5D Library › Multistage Ultimatum Bargaining, Accounts-Receivable Decay Kinetics and Optimal Escalation Sequences · 中文

Preface: Offers, Overdue Invoices and Threats as Arithmetic

Note

Please read this first. This book studies three kinds of hard conversation: haggling over a price, chasing money that is owed, and asking for a raise or a price increase. It asks what a pattern of concessions tells the other side, why overdue invoices seem to become less collectible every month, when to escalate from a reminder to stopping service to a lawyer’s letter, when a threat is credible, and how an outside alternative changes a negotiation. Its parameters are illustrative or synthetic, meant to show structure; all calculations are generated by the programs printed in the book. This book is not legal, financial or employment advice. Debt collection is regulated in most places; harassment, deception and threats of action one does not intend or is not allowed to take are unlawful in many of them and are not tactics this book endorses.

Several claims about negotiation and collection are widely repeated: that the Ackerman sequence of offers at 65%, 85%, 95% and 100% of the target, ending on an odd number, beats equal concessions; that receivables more than 90 days overdue are worth less than 40% of their face value; that a debt should be chased with a fixed escalation timetable; that a threat makes the other side pay; and that a raise is won by having an offer elsewhere. This book writes them as arithmetic that can be run, then asks when they hold.

What the book covers

Chapter 1 reads a sequence of concessions as evidence about the buyer’s limit and asks what a precise final number adds. Chapter 2 solves Rubinstein’s alternating offers and an ultimatum game with fairness-minded responders. Chapter 3 shows why the collectible share of overdue invoices falls month by month even when no debtor changes. Chapter 4 finds the best days to escalate and shows what a wrong flag costs. Chapter 5 asks when a threat to sue is credible and when it pays to follow through for the sake of reputation. Chapter 6 treats a raise as a Nash bargain and compares building a real alternative with bluffing. Chapter 7 reads Zhu Zhiwu’s speech to the Duke of Qin in the Zuo zhuan, the “Mou gong” chapter of the Sunzi and the Tang code’s ladder of penalties for unpaid debt. Chapter 8 gives a collection playbook, a way to choose an opening offer and the problem of knowing a client from a few invoices.

Claims corrected after checking

  1. Shrinking steps help, but modestly. After 65, 85 and 95 the seller’s estimate of the buyer’s limit is 110.9, against 115.8 after equal steps; the steps narrow the other side’s hopes rather than fix them (Chapter 1, p01).
  2. A precise number is evidence, not magic. Under assumed likelihoods it raises the seller’s belief that an offer is final from 0.333 to 0.750 (p02).
  3. “Below 40% after 90 days” is not general. In one book of debtors 0.697 of the invoices still open on day 90 are eventually paid, in a riskier one 0.478; the fall is mostly selection, because good payers leave the pool first (Chapter 3, p05, p06).
  4. Escalating at once destroys value. Stopping service and sending a lawyer’s letter on day 1 cuts net recovery from 0.9450 to 0.5936, because prompt customers are lost (Chapter 4, p07).
  5. A threat below the cost of carrying it out is empty. With ordinary litigation a threat to sue is credible only for invoices above 4,762; a small-claims track lowers the threshold to 476 (Chapter 5, p09).
  6. A bluff costs more than it seems. In the model, bluffing about an outside offer is worth -4,000 over a year, while a real search with an even chance of an offer is worth +1,500 (Chapter 6, p12).
  7. Two attributions. Zhu Zhiwu’s speech to the Duke of Qin is in the Zuo zhuan (Duke Xi, year 30), not in the Zhanguo ce; the Tang rule on unpaid debt is in the “Za lu” section of the Tang code, and the “gong yan” of Tang and Song were official certificates, not a system of debt recovery (Chapter 7).

How to read the boxes

The boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python computations (16 programs, standard library only, fixed random seeds, each actually run at build time with its real output printed beneath it), classical sources, notes and the author’s hypotheses; every hypothesis states what result would show it wrong. Programs and their output use ASCII characters only.

Disclosure

The author uses the works of 5D Library (including this book) as the methodological basis of community courses, the 5D Ascension Cards (Dimensional Shift Card Decks) and the Yafu AI knowledge base, and runs several websites, paid online calculators, subscriptions, reports, courses, business licences and advisory services, including a site on negotiation and on collection and raise scripts, which is exactly what this book studies; the author therefore has a direct commercial interest in its subject. This book promotes no software, course, card deck, collection agency, legal service or financial product, uses no client’s data, and accepts no sponsorship. All parameters in the book are synthetic or illustrative. The hypotheses of Chapters 1 to 7 must be tested under pre-registered protocols, and the results published whether positive or negative.

Fan, Y. (2026). Multistage Ultimatum Bargaining, Accounts-Receivable Decay Kinetics and Optimal Escalation Sequences: Ackerman Concession Curves, Credible Threat Thresholds and Default Recovery Bounds [多阶段最后通牒议价、应收账款衰减动力学与最优施压序列] (Version 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090245 · Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).