What does Utility, Truth and the Dual Ledger conclude, in numbers, about “Fitness Beats Truth: a Replicator Contest between One-Bit Perceptions”?

Answer: Chapters 1 and 2 rebuild "fitness beats truth" with replicator dynamics and the Moran process: with one perceptual bit and a single-peaked payoff, the share of the fitness-coded strategy rises from its starting value to 0.7712 by time 60. Yet once the number of goals rises from one to two, truth coding does at least as well on 0.703 of random goal sets, and when the payoff model is wrong or a cliff is present, the code that resolves the boundary truthfully wins. This is the book's correction of its blueprint: utility beats truth only inside a stated, bounded model.

Scope of the numbers: Its parameters and data are illustrative or synthetic, and every calculation is generated by its programs. The book is not medical advice, offers no clinical psychological service, is not personal investment advice and makes no promise of returns; functional beliefs are for one's own action frame and never for deceiving others.

中文版

Data table

The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.7712

thresholds: truth x > 0.27, fitness g(x) > 0.50
solo payoff: truth 0.5480, fitness 0.6895
payoff matrix (row meets column):
  T vs T 0.5149   T vs F 0.4645
  F vs T 0.6137   F vs F 0.5567
replicator, fitness share from 0.01 (Euler step 0.1):
  time  10.0  fitness share 0.0263
  time  20.0  fitness share 0.0670
  time  30.0  fitness share 0.1602
  time  40.0  fitness share 0.3347
  time  60.0  fitness share 0.7712
  time 400.0  fitness share 1.0000
Show the full program
# Chapter 1. p11: fitness-coded vs truth-coded perception, replicator run
# Model after Mark, Marion and Hoffman (2010): a resource quantity x is
# uniform on [0, 1]; its fitness payoff g(x) is single-peaked (too little
# or too much of the resource is worth less than the middle). Each
# strategy sees one bit per territory. TRUTH colours a territory "high"
# when x > t (an order-preserving split of x); FITNESS colours it "high"
# when g(x) > s. Both thresholds are tuned for a solo choice among three
# territories. In a contest, three territories are drawn, a random first
# mover takes the one it sees as "high", and the second mover takes its
# preferred one of the two left. All parameters are illustrative.
import math
import random

PEAK, WIDTH = 0.5, 0.18
DRAWS = 60000


def g(x):
    return math.exp(-0.5 * ((x - PEAK) / WIDTH) ** 2)


def pick(colours, rng):
    best = [i for i, c in enumerate(colours) if c]
    pool = best if best else list(range(len(colours)))
    return pool[rng.randrange(len(pool))]


def solo_payoff(rule, cut, terr):
    rng = random.Random(42711)
    vals = []
    for xs in terr:
        cols = [rule(x) > cut for x in xs]
        vals.append(g(xs[pick(cols, rng)]))
    return math.fsum(vals) / len(vals)


def tune(rule, terr):
    grid = [i / 100 for i in range(5, 96)]
    return max(grid, key=lambda c: (solo_payoff(rule, c, terr), -c))


rng0 = random.Random(42701)
TERR = [[rng0.random() for _ in range(3)] for _ in range(DRAWS)]
tune_set = TERR[:8000]
t_cut = tune(lambda x: x, tune_set)
s_cut = tune(g, tune_set)
RULES = {"T": (lambda x: x, t_cut), "F": (g, s_cut)}


def contest(a, b):
    rng = random.Random(42702)
    pay = []
    for n, xs in enumerate(TERR):
        a_first = n % 2 == 0
        first, second = (a, b) if a_first else (b, a)
        r1, c1 = RULES[first]
        i = pick([r1(x) > c1 for x in xs], rng)
        rest = [x for k, x in enumerate(xs) if k != i]
        r2, c2 = RULES[second]
        j = pick([r2(x) > c2 for x in rest], rng)
        pay.append(g(xs[i]) if a_first else g(rest[j]))
    return math.fsum(pay) / len(pay)


M = {(a, b): contest(a, b) for a in "TF" for b in "TF"}
print("thresholds: truth x > %.2f, fitness g(x) > %.2f" % (t_cut, s_cut))
print("solo payoff: truth %.4f, fitness %.4f" % (
    solo_payoff(lambda x: x, t_cut, TERR), solo_payoff(g, s_cut, TERR)))
print("payoff matrix (row meets column):")
for a in "TF":
    print("  %s vs T %.4f   %s vs F %.4f" % (a, M[(a, "T")], a, M[(a, "F")]))
xf, dt = 0.01, 0.1
print("replicator, fitness share from 0.01 (Euler step 0.1):")
for step in range(1, 4001):
    pf = xf * M[("F", "F")] + (1 - xf) * M[("F", "T")]
    pt = xf * M[("T", "F")] + (1 - xf) * M[("T", "T")]
    mean = xf * pf + (1 - xf) * pt
    xf += dt * xf * (pf - mean)
    if step in (100, 200, 300, 400, 600, 4000):
        print("  time %5.1f  fitness share %.4f" % (step * dt, xf))

Single source and citation

Fan, Y. (2026). When Utility Outperforms Literal Truth: Evolutionary Fitness-Payoff Games, Functional Belief Engineering and Physical Guardrails (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 1: Fitness Beats Truth: a Replicator Contest between One-Bit Perceptions. 5D Library. DOI pending

DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-427 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026427,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {When Utility Outperforms Literal Truth: Evolutionary Fitness-Payoff Games, Functional Belief Engineering and Physical Guardrails},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  note      = {DOI pending}
}

Other chapter answers in this book