What does Assurance Contracts and Pre-Sales conclude, in numbers, about “The Refund Bonus: Mechanism, Equilibria and Expected Cost of the Dominant Assurance Contract”?
Answer: The table shows three regularities. First, the expected bonus is largest when the chance of accepting puts the average number of accepters just below the threshold: at q of 0.15, an average of 45 people, the chance of failure is 0.9884 and the expected bonus 442.85; at q of 0.18 it is 411.45. Second, once the average passes the threshold the expected bonus falls quickly to nothing: 102.01 at q of 0.22, only 9.97 at 0.25, and 0.02 at 0.30. Third, the expected bonus as a share of the expected value of pledges never exceeds the ratio of bonus to price, 10 to 200, which is 0.0500, and at q of 0.20, where the average exactly equals the threshold, it is only 0.0215.
Scope of the numbers: Parameters are illustrative; all calculations are generated by the book's programs. The book is general analysis, not individualised business or legal advice.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.02, 0.0215, 0.0500, 0.15, 0.18, 0.20
| N = 300 | K = 60 | price S = 200 | bonus F = 10 | ||
| q | mean X | P(fail) | E bonus | E revenue | bonus/pledged |
| 0.10 | 30.0 | 1.0000 | 300.00 | 0.0 | 0.0500 |
| 0.15 | 45.0 | 0.9884 | 442.85 | 143.1 | 0.0492 |
| 0.18 | 54.0 | 0.7972 | 411.45 | 2571.1 | 0.0381 |
| 0.20 | 60.0 | 0.4770 | 258.59 | 6828.3 | 0.0215 |
| 0.22 | 66.0 | 0.1831 | 102.01 | 11159.7 | 0.0077 |
| 0.25 | 75.0 | 0.0175 | 9.97 | 14800.5 | 0.0007 |
| 0.30 | 90.0 | 0.0000 | 0.02 | 17999.6 | 0.0000 |
| worst case if it fails with K - 1 accepters: 590 |
Show the full program
# Chapter 4. p41: the expected cost of a refund bonus (Tabarrok 1998,
# "dominant assurance contract"): if fewer than K buyers accept, every
# accepter gets the full price back plus a bonus F. With an audience
# of N, each accepting with chance q, X ~ Binomial(N, q), and the
# expected bonus bill is F x E[X; X < K]. It is largest when q puts
# the mean just below K and vanishes once the mean is well above K;
# bonus/pledged divides it by the expected value of all pledges.
# Illustrative: N = 300, K = 60, price S = 200, bonus F = 10. Exact
# binomial terms; fsum.
import math
N, K, S, F = 300, 60, 200.0, 10.0
def pmf(n, k, p):
return math.exp(math.lgamma(n + 1) - math.lgamma(k + 1)
- math.lgamma(n - k + 1) + k * math.log(p)
+ (n - k) * math.log(1 - p))
def moments(q):
ps = [pmf(N, j, q) for j in range(N + 1)]
fail = math.fsum(ps[:K])
low = math.fsum(j * ps[j] for j in range(K))
high = math.fsum(j * ps[j] for j in range(K, N + 1))
return fail, low, high
if __name__ == "__main__":
print("N = {} K = {} price S = {:.0f} bonus F = {:.0f}".format(
N, K, S, F))
print(" q mean X P(fail) E bonus E revenue bonus/pledged")
for q in (0.10, 0.15, 0.18, 0.20, 0.22, 0.25, 0.30):
fail, low, high = moments(q)
bonus, rev = F * low, S * high
print("{:.2f} {:7.1f} {:8.4f} {:8.2f} {:10.1f} {:14.4f}".format(
q, N * q, fail, bonus, rev, bonus / (S * N * q)))
print("worst case if it fails with K - 1 accepters: {:.0f}".format(
F * (K - 1)))Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Assurance Contracts and Pre-Sale Group Thresholds: Refund Promises and Free-Riding Equilibria in Public Goods (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 4: The Refund Bonus: Mechanism, Equilibria and Expected Cost of the Dominant Assurance Contract. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-316 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026316,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Assurance Contracts and Pre-Sale Group Thresholds: Refund Promises and Free-Riding Equilibria in Public Goods},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · The Equilibrium List of a Threshold Game: What a Refund Promise Actually Changes
- Chapter 2 · From the Core to Crowdfunding: Refined Theory, Laboratory Evidence and Platform Data
- Chapter 3 · Before the Deadline: Success Probabilities under Poisson Arrivals, Binomial Audiences and Uncertain Rates
- Chapter 5 · Where to Put the Threshold: Break-Even, Sensitivity and the Weight of Pilot Data
- Chapter 6 · Rules for Displaying True Progress: Auditing Counts, Deadlines, Remaining Stock and Refunds
- Chapter 7 · Classical Sources East and West: "Goods Hate to Lie on the Ground" and Hume's Meadow
- Chapter 8 · Closing the Loop: Operating a Limited Pre-Sale Page, the Calculator and a Pre-Registered Test