5D Library › 多阶段最后通牒议价、应收账款衰减动力学与最优施压序列 · English
第一章 一串让步对对方透露了什么
阿克曼序列
一本流行的谈判书建议买方先定一个目标价,以它的 65% 开价,再升到 85%、95%,最后到 100%,并以一个精确的零头数字结尾 (Voss and Raz 2016)。它的说法是:递减的步子会让卖方相信买方已经接近底线。这是一个关于推断的说法,可以写成推断。设卖方把每一步看作以固定比例 缩小上一次出价与买方真实底线 之间的差距,外加一些噪声:
没有噪声时,三次出价就能精确确定 :。p01 给卖方一个宽的先验,并计算前三次出价之后的后验。
推导
# Chapter 1. p01: What a concession pattern tells the other side. A
# buyer with target price 100 makes four offers. Ackerman plan: 65, 85,
# 95, 100 (shrinking steps). Equal steps: 65, 77, 89, 100. The seller
# reads the steps with a simple model: each offer closes a fixed part
# k of the gap to the buyer's true limit R, plus noise (sd 2):
# o(n+1) - o(n) = k (R - o(n)) + e.
# Prior: R uniform on 95 to 160, k uniform on 0.2 to 0.8 (grid). The
# seller's posterior for R after the first three offers: its mean, the
# chance that R is at most 105 and the chance that R is above 120.
from math import exp
def posterior(offers, sd=2.0):
rs = [95 + i * 0.5 for i in range(131)]
ks = [0.2 + j * 0.01 for j in range(61)]
post = []
for r in rs:
w = 0.0
for k in ks:
ll = 0.0
for a, b in zip(offers, offers[1:]):
ll += -((b - a) - k * (r - a)) ** 2 / (2 * sd * sd)
w += exp(ll)
post.append(w)
z = sum(post)
return rs, [p / z for p in post]
if __name__ == "__main__":
print(" plan offers so far E[R] P(R <= 105)"
" P(R > 120)")
for lab, offers in (("Ackerman", (65, 85, 95)),
("equal steps", (65, 77, 89))):
rs, p = posterior(offers)
mean = sum(r * w for r, w in zip(rs, p))
lo = sum(w for r, w in zip(rs, p) if r <= 105)
hi = sum(w for r, w in zip(rs, p) if r > 120)
print(" {:<15} {:<14} {:6.1f} {:10.3f} {:10.3f}".format(
lab, ", ".join(map(str, offers)), mean, lo, hi))
o1, o2, o3 = 65, 85, 95
print(" noise-free limit implied by 65, 85, 95: {:.1f}".format(
(o2 * o2 - o1 * o3) / (2 * o2 - o1 - o3)))
# plan offers so far E[R] P(R <= 105) P(R > 120)
# Ackerman 65, 85, 95 110.9 0.389 0.185
# equal steps 65, 77, 89 115.8 0.206 0.360
# noise-free limit implied by 65, 85, 95: 105.0出过 65、85、95 之后,卖方对底线的最佳估计是 110.9;他认为底线不超过 105 的机会是 0.389,超过 120 的是 0.185。等幅出价 65、77、89 之后,估计是 115.8,不超过 105 的只有 0.206,超过 120 的有 0.360。没有噪声时,65、85、95 意味着底线恰好是 105.0。递减的步子确实把卖方的信念推向买方的真实底线,但只推了一部分,而且只在卖方这样解读时才有效。知道这个方法、或者用别的方式解读步子的卖方,从中学不到任何东西。
精确的最后数字
实验发现,人们从精确的锚点出发调整得比从整数锚点少,仿佛精确意味着这个数字是算出来的 (Janiszewski and Uy 2008)。p02 把这一点写成似然比:假设处在真实底线的买方,比还有余地的买方更常报出精确的数字。
推导
# Chapter 1. p02: A precise final number. The buyer's last offer is
# either round (100) or precise (99.37, the same money to two decimal
# places). The seller asks whether it is truly final. Assumed
# likelihoods: buyers at their real limit state a precise number with
# chance 0.6 and a round one with 0.4; buyers with room left state a
# precise number with chance 0.2 and a round one with 0.8. Prior that
# the offer is final, 0.5 (after an Ackerman sequence, 0.7). The seller
# pushes for more unless the posterior that it is final exceeds 0.70;
# a push ends the talks with chance 0.15.
def final_belief(prior, precise):
a = prior * (0.6 if precise else 0.4)
b = (1 - prior) * (0.2 if precise else 0.8)
return a / (a + b)
if __name__ == "__main__":
print(" prior last offer P(final) seller pushes? deal chance")
for prior in (0.5, 0.7):
for precise in (False, True):
q = final_belief(prior, precise)
push = q <= 0.70
print(" {:5.1f} {:<10} {:8.3f} {:>14} {:11.2f}".format(
prior, "precise" if precise else "round", q,
"yes" if push else "no", 0.85 if push else 1.00))
# prior last offer P(final) seller pushes? deal chance
# 0.5 round 0.333 yes 0.85
# 0.5 precise 0.750 no 1.00
# 0.7 round 0.538 yes 0.85
# 0.7 precise 0.875 no 1.00先验各半时,整数的最后报价让卖方认为「这是最后报价」的信念只有 0.333,卖方会要求更多,而这会以 0.15 的机会让谈判破裂;精确的数字把信念提高到 0.750,卖方就接受。在阿克曼序列已经把先验提高到 0.7 之后,两种信念分别是 0.538 与 0.875。精确数字只通过卖方对「谁会用精确数字」的假设起作用;如果虚张声势的买方也学会报精确数字,似然比与效果都会缩小到零。
假说 · 尚未验证
作者的诠释(尚未验证): 收到以精确数字结尾的递减让步序列的卖方,比收到以整数结尾、最终价格相同的等幅让步的卖方,对买方底线的估计更低,接受最后报价也更常见。什么会证明它错: 在一项随机分配出价序列、最终价格相同的预先登记谈判实验中,两种序列之间估计的底线与接受率都没有差别。
小结
递减的让步是关于底线的证据,精确的最后数字再多加一点,但两者都通过对方的推断起作用。在模型里它们的效果真实而有限,当对方知道这个方法时就消失了。
参考文献
Fan, Y. (2026). Multistage Ultimatum Bargaining, Accounts-Receivable Decay Kinetics and Optimal Escalation Sequences: Ackerman Concession Curves, Credible Threat Thresholds and Default Recovery Bounds [多阶段最后通牒议价、应收账款衰减动力学与最优施压序列] (Version 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090245 · Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).