Hydrostatic Specific Gravity and Bayesian Jadeite Identification, Window-Cut Signalling Games and the Winner's Curse in Rough-Jade Tenders: chapter answers
This book overturns a popular belief: that gambling on jadeite rough, "poor or rich with one cut", roughly breaks even over time. Its proposition is that, taken as a whole, buying windowed rough has a negative expected return from three sources: the window is a sample chosen by the seller, the decision to sell as rough is itself a selection, and a sealed tender is won by the most optimistic estimate. Published research supplies the general laws: in the jar-of-coins experiment the mean winning bid was 1.251 times the true value; in the laboratory larger groups lost more, yet a field study of o…
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- Chapter 1 · The Ledger of Rough: Adverse Selection, Chosen Windows and the Winner's Curse
Chapter 1 decomposes returns with a model: window selection alone gives a lone buyer a portfolio return of −0.225, while 0.313 of buyers who purchase only five stones see a profit in their ledgers. - Chapter 2 · Hydrostatic Weighing: Specific-Gravity Error and the Limits of a Single Reading
Chapter 2 covers hydrostatic weighing: a 2-gram stone on a 0.01-gram balance gives a specific-gravity reading with standard deviation 0.0393; specific gravity separates jadeite from nephrite but not from B jade, with an… - Chapter 3 · Chained Likelihood Ratios: Bayesian Identification by Specific Gravity, Refractive Index and Fluorescence
Chapter 3 chains specific gravity, refractive index and fluorescence into likelihood ratios: the same readings give a jadeite posterior of 0.8622 in a tourist market and 0.9657 at a reputable dealer. - Chapter 4 · Window Signals: Best-Spot Bias, a Separating Equilibrium and the Unravelling of Unwindowed Rough
Chapter 4 computes the window bias (a seller who examines four spots makes an uncorrecting buyer overpay 0.311), a separating equilibrium in window size (when faking is cheap a naive buyer overpays 42.0 per stone) and t… - Chapter 5 · Sealed Tenders: a Monte Carlo of the Winner's Curse in N-Bidder Common-Value Auctions
Chapter 5 simulates N-bidder common-value tenders: under the naive rule the winner of a twelve-bidder tender loses 19.46 per auction on average, while bidding as if one had already won restores the reserved profit. - Chapter 6 · The Bid Cap: Folding Identification, Window and Curse into One Number, with Stake Size and Ruin
Chapter 6 folds the three corrections into a bid cap: 0.309 of the window valuation with a chosen window, six bidders and a reliable certificate, and 0.274 with counter tests only; in a tender dominated by naive buyers… - Chapter 7 · Classical Sources East and West: the Tiangong Kaiwu on Jade and Book 37 of Pliny's Natural History
Chapter 7 examines Song Yingxing's jade workers who "judge the rough and set the price" in the Tiangong Kaiwu and Pliny's weight test in Book 37 of the Natural History: telling jadeite from B jade by hand has a discrimi… - Chapter 8 · Closing the Loop: the Buyer's Flow Card, the Bid Cap, a Compliant Script and Pre-Registered Tests
Chapter 8 gives the buyer's flow card (a false-pass rate of 0.0068 once infrared is added), a compliant script for declining to buy rough for clients, the distilled Jade Likelihood Identifier and a pre-registered testin…
Illustrative model calculation, not a live quote