5D Library › Unbundling Economics, Anti-Arbitrage Identity Locking and Multi-Tier Licensing Ladders · 中文
Chapter 5. The Six-Tier Menu: an Exactly Solved Screening Problem
From the hook to the agency seat
The six tiers in the author’s outline are: a lead-in hook , a single deep report , a one-module personal annual card , a cross-module add-on , a business-practitioner licence that opens multi-client charting with 50% commission withdrawal , and a seat on the private board with full-matrix agency rights . The seller does not know which kind of visitor is which; it can only put up a menu and let each kind choose. This is Mussa and Rosen’s problem of nonlinear pricing (screening): the seller designs a set of quality-price pairs so that each type prefers the item meant for it (incentive compatibility, IC) and prefers buying to not buying (individual rationality, IR) (Mussa and Rosen 1978).
Six types of buyer
The program has six types of visitor: the curious, seekers, regulars, enthusiasts, studios and agencies, with shares 0.60, 0.22, 0.10, 0.05, 0.025 and 0.005; each type’s values (in dollars) for the six tiers are listed in the program. A studio’s value for the licence is its commission income: 260 clients a year at 99 each with commission 0.5, together 12,870. Values have increasing differences (single crossing): the higher the type, the more it gains by moving up a tier. Each tier has a unit cost (the licence and the seat include training and support).
Under increasing differences the optimal prices follow a chain: the IR constraint of the lowest type served binds, and after that each type’s “downward IC” constraint against the type below binds: The program enumerates every monotone assignment of types to tiers, prices it by this chain, re-checks every type’s choice and keeps the most profitable, so the result is the exact optimum, not an approximation.
Calculation
# Chapter 5. [p09] The six-tier menu as a screening problem.
# Tiers: 1 hook, 2 deep report, 3 one-module annual card, 4 cross-module
# add-on (two modules), 5 business licence (multi-client charts, 50%
# commission withdrawal), 6 private board + full-matrix agency seat.
# Six buyer types, shares per visitor. Values in USD (willingness to
# pay for each tier). A studio's licence value is its commission income:
# 0.5 x 99 x 260 clients a year = 12,870. Values have increasing
# differences (single crossing). Unit costs per tier below.
# Exact search: every monotone assignment of types to tiers (or none),
# prices from the binding IR of the lowest type served and the binding
# downward IC of each next type, then every choice re-checked.
from itertools import combinations_with_replacement as cwr
TYPES = ("curious", "seeker", "regular", "enthusiast", "studio",
"agency")
SHARE = (0.60, 0.22, 0.10, 0.05, 0.025, 0.005)
V = ((12, 30, 40, 45, 50, 55),
(15, 120, 180, 210, 240, 260),
(18, 160, 330, 420, 520, 560),
(20, 180, 420, 700, 1100, 1300),
(20, 200, 500, 900, 12870, 16000),
(20, 200, 520, 1000, 16000, 38000))
COST = (1, 3, 8, 12, 1500, 6000)
def prices_for(assign):
price, prev = {}, None
for t, j in enumerate(assign):
if j == 0:
continue
if prev is None:
price[j] = V[t][j - 1]
elif j not in price:
price[j] = price[prev] + V[t][j - 1] - V[t][prev - 1]
prev = j
return price
def choose(t, price):
"""the tier with the largest surplus >= 0; ties go up the ladder"""
opts = [(round(V[t][j - 1] - price[j], 9), j) for j in price]
opts = [o for o in opts if o[0] >= 0]
return max(opts)[1] if opts else 0
def profit(price):
tot, by = 0.0, {}
for t in range(6):
j = choose(t, price)
if j:
m = SHARE[t] * (price[j] - COST[j - 1])
tot += m
by[j] = by.get(j, 0.0) + m
return tot, by
def solve(allowed=(1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6)):
best = (-1, None, None)
for assign in cwr((0,) + allowed, 6):
price = prices_for(assign)
p, by = profit(price)
if p > best[0] + 1e-9:
best = (p, price, by)
return best
if __name__ == "__main__":
p, price, by = solve()
print(" optimal menu (profit {:.2f} per visitor)".format(p))
print(" tier price ratio to previous contribution share")
prev = None
for j in sorted(price):
r = "" if prev is None else "{:.2f}".format(price[j] / prev)
print(" {:4d} {:9.2f} {:>12s} {:20.3f}".format(
j, price[j], r, by.get(j, 0.0) / p))
prev = price[j]
for t, name in enumerate(TYPES):
j = choose(t, price)
print(" {:10s} buys tier {} surplus {:6.0f}".format(
name, j, V[t][j - 1] - price[j] if j else 0.0))
# optimal menu (profit 505.94 per visitor)
# tier price ratio to previous contribution share
# 1 12.00 0.013
# 2 117.00 9.75 0.050
# 3 287.00 2.45 0.055
# 4 567.00 1.98 0.055
# 5 12537.00 22.11 0.545
# 6 34537.00 2.75 0.282
# curious buys tier 1 surplus 0
# seeker buys tier 2 surplus 3
# regular buys tier 3 surplus 43
# enthusiast buys tier 4 surplus 133
# studio buys tier 5 surplus 333
# agency buys tier 6 surplus 3463The optimal menu is 12, 117, 287, 567, 12537 and 34537: prices do span three orders of magnitude, the licence at about ten thousand and the agency seat at about thirty thousand, as the outline envisaged. The ratios between neighbouring steps are 9.75, 2.45, 1.98, 22.11 and 2.75. Profit, however, is highly concentrated: the licence brings 0.545 and the seat 0.282, together about four fifths; the first four tiers together bring less than a fifth.
The gap between the two B2B tiers is also set by the IC chain: the seat’s price is the licence price plus what an agency gains by moving up from licence to seat. Studios keep a surplus of 333 on the licence and agencies 3463 on the seat: the “information rent” of the screening model, the concession a high type must get so that it does not pose as a lower one.
Summary
Written as a screening problem, the six-tier menu can be solved exactly: with this book’s parameters 12, 117, 287, 567, 12537 and 34537, with the licence and the agency seat bringing about four fifths of profit. For that very reason the menu is very sensitive to what is assumed at the top: a licence priced too low drags the seat price down through the IC chain, and if commission income halves, the licence tier is not worth having.
References
Fan, Y. (2026). Unbundling Economics, Anti-Arbitrage Identity Locking and Multi-Tier Licensing Ladders: Orthogonal Demand Partitioning, Resale Cannibalization Bounds, Affiliate Margin Preservation and Five-Figure B2B Upsell Equilibria [分拆经济学、防套利身份锁定与多阶授权阶梯] (Version 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090184 · Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).