What does Utility, Truth and the Dual Ledger conclude, in numbers, about “Fitness Beats Truth: a Replicator Contest between One-Bit Perceptions”?
Answer: Chapters 1 and 2 rebuild "fitness beats truth" with replicator dynamics and the Moran process: with one perceptual bit and a single-peaked payoff, the share of the fitness-coded strategy rises from its starting value to 0.7712 by time 60. Yet once the number of goals rises from one to two, truth coding does at least as well on 0.703 of random goal sets, and when the payoff model is wrong or a cliff is present, the code that resolves the boundary truthfully wins. This is the book's correction of its blueprint: utility beats truth only inside a stated, bounded model.
Scope of the numbers: Its parameters and data are illustrative or synthetic, and every calculation is generated by its programs. The book is not medical advice, offers no clinical psychological service, is not personal investment advice and makes no promise of returns; functional beliefs are for one's own action frame and never for deceiving others.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.7712
thresholds: truth x > 0.27, fitness g(x) > 0.50 solo payoff: truth 0.5480, fitness 0.6895 payoff matrix (row meets column): T vs T 0.5149 T vs F 0.4645 F vs T 0.6137 F vs F 0.5567 replicator, fitness share from 0.01 (Euler step 0.1): time 10.0 fitness share 0.0263 time 20.0 fitness share 0.0670 time 30.0 fitness share 0.1602 time 40.0 fitness share 0.3347 time 60.0 fitness share 0.7712 time 400.0 fitness share 1.0000
Show the full program
# Chapter 1. p11: fitness-coded vs truth-coded perception, replicator run
# Model after Mark, Marion and Hoffman (2010): a resource quantity x is
# uniform on [0, 1]; its fitness payoff g(x) is single-peaked (too little
# or too much of the resource is worth less than the middle). Each
# strategy sees one bit per territory. TRUTH colours a territory "high"
# when x > t (an order-preserving split of x); FITNESS colours it "high"
# when g(x) > s. Both thresholds are tuned for a solo choice among three
# territories. In a contest, three territories are drawn, a random first
# mover takes the one it sees as "high", and the second mover takes its
# preferred one of the two left. All parameters are illustrative.
import math
import random
PEAK, WIDTH = 0.5, 0.18
DRAWS = 60000
def g(x):
return math.exp(-0.5 * ((x - PEAK) / WIDTH) ** 2)
def pick(colours, rng):
best = [i for i, c in enumerate(colours) if c]
pool = best if best else list(range(len(colours)))
return pool[rng.randrange(len(pool))]
def solo_payoff(rule, cut, terr):
rng = random.Random(42711)
vals = []
for xs in terr:
cols = [rule(x) > cut for x in xs]
vals.append(g(xs[pick(cols, rng)]))
return math.fsum(vals) / len(vals)
def tune(rule, terr):
grid = [i / 100 for i in range(5, 96)]
return max(grid, key=lambda c: (solo_payoff(rule, c, terr), -c))
rng0 = random.Random(42701)
TERR = [[rng0.random() for _ in range(3)] for _ in range(DRAWS)]
tune_set = TERR[:8000]
t_cut = tune(lambda x: x, tune_set)
s_cut = tune(g, tune_set)
RULES = {"T": (lambda x: x, t_cut), "F": (g, s_cut)}
def contest(a, b):
rng = random.Random(42702)
pay = []
for n, xs in enumerate(TERR):
a_first = n % 2 == 0
first, second = (a, b) if a_first else (b, a)
r1, c1 = RULES[first]
i = pick([r1(x) > c1 for x in xs], rng)
rest = [x for k, x in enumerate(xs) if k != i]
r2, c2 = RULES[second]
j = pick([r2(x) > c2 for x in rest], rng)
pay.append(g(xs[i]) if a_first else g(rest[j]))
return math.fsum(pay) / len(pay)
M = {(a, b): contest(a, b) for a in "TF" for b in "TF"}
print("thresholds: truth x > %.2f, fitness g(x) > %.2f" % (t_cut, s_cut))
print("solo payoff: truth %.4f, fitness %.4f" % (
solo_payoff(lambda x: x, t_cut, TERR), solo_payoff(g, s_cut, TERR)))
print("payoff matrix (row meets column):")
for a in "TF":
print(" %s vs T %.4f %s vs F %.4f" % (a, M[(a, "T")], a, M[(a, "F")]))
xf, dt = 0.01, 0.1
print("replicator, fitness share from 0.01 (Euler step 0.1):")
for step in range(1, 4001):
pf = xf * M[("F", "F")] + (1 - xf) * M[("F", "T")]
pt = xf * M[("T", "F")] + (1 - xf) * M[("T", "T")]
mean = xf * pf + (1 - xf) * pt
xf += dt * xf * (pf - mean)
if step in (100, 200, 300, 400, 600, 4000):
print(" time %5.1f fitness share %.4f" % (step * dt, xf))Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). When Utility Outperforms Literal Truth: Evolutionary Fitness-Payoff Games, Functional Belief Engineering and Physical Guardrails (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 1: Fitness Beats Truth: a Replicator Contest between One-Bit Perceptions. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-427 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026427,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {When Utility Outperforms Literal Truth: Evolutionary Fitness-Payoff Games, Functional Belief Engineering and Physical Guardrails},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 2 · Truth Strikes Back: Shifting Goals, Wrong Models and Cliff-Edge Costs
- Chapter 3 · When Overconfidence Evolves: the Value-to-Cost Ratio and Noisy Reading of Rivals
- Chapter 4 · The Ceiling on Self-Fulfilment: How Far Confidence Can Lift the Odds
- Chapter 5 · Overconfidence Meets the Kelly Criterion: the Growth Cost of an Inflated Win Rate and the Probability of Ruin
- Chapter 6 · The Dual Ledger: the Brier Score, Its Calibration Decomposition and Boundaries That Do Not Yield
- Chapter 7 · Classical Sources: the Constant Course of Heaven, the Hare and the Stump, the Expedient and Obedience to Nature
- Chapter 8 · Field Tools and Checker Specifications: the Dual-Ledger Records, Red-Flag Rules and a Pre-Registered Test