关于「过度自信的演化条件:价值代价比与读数噪声」,《效用、真实与双账本》给出的定量结论是什么?

结论:第三章用 Johnson 与 Fowler 型竞争模型显示,稳定的自我高估只在价值代价比高于约 0.75 时出现,且常让群体受损。

数据口径:书中参数与数据均为示意或合成,全部计算由书中程序生成;本书不是医疗建议,不提供任何临床心理服务,不是个人投资建议,不承诺任何收益;功能性信念只用于自己的行动框架,不用于欺骗他人。 第六章建立双账本:行动框架可按效用编码,概率账以 Brier 分数校准,硬边界账不让步;框架改写概率账时,示意破产比例从 0.0925 升到 0.7055。

English version

对照数据表

下表数字由本章 Python 程序原样打印,可重新运行复现。 程序只用 Python 标准库与结论吻合的打印值: 0.75

r/cstable k*U(k*,k*)U(0,k*)edge of k* over 0
0.25-0.2900.08080.07500.0058
0.50-0.1240.17410.17260.0016
0.75-0.0180.27300.27290.0000
1.000.0600.37550.37490.0006
1.500.1750.58800.58190.0061
2.000.2570.80750.79170.0158
3.000.3741.25981.21670.0431
查看完整验算程序
# Chapter 3. p31: the evolutionarily stable bias in a contest for a prize
# A Johnson-Fowler type model (Johnson and Fowler 2011). Two rivals have
# capabilities a, b ~ N(0, 1). Each knows its own capability, adds a
# bias k to it, and sees the rival's capability with noise of sd 0.5.
# Each claims the prize when its biased self-estimate beats the noisy
# estimate of the rival. One claimant takes the prize r; two claimants
# fight, both pay c = 1 and the stronger takes r; no claimant, nothing.
# Given D = a - b ~ N(0, 2), the two claims are independent, so the
# payoff U(k_mutant, k_resident) is a one-dimensional integral, done on
# a 401-point grid with math.fsum. The stable bias k* solves k = BR(k)
# (BR by ternary search on [-4, 4]). Illustrative parameters only.
import math

SD = 0.5
NODES = [-6 + 12 * i / 400 for i in range(401)]
PHI = [math.exp(-z * z / 4) / math.sqrt(4 * math.pi) for z in NODES]
STEP = 12 / 400


def cdf(z):
    return 0.5 * (1 + math.erf(z / math.sqrt(2)))


def payoff(km, kr, r, c=1.0):
    terms = []
    for d, w in zip(NODES, PHI):
        pm = cdf((d + km) / SD)
        pr = cdf((kr - d) / SD)
        win = r if d > 0 else 0.0
        terms.append(w * (pm * (1 - pr) * r + pm * pr * (win - c)))
    return math.fsum(terms) * STEP


def best_response(kr, r):
    lo, hi = -4.0, 4.0
    for _ in range(45):
        m1, m2 = lo + (hi - lo) / 3, hi - (hi - lo) / 3
        if payoff(m1, kr, r) < payoff(m2, kr, r):
            lo = m1
        else:
            hi = m2
    return (lo + hi) / 2


def stable_bias(r):
    lo, hi = -4.0, 4.0
    for _ in range(30):
        mid = (lo + hi) / 2
        if best_response(mid, r) > mid:
            lo = mid
        else:
            hi = mid
    return (lo + hi) / 2


print(" r/c   stable k*  U(k*,k*)  U(0,k*)  edge of k* over 0")
for r in (0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1.0, 1.5, 2.0, 3.0):
    k = stable_bias(r)
    u_star, u_zero = payoff(k, k, r), payoff(0.0, k, r)
    print("%4.2f  %9.3f  %8.4f  %7.4f  %17.4f" % (
        r, k, u_star, u_zero, u_star - u_zero))

唯一数据源与引用

范雅福(Fan, Y.). (2026). 《效用优先于字面真实:演化适存度博弈、功能性信念重塑与物理硬边界母典》第 3 章「过度自信的演化条件:价值代价比与读数噪声」(版本 1.0.0). 5D Library. DOI 待发布

DOI 待发布 · 专著页正式发布后上线(本站暂无专著页) · 5DL-B-427 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026427,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {When Utility Outperforms Literal Truth: Evolutionary Fitness-Payoff Games, Functional Belief Engineering and Physical Guardrails},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  note      = {DOI pending}
}

本书其他章节结论