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Chapter 5. The Six-Tier Menu: an Exactly Solved Screening Problem

From the hook to the agency seat

The six tiers in the author’s outline are: a lead-in hook p1p_1, a single deep report p2p_2, a one-module personal annual card p3p_3, a cross-module add-on p4p_4, a business-practitioner licence that opens multi-client charting with 50% commission withdrawal p5p_5, and a seat on the private board with full-matrix agency rights p6p_6. The seller does not know which kind of visitor is which; it can only put up a menu and let each kind choose. This is Mussa and Rosen’s problem of nonlinear pricing (screening): the seller designs a set of quality-price pairs so that each type prefers the item meant for it (incentive compatibility, IC) and prefers buying to not buying (individual rationality, IR) (Mussa and Rosen 1978).

Six types of buyer

The program has six types of visitor: the curious, seekers, regulars, enthusiasts, studios and agencies, with shares 0.60, 0.22, 0.10, 0.05, 0.025 and 0.005; each type’s values (in dollars) for the six tiers are listed in the program. A studio’s value for the licence is its commission income: 260 clients a year at 99 each with commission 0.5, together 12,870. Values have increasing differences (single crossing): the higher the type, the more it gains by moving up a tier. Each tier has a unit cost (the licence and the seat include training and support).

Under increasing differences the optimal prices follow a chain: the IR constraint of the lowest type served binds, and after that each type’s “downward IC” constraint against the type below binds: pj=pj−1+vt(j)−vt(j−1).p_j = p_{j-1} + v_t(j) – v_t(j-1) . The program enumerates every monotone assignment of types to tiers, prices it by this chain, re-checks every type’s choice and keeps the most profitable, so the result is the exact optimum, not an approximation.

Calculation

# Chapter 5. [p09] The six-tier menu as a screening problem.
# Tiers: 1 hook, 2 deep report, 3 one-module annual card, 4 cross-module
# add-on (two modules), 5 business licence (multi-client charts, 50%
# commission withdrawal), 6 private board + full-matrix agency seat.
# Six buyer types, shares per visitor. Values in USD (willingness to
# pay for each tier). A studio's licence value is its commission income:
# 0.5 x 99 x 260 clients a year = 12,870. Values have increasing
# differences (single crossing). Unit costs per tier below.
# Exact search: every monotone assignment of types to tiers (or none),
# prices from the binding IR of the lowest type served and the binding
# downward IC of each next type, then every choice re-checked.
from itertools import combinations_with_replacement as cwr

TYPES = ("curious", "seeker", "regular", "enthusiast", "studio",
         "agency")
SHARE = (0.60, 0.22, 0.10, 0.05, 0.025, 0.005)
V = ((12, 30, 40, 45, 50, 55),
     (15, 120, 180, 210, 240, 260),
     (18, 160, 330, 420, 520, 560),
     (20, 180, 420, 700, 1100, 1300),
     (20, 200, 500, 900, 12870, 16000),
     (20, 200, 520, 1000, 16000, 38000))
COST = (1, 3, 8, 12, 1500, 6000)

def prices_for(assign):
    price, prev = {}, None
    for t, j in enumerate(assign):
        if j == 0:
            continue
        if prev is None:
            price[j] = V[t][j - 1]
        elif j not in price:
            price[j] = price[prev] + V[t][j - 1] - V[t][prev - 1]
        prev = j
    return price

def choose(t, price):
    """the tier with the largest surplus >= 0; ties go up the ladder"""
    opts = [(round(V[t][j - 1] - price[j], 9), j) for j in price]
    opts = [o for o in opts if o[0] >= 0]
    return max(opts)[1] if opts else 0

def profit(price):
    tot, by = 0.0, {}
    for t in range(6):
        j = choose(t, price)
        if j:
            m = SHARE[t] * (price[j] - COST[j - 1])
            tot += m
            by[j] = by.get(j, 0.0) + m
    return tot, by

def solve(allowed=(1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6)):
    best = (-1, None, None)
    for assign in cwr((0,) + allowed, 6):
        price = prices_for(assign)
        p, by = profit(price)
        if p > best[0] + 1e-9:
            best = (p, price, by)
    return best

if __name__ == "__main__":
    p, price, by = solve()
    print("   optimal menu (profit {:.2f} per visitor)".format(p))
    print("   tier  price     ratio to previous  contribution share")
    prev = None
    for j in sorted(price):
        r = "" if prev is None else "{:.2f}".format(price[j] / prev)
        print("   {:4d} {:9.2f} {:>12s} {:20.3f}".format(
            j, price[j], r, by.get(j, 0.0) / p))
        prev = price[j]
    for t, name in enumerate(TYPES):
        j = choose(t, price)
        print("     {:10s} buys tier {}  surplus {:6.0f}".format(
            name, j, V[t][j - 1] - price[j] if j else 0.0))
#    optimal menu (profit 505.94 per visitor)
#    tier  price     ratio to previous  contribution share
#       1     12.00                             0.013
#       2    117.00         9.75                0.050
#       3    287.00         2.45                0.055
#       4    567.00         1.98                0.055
#       5  12537.00        22.11                0.545
#       6  34537.00         2.75                0.282
#      curious    buys tier 1  surplus      0
#      seeker     buys tier 2  surplus      3
#      regular    buys tier 3  surplus     43
#      enthusiast buys tier 4  surplus    133
#      studio     buys tier 5  surplus    333
#      agency     buys tier 6  surplus   3463
Prices of the six tiers (right axis, log scale) and each tier’s contribution to profit.

The optimal menu is 12, 117, 287, 567, 12537 and 34537: prices do span three orders of magnitude, the licence at about ten thousand and the agency seat at about thirty thousand, as the outline envisaged. The ratios between neighbouring steps are 9.75, 2.45, 1.98, 22.11 and 2.75. Profit, however, is highly concentrated: the licence brings 0.545 and the seat 0.282, together about four fifths; the first four tiers together bring less than a fifth.

The gap between the two B2B tiers is also set by the IC chain: the seat’s price is the licence price plus what an agency gains by moving up from licence to seat. Studios keep a surplus of 333 on the licence and agencies 3463 on the seat: the “information rent” of the screening model, the concession a high type must get so that it does not pose as a lower one.

How much the menu rests on its top

The program re-solves exactly under five changes.

Calculation

# Chapter 5. [p10] How much of the ladder's profit depends on its top?
# The model of p09 (same six types, values, shares and unit costs) is
# re-solved exactly under five changes: (a) consumer tiers only (1-4);
# (b) no agency seat (1-5); (c) licence capped at 3,000 because "it is
# only software" (it stays on the menu, higher prices follow from it);
# (d) studio and agency shares halved; (e) the studio commission
# halved (licence value 0.25 x 99 x 260 = 6,435).
from itertools import combinations_with_replacement as cwr

SHARE = (0.60, 0.22, 0.10, 0.05, 0.025, 0.005)
V = ((12, 30, 40, 45, 50, 55),
     (15, 120, 180, 210, 240, 260),
     (18, 160, 330, 420, 520, 560),
     (20, 180, 420, 700, 1100, 1300),
     (20, 200, 500, 900, 12870, 16000),
     (20, 200, 520, 1000, 16000, 38000))
COST = (1, 3, 8, 12, 1500, 6000)

def solve(v, share, allowed=(1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6), cap=None):
    best = (-1.0, None)
    for assign in cwr((0,) + allowed, 6):
        if cap and not set(cap) <= set(assign):
            continue          # a capped tier must stay on the menu
        price, prev = {}, None
        for t, j in enumerate(assign):
            if j == 0:
                continue
            if prev is None:
                price[j] = v[t][j - 1]
            elif j not in price:
                price[j] = price[prev] + v[t][j - 1] - v[t][prev - 1]
            if cap and j in cap:
                price[j] = min(price[j], cap[j])
            prev = j
        tot = 0.0
        for t in range(6):
            opts = [(round(v[t][j - 1] - price[j], 9), j) for j in price]
            opts = [o for o in opts if o[0] >= 0]
            if opts:
                j = max(opts)[1]
                tot += share[t] * (price[j] - COST[j - 1])
        if tot > best[0] + 1e-9:
            best = (tot, price)
    return best

if __name__ == "__main__":
    base, _ = solve(V, SHARE)
    v_half = [list(r) for r in V]
    v_half[4][4] = 6435
    cases = (("p09 menu", V, SHARE, (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6), None),
             ("(a) tiers 1-4 only", V, SHARE, (1, 2, 3, 4), None),
             ("(b) no agency seat", V, SHARE, (1, 2, 3, 4, 5), None),
             ("(c) licence <= 3,000", V, SHARE, (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6),
              {5: 3000}),
             ("(d) B2B shares halved", V,
              SHARE[:4] + (0.0125, 0.0025), (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6), None),
             ("(e) commission halved", v_half, SHARE,
              (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6), None))
    print("   case                      profit/visitor  vs p09   p5     p6")
    for name, v, sh, al, cap in cases:
        p, price = solve(v, sh, al, cap)
        print("   {:24s} {:12.2f} {:8.3f} {:>6s} {:>6s}".format(
            name, p, p / base,
            "{:.0f}".format(price[5]) if 5 in price else "-",
            "{:.0f}".format(price[6]) if 6 in price else "-"))
    print("\nReading: the two B2B tiers carry most of the profit. A cheap")
    print("licence does not just lose its own margin: the agency price")
    print("is tied to it through the IC chain and falls with it. If the")
    print("commission halves, the best menu drops the licence and sells")
    print("studios the agency seat at a lower price instead.")
#    case                      profit/visitor  vs p09   p5     p6
#    p09 menu                       505.94    1.000  12537  34537
#    (a) tiers 1-4 only             103.98    0.206      -      -
#    (b) no agency seat             418.44    0.827  12537      -
#    (c) licence <= 3,000           219.83    0.434   3000  25000
#    (d) B2B shares halved          296.63    0.586  12537  34537
#    (e) commission halved          377.34    0.746      -  15667
#
# Reading: the two B2B tiers carry most of the profit. A cheap
# licence does not just lose its own margin: the agency price
# is tied to it through the IC chain and falls with it. If the
# commission halves, the best menu drops the licence and sells
# studios the agency seat at a lower price instead.

Selling only the consumer tiers (1 to 4) leaves 0.206 of profit; without the agency seat, 0.827. Most striking is (c): if the licence is held below 3,000 because “it is only software”, profit falls to 0.434, and the agency seat falls to 25000 with it, because the IC chain ties it to the licence price. In (e), if the studios’ commission is halved, the best menu drops the licence altogether and sells the agency seat to studios and agencies alike at 15667.

Hypothesis · not established

The author’s interpretation (not yet tested): the author’s business is at heart a B2B licensing company, and the consumer tiers serve mainly to screen and grow future studios. What would show this wrong: if real data put studios’ and agencies’ values for the licence and the seat far below this book’s parameters (for example, studios serving only a few dozen clients a year), case (e) of p10 becomes reality, the optimal menu no longer includes a licence, and the author should move the weight back to the consumer tiers.

Summary

Written as a screening problem, the six-tier menu can be solved exactly: with this book’s parameters 12, 117, 287, 567, 12537 and 34537, with the licence and the agency seat bringing about four fifths of profit. For that very reason the menu is very sensitive to what is assumed at the top: a licence priced too low drags the seat price down through the IC chain, and if commission income halves, the licence tier is not worth having.

References

Mussa, Michael, and Sherwin Rosen. 1978. “Monopoly and Product Quality.” Journal of Economic Theory 18 (2): 301–17.

Fan, Y. (2026). Unbundling Economics, Anti-Arbitrage Identity Locking and Multi-Tier Licensing Ladders: Orthogonal Demand Partitioning, Resale Cannibalization Bounds, Affiliate Margin Preservation and Five-Figure B2B Upsell Equilibria [分拆经济学、防套利身份锁定与多阶授权阶梯] (Version 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090184 · Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).