What does Utility, Truth and the Dual Ledger conclude, in numbers, about “When Overconfidence Evolves: the Value-to-Cost Ratio and Noisy Reading of Rivals”?

Answer: Chapter 3 uses a contest model of the Johnson and Fowler type to show that a stable upward self-bias appears only when the value-to-cost ratio exceeds about 0.75, and often harms the group.

Scope of the numbers: Its parameters and data are illustrative or synthetic, and every calculation is generated by its programs. The book is not medical advice, offers no clinical psychological service, is not personal investment advice and makes no promise of returns; functional beliefs are for one's own action frame and never for deceiving others.

中文版

Data table

The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.75

r/cstable k*U(k*,k*)U(0,k*)edge of k* over 0
0.25-0.2900.08080.07500.0058
0.50-0.1240.17410.17260.0016
0.75-0.0180.27300.27290.0000
1.000.0600.37550.37490.0006
1.500.1750.58800.58190.0061
2.000.2570.80750.79170.0158
3.000.3741.25981.21670.0431
Show the full program
# Chapter 3. p31: the evolutionarily stable bias in a contest for a prize
# A Johnson-Fowler type model (Johnson and Fowler 2011). Two rivals have
# capabilities a, b ~ N(0, 1). Each knows its own capability, adds a
# bias k to it, and sees the rival's capability with noise of sd 0.5.
# Each claims the prize when its biased self-estimate beats the noisy
# estimate of the rival. One claimant takes the prize r; two claimants
# fight, both pay c = 1 and the stronger takes r; no claimant, nothing.
# Given D = a - b ~ N(0, 2), the two claims are independent, so the
# payoff U(k_mutant, k_resident) is a one-dimensional integral, done on
# a 401-point grid with math.fsum. The stable bias k* solves k = BR(k)
# (BR by ternary search on [-4, 4]). Illustrative parameters only.
import math

SD = 0.5
NODES = [-6 + 12 * i / 400 for i in range(401)]
PHI = [math.exp(-z * z / 4) / math.sqrt(4 * math.pi) for z in NODES]
STEP = 12 / 400


def cdf(z):
    return 0.5 * (1 + math.erf(z / math.sqrt(2)))


def payoff(km, kr, r, c=1.0):
    terms = []
    for d, w in zip(NODES, PHI):
        pm = cdf((d + km) / SD)
        pr = cdf((kr - d) / SD)
        win = r if d > 0 else 0.0
        terms.append(w * (pm * (1 - pr) * r + pm * pr * (win - c)))
    return math.fsum(terms) * STEP


def best_response(kr, r):
    lo, hi = -4.0, 4.0
    for _ in range(45):
        m1, m2 = lo + (hi - lo) / 3, hi - (hi - lo) / 3
        if payoff(m1, kr, r) < payoff(m2, kr, r):
            lo = m1
        else:
            hi = m2
    return (lo + hi) / 2


def stable_bias(r):
    lo, hi = -4.0, 4.0
    for _ in range(30):
        mid = (lo + hi) / 2
        if best_response(mid, r) > mid:
            lo = mid
        else:
            hi = mid
    return (lo + hi) / 2


print(" r/c   stable k*  U(k*,k*)  U(0,k*)  edge of k* over 0")
for r in (0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1.0, 1.5, 2.0, 3.0):
    k = stable_bias(r)
    u_star, u_zero = payoff(k, k, r), payoff(0.0, k, r)
    print("%4.2f  %9.3f  %8.4f  %7.4f  %17.4f" % (
        r, k, u_star, u_zero, u_star - u_zero))

Single source and citation

Fan, Y. (2026). When Utility Outperforms Literal Truth: Evolutionary Fitness-Payoff Games, Functional Belief Engineering and Physical Guardrails (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 3: When Overconfidence Evolves: the Value-to-Cost Ratio and Noisy Reading of Rivals. 5D Library. DOI pending

DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-427 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026427,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {When Utility Outperforms Literal Truth: Evolutionary Fitness-Payoff Games, Functional Belief Engineering and Physical Guardrails},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  note      = {DOI pending}
}

Other chapter answers in this book