5D Library › Unbundling Economics, Anti-Arbitrage Identity Locking and Multi-Tier Licensing Ladders · 中文
Chapter 4. Self-Referral, Channel Blow-Through and Imitating Partners
Self-referral: arbitrage at half the cost
Chapter 3 assumed that the fortune-teller pays full price for the card. Many affiliate programmes do not forbid partners from buying through their own link, so she also gets back as commission and a slot costs her . On the other side, each reading costs the firm something to deliver (compute, manual review, support), here . If the firm’s net from each resold slot, , turns negative, the channel “blows through”: the more it sells, the more it loses.
Calculation
# Chapter 4. [p07] Self-referral and the channel "blow-through".
# As in p05: p2 = 99, card P = 199 for the holder plus k extra slots,
# commission g = 0.5. If the reseller may also buy the card through
# her own affiliate link, she gets g * P back, so a slot costs her
# (1 - g) P / (k + 1). Each reading costs the firm c = 15 to deliver
# (compute, review, support). The channel blows through when the firm's
# net per reading served, (1 - g) P / (k + 1) - c, falls below zero.
P2, CARD, G, C = 99.0, 199.0, 0.5, 15.0
if __name__ == "__main__":
print(" k slot cost slot cost reseller margin firm net/slot")
print(" (no self) (self-ref) at s = p2, self with self-ref")
for k in range(0, 9):
plain = CARD / (k + 1)
self_ = (1 - G) * CARD / (k + 1)
print(" {:2d} {:10.2f} {:11.2f} {:16.2f} {:14.2f}".format(
k, plain, self_, P2 - self_, self_ - C))
kb = next(k for k in range(0, 99) if (1 - G) * CARD / (k + 1) < C)
ka = next(k for k in range(0, 99)
if P2 - (1 - G) * CARD / (k + 1) > G * P2)
print(" with self-referral, resale beats referral from k = {}".format(
ka))
print(" firm net per slot below zero (blow-through) from k = {}".format(
kb))
print(" referral net per reading for comparison: {:.2f}".format(
(1 - G) * P2 - C))
print("\nReading: paying commission on a partner's own purchase halves")
print("the cost of arbitrage: two extra slots already make resale")
print("beat referral, and from six the firm pays to serve a reading.")
# k slot cost slot cost reseller margin firm net/slot
# (no self) (self-ref) at s = p2, self with self-ref
# 0 199.00 99.50 -0.50 84.50
# 1 99.50 49.75 49.25 34.75
# 2 66.33 33.17 65.83 18.17
# 3 49.75 24.88 74.12 9.88
# 4 39.80 19.90 79.10 4.90
# 5 33.17 16.58 82.42 1.58
# 6 28.43 14.21 84.79 -0.79
# 7 24.88 12.44 86.56 -2.56
# 8 22.11 11.06 87.94 -3.94
# with self-referral, resale beats referral from k = 2
# firm net per slot below zero (blow-through) from k = 6
# referral net per reading for comparison: 34.50
#
# Reading: paying commission on a partner's own purchase halves
# the cost of arbitrage: two extra slots already make resale
# beat referral, and from six the firm pays to serve a reading.With self-referral, two extra slots already make resale beat referral (65.83 against the 49.5 of p05 in Chapter 3, per client); with six, the firm loses 0.79 on every resold slot it serves, while a client referred in the ordinary way leaves the firm 34.50. Self-referral pulls Chapter 3’s threshold down from 4 slots to 2 and makes the firm truly lose money at 6.
Calculation
The blow-through condition. With self-referral and extra slots the firm’s net per resold slot is which is negative if and only if . With this book’s parameters the channel blows through from . The two rules that prevent it are independent: pay no commission on a partner’s own purchase (the second use of the identity lock), or make extra slots non-transferable.
Whom channel partners imitate
Once arbitrage pays better than referral it does not stay with a few people. Take 400 channel partners, each serving 10 clients a month. Each month each partner looks at a random colleague and, if the colleague earned more last month, switches to her strategy with a probability proportional to the difference. This is the pairwise imitation rule of evolutionary game theory, whose average dynamics is the replicator dynamics (Weibull 1995). Resale also loses clients to complaints (10% a month). At the start 2% of partners resell.
Calculation
# Chapter 4. [p08] Partner dynamics: how fast does a channel turn into
# resellers? 400 channel partners each serve 10 clients a month. Each
# month a partner compares her last-month payoff with that of a random
# other partner and copies the better strategy with probability
# gap / (referral payoff) (pairwise imitation, a discrete replicator
# rule), seed 68. Referral pays g * p2 = 49.5 per client. Resale pays
# p2 - slot cost, slot cost from p05/p07; resale also loses a share of
# clients each month to complaints (10%). Start: 2% resellers.
import random
P2, CARD, G, PARTNERS, CLIENTS = 99.0, 199.0, 0.5, 400, 10
def resale_pay(k, self_ref):
cost = (1 - G) * CARD if self_ref else CARD
return P2 - cost / (k + 1)
def run(k, self_ref, months=24, seed=68):
rng = random.Random(seed)
resell = [rng.random() < 0.02 for _ in range(PARTNERS)]
pay_r = 0.9 * CLIENTS * resale_pay(k, self_ref)
pay_a = CLIENTS * G * P2
scale = pay_a
for _ in range(months):
new = resell[:]
for i in range(PARTNERS):
j = rng.randrange(PARTNERS)
mine = pay_r if resell[i] else pay_a
theirs = pay_r if resell[j] else pay_a
if theirs > mine and rng.random() < (theirs - mine) / scale:
new[i] = resell[j]
resell = new
return sum(resell) / PARTNERS
if __name__ == "__main__":
print(" share of partners reselling after 6, 12 and 24 months")
print(" card 6 mo 12 mo 24 mo")
cases = (("identity lock (k = 0)", 0, False),
("k = 3, no self-referral", 3, False),
("k = 5, no self-referral", 5, False),
("k = 3, self-referral paid", 3, True))
for name, k, sr in cases:
out = [run(k, sr, m) for m in (6, 12, 24)]
print(" {:26s} {:6.3f} {:7.3f} {:7.3f}".format(name, *out))
print("\nReading: once resale pays more than referral, imitation")
print("spreads it, slowly at first and then fast: most of the channel")
print("within two years when self-referral is paid. With the lock, or")
print("whenever resale pays less, the first resellers die out.")
# share of partners reselling after 6, 12 and 24 months
# card 6 mo 12 mo 24 mo
# identity lock (k = 0) 0.000 0.000 0.000
# k = 3, no self-referral 0.010 0.003 0.000
# k = 5, no self-referral 0.020 0.062 0.380
# k = 3, self-referral paid 0.028 0.122 0.877
#
# Reading: once resale pays more than referral, imitation
# spreads it, slowly at first and then fast: most of the channel
# within two years when self-referral is paid. With the lock, or
# whenever resale pays less, the first resellers die out.With the identity lock the initial 2% of resellers soon vanish; with 3 extra slots and no self-referral resale pays less than referral, and resellers vanish too. With 5 extra slots resale pays slightly more; it spreads slowly at first, reaching only 0.062 at month 12, but 0.380 at month 24. With 3 extra slots and self-referral, 0.877 of partners resell after 24 months: the affiliate channel has turned into a resale channel.
Hypothesis · not established
The author’s interpretation (not yet tested): resale in a channel is not a matter of a few individuals’ ethics but a consequence of the price structure: whenever resale pays better than referral it spreads through imitation among colleagues, and within a year the spread is often invisible. What would show this wrong: if, in a channel that keeps extra slots and self-referral, the share of reselling partners stays low over two years (for example below 5%), imitation among partners is much weaker than in this model, or some cost the model leaves out (reputation, for instance) is at work.
Summary
Self-referral halves the cost of arbitrage: two extra slots make resale beat referral, and at six the firm pays for every resold slot it serves. Imitation among partners spreads profitable resale: with 3 extra slots and self-referral, 0.877 of partners resell after two years. The identity lock and “no commission on a partner’s own purchase” together make resale unprofitable from the start.
References
Fan, Y. (2026). Unbundling Economics, Anti-Arbitrage Identity Locking and Multi-Tier Licensing Ladders: Orthogonal Demand Partitioning, Resale Cannibalization Bounds, Affiliate Margin Preservation and Five-Figure B2B Upsell Equilibria [分拆经济学、防套利身份锁定与多阶授权阶梯] (Version 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090184 · Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).