])])
tot[rule] = (good, allne)
for rule in ("keep", "refund"):
g, a = tot[rule]
print("{:7s} equilibria {:2d}, batch made in {:2d}, share {:.3f}"
.format(rule, a, g, g / a))
print("refund adds equilibria with 1 pledger: refunded pledgers")
print("lose nothing, so a lone pledger has no reason to withdraw")Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Assurance Contracts and Pre-Sale Group Thresholds: Refund Promises and Free-Riding Equilibria in Public Goods (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 1: The Equilibrium List of a Threshold Game: What a Refund Promise Actually Changes. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-316 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026316,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Assurance Contracts and Pre-Sale Group Thresholds: Refund Promises and Free-Riding Equilibria in Public Goods},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 2 · From the Core to Crowdfunding: Refined Theory, Laboratory Evidence and Platform Data
- Chapter 3 · Before the Deadline: Success Probabilities under Poisson Arrivals, Binomial Audiences and Uncertain Rates
- Chapter 4 · The Refund Bonus: Mechanism, Equilibria and Expected Cost of the Dominant Assurance Contract
- Chapter 5 · Where to Put the Threshold: Break-Even, Sensitivity and the Weight of Pilot Data
- Chapter 6 · Rules for Displaying True Progress: Auditing Counts, Deadlines, Remaining Stock and Refunds
- Chapter 7 · Classical Sources East and West: "Goods Hate to Lie on the Ground" and Hume's Meadow
- Chapter 8 · Closing the Loop: Operating a Limited Pre-Sale Page, the Calculator and a Pre-Registered Test