5D Library › Multistage Ultimatum Bargaining, Accounts-Receivable Decay Kinetics and Optimal Escalation Sequences · 中文

Chapter 2. Patience, Deadlines and Fairness

Alternating offers

Rubinstein showed that when two sides take turns making offers over a surplus that shrinks with delay, there is a unique subgame-perfect outcome, reached at once: the first proposer receives (1−δ2)/(1−δ1δ2)(1 – \delta_2)/(1 – \delta_1 \delta_2), where δi\delta_i is how much side ii values a deal one round later (Rubinstein 1982).

Calculation

# Chapter 2. p03: Rubinstein's alternating offers. Two sides split a
# surplus of 1, making offers in turn; each round of delay shrinks the
# value to side i by the factor d_i. In the unique subgame-perfect
# equilibrium the first proposer gets (1 - d2) / (1 - d1 d2) at once.
# With a chance b that talks break down after any rejection, each
# side's effective factor becomes d_i (1 - b).
def share(d1, d2):
    return (1 - d2) / (1 - d1 * d2)

if __name__ == "__main__":
    print("   d1 (proposer)   d2 (other)   proposer's share")
    for d1, d2 in ((0.9, 0.9), (0.99, 0.99), (0.95, 0.8), (0.8, 0.95)):
        print("   {:13.2f}   {:10.2f}   {:16.3f}".format(d1, d2,
                                                         share(d1, d2)))
    print("   breakdown risk b with d1 = d2 = 0.99")
    for b in (0.0, 0.05, 0.2):
        e = 0.99 * (1 - b)
        print("   b = {:.2f}: proposer's share {:.3f}".format(b, share(e, e)))
#    d1 (proposer)   d2 (other)   proposer's share
#             0.90         0.90              0.526
#             0.99         0.99              0.503
#             0.95         0.80              0.833
#             0.80         0.95              0.208
#    breakdown risk b with d1 = d2 = 0.99
#    b = 0.00: proposer's share 0.503
#    b = 0.05: proposer's share 0.515
#    b = 0.20: proposer's share 0.558

With equal patience of 0.9 the proposer gets 0.526; with 0.99, 0.503, almost an even split. Patience is power: a proposer with 0.95 facing an impatient side with 0.8 gets 0.833, and the reverse gives only 0.208. A risk that talks break down after a rejection acts like impatience on both sides and favours whoever moves first: with a breakdown risk of 0.05 the proposer’s share rises to 0.515, with 0.2 to 0.558. In a collection or a price negotiation, the side that can afford to wait, a supplier with other customers or a debtor with no urgent need for the supplier, holds the stronger hand.

Ultimatums and fairness

The ultimatum game is the last round of such a negotiation: one side proposes, the other accepts or both get nothing. Theory says the responder accepts any positive offer, but experiments find that low offers are often rejected (Güth et al. 1982). p04 gives responders a private threshold, spread evenly between 0 and half the pie, and adds a deadline game in which the pie shrinks 10% a round.

Calculation

# Chapter 2. p04: An ultimatum with a fairness threshold. A proposer
# offers a share x of 1; the responder accepts if x is at least a
# private threshold t. Thresholds are uniform on 0 to 0.5 (people who
# reject unfair offers, as in ultimatum experiments). The proposer's
# expected payoff is (1 - x) P(t <= x) = (1 - x) 2x, largest at
# x = 0.5. Then a deadline game: n rounds of alternating ultimatums,
# the pie shrinking 10% a round; the responder in the last round has
# no future, so the last proposer gets the most. The parity of n decides
# who makes the last offer (odd n: the first proposer; even n: the other
# side), so the first proposer's share alternates; the alternation damps
# by 0.9 a round and the share converges to 1 / (1 + 0.9), the Rubinstein
# share of p03 for patience 0.9.
if __name__ == "__main__":
    print("   offer x   accepted   proposer's expected payoff")
    for x in (0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5):
        acc = min(1.0, 2 * x)
        print("   {:7.1f}   {:8.2f}   {:26.3f}".format(x, acc, (1 - x) * acc))
    print("   deadline game, pie shrinks 10% a round (backward induction)")
    for n in (1, 2, 3, 4, 10):
        v = 1.0              # last proposer's share of the remaining pie
        for _ in range(n - 1):
            v = 1 - 0.9 * v  # earlier proposer leaves the other its value
        print("   rounds {:2d}: first proposer's share {:.3f}".format(n, v))
    print("   limit as rounds grow: {:.3f} (= 1 / 1.9)".format(1 / 1.9))
#    offer x   accepted   proposer's expected payoff
#        0.1       0.20                        0.180
#        0.2       0.40                        0.320
#        0.3       0.60                        0.420
#        0.4       0.80                        0.480
#        0.5       1.00                        0.500
#    deadline game, pie shrinks 10% a round (backward induction)
#    rounds  1: first proposer's share 1.000
#    rounds  2: first proposer's share 0.100
#    rounds  3: first proposer's share 0.910
#    rounds  4: first proposer's share 0.181
#    rounds 10: first proposer's share 0.343
#    limit as rounds grow: 0.526 (= 1 / 1.9)

Against fairness-minded responders the proposer’s best offer is half: an offer of 0.1 is accepted only a fifth of the time and yields 0.180, while 0.5 is always accepted and yields 0.500. In the deadline game the last proposer takes everything; with two rounds, the first proposer gets only 0.100; with three, 0.910; with ten, 0.343. The shares alternate because the parity of the number of rounds decides who makes the last offer: with an odd number the first proposer also makes the last offer, with an even number the other side does. Each extra round damps the swing by a factor of 0.9, and as the rounds grow the first proposer’s share converges to 0.526, the same Rubinstein share for patience 0.9 that p03 gives. Who makes the last offer before a real deadline matters more than how clever the earlier offers were, which is why setting the deadline, and making it credible, is itself part of a negotiation.

Hypothesis · not established

The author’s interpretation (not yet tested): in business negotiations with a fixed external deadline, the party that makes the last offer before the deadline obtains a larger share of the surplus than the other party. What would show it wrong: in a pre-registered study of negotiations with documented deadlines and offer sequences, the share obtained is unrelated to which party made the last offer.

Summary

Patience and a credible deadline decide much of a bargain before any offer is made; and because people reject offers they find unfair, the arithmetic of a final offer has to include the other side’s sense of fairness.

References

Güth, Werner, Rolf Schmittberger, and Bernd Schwarze. 1982. “An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 3 (4): 367 to 388.
Rubinstein, Ariel. 1982. “Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model.” Econometrica 50 (1): 97 to 109.

Fan, Y. (2026). Multistage Ultimatum Bargaining, Accounts-Receivable Decay Kinetics and Optimal Escalation Sequences: Ackerman Concession Curves, Credible Threat Thresholds and Default Recovery Bounds [多阶段最后通牒议价、应收账款衰减动力学与最优施压序列] (Version 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090245 · Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).