What does Jadeite Identification and the Winner's Curse conclude, in numbers, about “Sealed Tenders: a Monte Carlo of the Winner's Curse in N-Bidder Common-Value Auctions”?

Answer: Chapter 5 simulates N-bidder common-value tenders: under the naive rule the winner of a twelve-bidder tender loses 19.46 per auction on average, while bidding as if one had already won restores the reserved profit.

Scope of the numbers: Its parameters are illustrative; all calculations are generated by its programs; it is not personalised legal or financial advice, nor an identification report on any stone. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (18 programs), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.

中文版

Data table

The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python only

naive bidders: bid = own estimate - 5
Nmean profitP(winner loses)theory 5 - 15 e_N
2-3.500.603-3.46
4-10.460.841-10.44
6-14.000.939-14.01
8-16.470.976-16.35
12-19.460.996-19.44
16-21.351.000-21.49
24-24.171.000-24.22
N = 12, auctions split by winning bid:
lowest thirdmean bid95.9mean profit -15.94
middle thirdmean bid119.1mean profit -19.15
highest thirdmean bid142.9mean profit -23.28
Show the full program
# Chapter 5. p51: N-bidder common-value auction with naive bidders.
# 共同价值模型(参数示意):一块原石对所有买手价值相同 V ~ N(100, 20);
# 每位买手的估计 s_i = V + e_i,e_i ~ N(0, 15),无偏且相互独立。
# 天真买手按估计减固定利润 5 出价;暗标最高价中标并按己价付款。
# 固定种子蒙特卡洛,每个 N 模拟 20000 场;理论值 = 5 - 15 e_N(见 p11)。
# 再在 N = 12 时按中标价三等分,看「中标价越高,赢家亏得越多」是否成立(条件期望,而非因果)。
import math
import random
from statistics import NormalDist

ND = NormalDist()

MU, TAU, SIG, MARGIN = 100.0, 20.0, 15.0, 5.0
ROUNDS = 20000


def e_max(n, lo=-9.0, hi=9.0, steps=18000):
    h = (hi - lo) / steps
    vals = []
    for i in range(steps + 1):
        x = lo + i * h
        w = 1 if i in (0, steps) else (4 if i % 2 else 2)
        vals.append(w * x * n * ND.pdf(x) * ND.cdf(x) ** (n - 1))
    return math.fsum(vals) * h / 3


def auction(rng, n):
    v = rng.gauss(MU, TAU)
    top = max(v + rng.gauss(0.0, SIG) for _ in range(n))
    bid = top - MARGIN
    return v, bid


def main():
    print("naive bidders: bid = own estimate - %.0f" % MARGIN)
    print("   N   mean profit   P(winner loses)   theory 5 - 15 e_N")
    for n in (2, 4, 6, 8, 12, 16, 24):
        rng = random.Random(20261112 + n)
        prof = []
        for _ in range(ROUNDS):
            v, b = auction(rng, n)
            prof.append(v - b)
        mp = math.fsum(prof) / ROUNDS
        pl = len([p for p in prof if p < 0]) / ROUNDS
        print("%4d    %+7.2f          %.3f            %+6.2f"
              % (n, mp, pl, MARGIN - SIG * e_max(n)))
    rng = random.Random(20261112)
    rows = sorted((auction(rng, 12) for _ in range(ROUNDS)),
                  key=lambda r: r[1])
    print("N = 12, auctions split by winning bid:")
    third = ROUNDS // 3
    names = ("lowest third", "middle third", "highest third")
    for j in range(3):
        part = rows[j * third:(j + 1) * third]
        mb = math.fsum(b for _, b in part) / len(part)
        mp = math.fsum(v - b for v, b in part) / len(part)
        print("  %-14s mean bid %6.1f   mean profit %+6.2f"
              % (names[j], mb, mp))


if __name__ == "__main__":
    main()

Single source and citation

Fan, Y. (2026). Hydrostatic Specific Gravity and Bayesian Jadeite Identification, Window-Cut Signalling Games and the Winner's Curse in Rough-Jade Tenders (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 5: Sealed Tenders: a Monte Carlo of the Winner's Curse in N-Bidder Common-Value Auctions. 5D Library. DOI pending

DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-206 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026206,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Hydrostatic Specific Gravity and Bayesian Jadeite Identification, Window-Cut Signalling Games and the Winner's Curse in Rough-Jade Tenders},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  note      = {DOI pending}
}

Other chapter answers in this book