关于「过度自信的演化条件:价值代价比与读数噪声」,《效用、真实与双账本》给出的定量结论是什么?
结论:第三章用 Johnson 与 Fowler 型竞争模型显示,稳定的自我高估只在价值代价比高于约 0.75 时出现,且常让群体受损。
数据口径:书中参数与数据均为示意或合成,全部计算由书中程序生成;本书不是医疗建议,不提供任何临床心理服务,不是个人投资建议,不承诺任何收益;功能性信念只用于自己的行动框架,不用于欺骗他人。 第六章建立双账本:行动框架可按效用编码,概率账以 Brier 分数校准,硬边界账不让步;框架改写概率账时,示意破产比例从 0.0925 升到 0.7055。
对照数据表
下表数字由本章 Python 程序原样打印,可重新运行复现。 程序只用 Python 标准库与结论吻合的打印值: 0.75
| r/c | stable k* | U(k*,k*) | U(0,k*) | edge of k* over 0 |
| 0.25 | -0.290 | 0.0808 | 0.0750 | 0.0058 |
| 0.50 | -0.124 | 0.1741 | 0.1726 | 0.0016 |
| 0.75 | -0.018 | 0.2730 | 0.2729 | 0.0000 |
| 1.00 | 0.060 | 0.3755 | 0.3749 | 0.0006 |
| 1.50 | 0.175 | 0.5880 | 0.5819 | 0.0061 |
| 2.00 | 0.257 | 0.8075 | 0.7917 | 0.0158 |
| 3.00 | 0.374 | 1.2598 | 1.2167 | 0.0431 |
查看完整验算程序
# Chapter 3. p31: the evolutionarily stable bias in a contest for a prize
# A Johnson-Fowler type model (Johnson and Fowler 2011). Two rivals have
# capabilities a, b ~ N(0, 1). Each knows its own capability, adds a
# bias k to it, and sees the rival's capability with noise of sd 0.5.
# Each claims the prize when its biased self-estimate beats the noisy
# estimate of the rival. One claimant takes the prize r; two claimants
# fight, both pay c = 1 and the stronger takes r; no claimant, nothing.
# Given D = a - b ~ N(0, 2), the two claims are independent, so the
# payoff U(k_mutant, k_resident) is a one-dimensional integral, done on
# a 401-point grid with math.fsum. The stable bias k* solves k = BR(k)
# (BR by ternary search on [-4, 4]). Illustrative parameters only.
import math
SD = 0.5
NODES = [-6 + 12 * i / 400 for i in range(401)]
PHI = [math.exp(-z * z / 4) / math.sqrt(4 * math.pi) for z in NODES]
STEP = 12 / 400
def cdf(z):
return 0.5 * (1 + math.erf(z / math.sqrt(2)))
def payoff(km, kr, r, c=1.0):
terms = []
for d, w in zip(NODES, PHI):
pm = cdf((d + km) / SD)
pr = cdf((kr - d) / SD)
win = r if d > 0 else 0.0
terms.append(w * (pm * (1 - pr) * r + pm * pr * (win - c)))
return math.fsum(terms) * STEP
def best_response(kr, r):
lo, hi = -4.0, 4.0
for _ in range(45):
m1, m2 = lo + (hi - lo) / 3, hi - (hi - lo) / 3
if payoff(m1, kr, r) < payoff(m2, kr, r):
lo = m1
else:
hi = m2
return (lo + hi) / 2
def stable_bias(r):
lo, hi = -4.0, 4.0
for _ in range(30):
mid = (lo + hi) / 2
if best_response(mid, r) > mid:
lo = mid
else:
hi = mid
return (lo + hi) / 2
print(" r/c stable k* U(k*,k*) U(0,k*) edge of k* over 0")
for r in (0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1.0, 1.5, 2.0, 3.0):
k = stable_bias(r)
u_star, u_zero = payoff(k, k, r), payoff(0.0, k, r)
print("%4.2f %9.3f %8.4f %7.4f %17.4f" % (
r, k, u_star, u_zero, u_star - u_zero))唯一数据源与引用
范雅福(Fan, Y.). (2026). 《效用优先于字面真实:演化适存度博弈、功能性信念重塑与物理硬边界母典》第 3 章「过度自信的演化条件:价值代价比与读数噪声」(版本 1.0.0). 5D Library. DOI 待发布
DOI 待发布 · 专著页正式发布后上线(本站暂无专著页) · 5DL-B-427 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026427,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {When Utility Outperforms Literal Truth: Evolutionary Fitness-Payoff Games, Functional Belief Engineering and Physical Guardrails},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}