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Chapter 3. Why Overdue Invoices Look Less Collectible Every Month

The ageing table

Collection agencies and credit managers circulate tables showing that the chance of collecting an overdue debt falls steeply with its age, often with a figure such as “below 40% after 90 days”. This book could not trace such tables to an original study with stated data, so it treats the figure as a claim to test. The shape, at least, is easy to produce. p05 builds two books of 10,000 overdue invoices from three kinds of debtor: prompt payers who are a little late, slow payers, and distressed debtors who may become insolvent. Crucially, nobody’s own chance of paying changes with time.

Calculation

# Chapter 3. p05: Why overdue invoices look less collectible every
# month. 10,000 overdue invoices of equal size. Debtors are of three
# kinds: prompt-but-late (pay with hazard 1/15 a day), slow (1/90 a
# day) and distressed (1/400 a day, and each day a 1/250 chance of
# becoming insolvent, after which nothing is paid). Nobody's own hazard
# changes with time. Book A: 60% / 30% / 10%. Book B, a riskier book:
# 40% / 30% / 30%. For invoices still unpaid on day t, the share
# eventually collected within two years. Seed 94.
import random

RATES = ((1 / 15, 0.0), (1 / 90, 0.0), (1 / 400, 1 / 250))

def invoice(rng, mix):
    u, k = rng.random(), 0
    while u >= mix[k]:
        u -= mix[k]
        k += 1
    pay, fail = RATES[k]
    t_pay = rng.expovariate(pay)
    t_fail = rng.expovariate(fail) if fail else 1e9
    return t_pay if t_pay < min(t_fail, 730) else None

def table(rng, mix):
    inv = [invoice(rng, mix) for _ in range(10000)]
    rows = []
    for t in (0, 30, 60, 90, 180, 365):
        open_ = [x for x in inv if x is None or x > t]
        col = sum(1 for x in open_ if x is not None) / len(open_)
        rows.append((t, len(open_) / len(inv), col))
    return rows

if __name__ == "__main__":
    rng = random.Random(94)
    a = table(rng, (0.6, 0.3, 0.1))
    b = table(rng, (0.4, 0.3, 0.3))
    print("   days     book A: unpaid  collectible   book B: unpaid"
          "  collectible")
    for (t, ua, ca), (_, ub, cb) in zip(a, b):
        print("   {:4d}   {:14.3f}  {:11.3f}   {:14.3f}  {:11.3f}".format(
            t, ua, ca, ub, cb))
#    days     book A: unpaid  collectible   book B: unpaid  collectible
#       0            1.000        0.939            1.000        0.816
#      30            0.391        0.845            0.543        0.660
#      60            0.258        0.765            0.418        0.559
#      90            0.200        0.697            0.353        0.478
#     180            0.114        0.469            0.256        0.279
#     365            0.068        0.111            0.199        0.071

In book A, 0.939 of all overdue invoices are eventually paid. But among invoices still open on day 90, only 0.697 will be; on day 180, 0.469; on day 365, 0.111. In the riskier book B the figures are 0.816 at the start, 0.478 on day 90 and 0.279 on day 180. The ageing curve falls steeply, and the “below 40% at 90 days” figure would need a book riskier still. Yet no debtor’s propensity has declined: by day 90 the prompt payers have paid and left, and the invoices still open belong mostly to slow and distressed debtors. Only 0.200 of book A’s invoices are still open on day 90, against 0.353 of book B’s.

Share of invoices still open on each day that are eventually paid, for two books of debtors (p05).

Selection or decay?

Does that mean time does not matter? p06 separates the two effects for the slow payers alone.

Calculation

# Chapter 3. p06: Selection or decay? Take the slow debtors of p05
# alone (hazard of paying 1/90 a day). Case A: their hazard stays
# constant. Case B: each debtor's hazard itself decays, halving every
# 60 days (memories fade, records are lost, the relationship cools).
# Case C: as A, but with a 1/250 daily chance of insolvency. For an
# invoice still unpaid on day t, the chance it is ever paid within two
# years, computed from the hazards (daily steps).
from math import exp, log

def collect_from(t, hazard, fail=0.0, end=730):
    alive, got = 1.0, 0.0
    for d in range(t, end):
        h = hazard(d)
        got += alive * h
        alive *= (1 - h) * (1 - fail)
    return got

if __name__ == "__main__":
    a = lambda d: 1 / 90
    b = lambda d: (1 / 90) * exp(-log(2) * d / 60)
    print("   day t   A constant   B own decay   C insolvency")
    for t in (0, 30, 90, 180):
        print("   {:5d}   {:10.3f}   {:11.3f}   {:12.3f}".format(
            t, collect_from(t, a), collect_from(t, b),
            collect_from(t, a, 1 / 250)))
#    day t   A constant   B own decay   C insolvency
#        0        1.000         0.621          0.737
#       30        1.000         0.496          0.737
#       90        0.999         0.290          0.737
#      180        0.998         0.114          0.737

If a slow payer’s hazard stays constant, the chance of being paid within two years is 1.000 on day 0 and still 0.998 on day 180: waiting costs almost nothing. If the debtor’s own propensity halves every 60 days, it falls from 0.621 to 0.496 on day 30, 0.290 on day 90 and 0.114 on day 180: here time really destroys value. A constant risk of insolvency gives 0.737 whatever the day, because a risk that does not change with time cannot make an old invoice worse than a new one. An ageing table cannot tell these cases apart; only the debtor’s own behaviour can. For a collector, the useful question is not “how old is the invoice?” but “which kind of debtor is this, and is their ability or willingness to pay declining?”

Hypothesis · not established

The author’s interpretation (not yet tested): most of the decline in collection rates with the age of a debt reflects the changing mix of debtors still unpaid rather than a decline in each debtor’s own propensity to pay. What would show it wrong: in a pre-registered analysis of a creditor’s records with debtor characteristics, the within-debtor hazard of payment falls with age by about as much as the pooled collection rate does, after debtor type is held fixed.

Summary

Ageing curves fall even when no debtor changes, because the debtors who pay early leave first. The popular “40% after 90 days” depends on the mix of debtors; what matters for action is whether a particular debtor’s capacity or willingness is declining.

Fan, Y. (2026). Multistage Ultimatum Bargaining, Accounts-Receivable Decay Kinetics and Optimal Escalation Sequences: Ackerman Concession Curves, Credible Threat Thresholds and Default Recovery Bounds [多阶段最后通牒议价、应收账款衰减动力学与最优施压序列] (Version 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090245 · Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).