5D Library › Multistage Ultimatum Bargaining, Accounts-Receivable Decay Kinetics and Optimal Escalation Sequences · 中文
Chapter 1. What a Pattern of Concessions Tells the Other Side
The Ackerman sequence
A popular negotiation book recommends that a buyer set a target price, open at 65% of it, and then rise to 85%, 95% and finally 100%, ending on a precise, non-round number (Voss and Raz 2016). The claim is that shrinking steps persuade the seller that the buyer is approaching a limit. That is a claim about inference, and it can be written as one. Suppose the seller reads each step as closing a fixed part of the gap between the last offer and the buyer’s true limit , with some noise:
Without noise, three offers fix exactly: . p01 gives the seller a wide prior and computes the posterior after the first three offers.
Calculation
# Chapter 1. p01: What a concession pattern tells the other side. A
# buyer with target price 100 makes four offers. Ackerman plan: 65, 85,
# 95, 100 (shrinking steps). Equal steps: 65, 77, 89, 100. The seller
# reads the steps with a simple model: each offer closes a fixed part
# k of the gap to the buyer's true limit R, plus noise (sd 2):
# o(n+1) - o(n) = k (R - o(n)) + e.
# Prior: R uniform on 95 to 160, k uniform on 0.2 to 0.8 (grid). The
# seller's posterior for R after the first three offers: its mean, the
# chance that R is at most 105 and the chance that R is above 120.
from math import exp
def posterior(offers, sd=2.0):
rs = [95 + i * 0.5 for i in range(131)]
ks = [0.2 + j * 0.01 for j in range(61)]
post = []
for r in rs:
w = 0.0
for k in ks:
ll = 0.0
for a, b in zip(offers, offers[1:]):
ll += -((b - a) - k * (r - a)) ** 2 / (2 * sd * sd)
w += exp(ll)
post.append(w)
z = sum(post)
return rs, [p / z for p in post]
if __name__ == "__main__":
print(" plan offers so far E[R] P(R <= 105)"
" P(R > 120)")
for lab, offers in (("Ackerman", (65, 85, 95)),
("equal steps", (65, 77, 89))):
rs, p = posterior(offers)
mean = sum(r * w for r, w in zip(rs, p))
lo = sum(w for r, w in zip(rs, p) if r <= 105)
hi = sum(w for r, w in zip(rs, p) if r > 120)
print(" {:<15} {:<14} {:6.1f} {:10.3f} {:10.3f}".format(
lab, ", ".join(map(str, offers)), mean, lo, hi))
o1, o2, o3 = 65, 85, 95
print(" noise-free limit implied by 65, 85, 95: {:.1f}".format(
(o2 * o2 - o1 * o3) / (2 * o2 - o1 - o3)))
# plan offers so far E[R] P(R <= 105) P(R > 120)
# Ackerman 65, 85, 95 110.9 0.389 0.185
# equal steps 65, 77, 89 115.8 0.206 0.360
# noise-free limit implied by 65, 85, 95: 105.0After 65, 85 and 95 the seller’s best estimate of the limit is 110.9; it puts 0.389 on the limit being at most 105 and 0.185 on its being above 120. After equal steps of 65, 77 and 89 the estimate is 115.8, with only 0.206 at most 105 and 0.360 above 120. Without noise, 65, 85 and 95 would imply a limit of exactly 105.0. The shrinking steps do move the seller’s beliefs toward the buyer’s real limit, but only part of the way, and only if the seller reads them this way. A seller who knows the method, or who reads steps differently, learns nothing from them.
A precise final number
Experiments find that people adjust less from a precise anchor than from a round one, as if precision signalled that the number had been worked out (Janiszewski and Uy 2008). p02 writes this as a likelihood ratio: a buyer at the real limit is assumed to name a precise number more often than one with room to spare.
Calculation
# Chapter 1. p02: A precise final number. The buyer's last offer is
# either round (100) or precise (99.37, the same money to two decimal
# places). The seller asks whether it is truly final. Assumed
# likelihoods: buyers at their real limit state a precise number with
# chance 0.6 and a round one with 0.4; buyers with room left state a
# precise number with chance 0.2 and a round one with 0.8. Prior that
# the offer is final, 0.5 (after an Ackerman sequence, 0.7). The seller
# pushes for more unless the posterior that it is final exceeds 0.70;
# a push ends the talks with chance 0.15.
def final_belief(prior, precise):
a = prior * (0.6 if precise else 0.4)
b = (1 - prior) * (0.2 if precise else 0.8)
return a / (a + b)
if __name__ == "__main__":
print(" prior last offer P(final) seller pushes? deal chance")
for prior in (0.5, 0.7):
for precise in (False, True):
q = final_belief(prior, precise)
push = q <= 0.70
print(" {:5.1f} {:<10} {:8.3f} {:>14} {:11.2f}".format(
prior, "precise" if precise else "round", q,
"yes" if push else "no", 0.85 if push else 1.00))
# prior last offer P(final) seller pushes? deal chance
# 0.5 round 0.333 yes 0.85
# 0.5 precise 0.750 no 1.00
# 0.7 round 0.538 yes 0.85
# 0.7 precise 0.875 no 1.00With an even prior, a round final offer leaves the seller’s belief that it is final at 0.333, and the seller pushes for more, which ends the talks with chance 0.15; a precise one raises the belief to 0.750 and the seller accepts. After an Ackerman sequence that has already raised the prior to 0.7, the beliefs are 0.538 and 0.875. The precision works only through the seller’s assumption about who uses precise numbers; if buyers who bluff learn to name precise numbers too, the likelihood ratio and the effect shrink toward nothing.
Hypothesis · not established
The author’s interpretation (not yet tested): sellers who receive a sequence of shrinking concessions ending on a precise number estimate the buyer’s limit lower, and accept the final offer more often, than sellers who receive equal concessions ending on a round number with the same final price. What would show it wrong: in a pre-registered negotiation experiment with randomised offer sequences and the same final price, neither the estimated limit nor the acceptance rate differs between the two sequences.
Summary
Shrinking concessions are evidence about a limit, and a precise final number adds a little more, but both work through the other side’s inference. In the model their effect is real and modest, and it vanishes when the other side knows the method.
References
Fan, Y. (2026). Multistage Ultimatum Bargaining, Accounts-Receivable Decay Kinetics and Optimal Escalation Sequences: Ackerman Concession Curves, Credible Threat Thresholds and Default Recovery Bounds [多阶段最后通牒议价、应收账款衰减动力学与最优施压序列] (Version 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090245 · Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).