5D Library › 分拆经济学、防套利身份锁定与多阶授权阶梯 · English

第四章 自购返佣、渠道穿仓与伙伴的模仿

自购返佣:套利成本减半

第三章假定算命师买卡要付全价。许多分销计划并不禁止伙伴通过自己的推广链接购买,于是她买卡时还能拿回 γP\gamma P 的佣金,每个名额的成本降为 (1−γ)P/(k+1)(1-\gamma)P/(k+1)。另一方面,公司交付每一次测算都有成本(算力、人工复核、客服),这里记为 c=15c = 15。若公司从每个被转售名额得到的净额 (1−γ)P/(k+1)−c(1-\gamma)P/(k+1) – c 变成负数,渠道就「穿仓」了:卖得越多,亏得越多。

推导

# Chapter 4. [p07] Self-referral and the channel "blow-through".
# As in p05: p2 = 99, card P = 199 for the holder plus k extra slots,
# commission g = 0.5. If the reseller may also buy the card through
# her own affiliate link, she gets g * P back, so a slot costs her
# (1 - g) P / (k + 1). Each reading costs the firm c = 15 to deliver
# (compute, review, support). The channel blows through when the firm's
# net per reading served, (1 - g) P / (k + 1) - c, falls below zero.
P2, CARD, G, C = 99.0, 199.0, 0.5, 15.0

if __name__ == "__main__":
    print("    k   slot cost   slot cost   reseller margin  firm net/slot")
    print("        (no self)   (self-ref)  at s = p2, self  with self-ref")
    for k in range(0, 9):
        plain = CARD / (k + 1)
        self_ = (1 - G) * CARD / (k + 1)
        print("   {:2d} {:10.2f} {:11.2f} {:16.2f} {:14.2f}".format(
            k, plain, self_, P2 - self_, self_ - C))
    kb = next(k for k in range(0, 99) if (1 - G) * CARD / (k + 1) < C)
    ka = next(k for k in range(0, 99)
              if P2 - (1 - G) * CARD / (k + 1) > G * P2)
    print("   with self-referral, resale beats referral from k = {}".format(
        ka))
    print("   firm net per slot below zero (blow-through) from k = {}".format(
        kb))
    print("   referral net per reading for comparison: {:.2f}".format(
        (1 - G) * P2 - C))
    print("\nReading: paying commission on a partner's own purchase halves")
    print("the cost of arbitrage: two extra slots already make resale")
    print("beat referral, and from six the firm pays to serve a reading.")
#     k   slot cost   slot cost   reseller margin  firm net/slot
#         (no self)   (self-ref)  at s = p2, self  with self-ref
#     0     199.00       99.50            -0.50          84.50
#     1      99.50       49.75            49.25          34.75
#     2      66.33       33.17            65.83          18.17
#     3      49.75       24.88            74.12           9.88
#     4      39.80       19.90            79.10           4.90
#     5      33.17       16.58            82.42           1.58
#     6      28.43       14.21            84.79          -0.79
#     7      24.88       12.44            86.56          -2.56
#     8      22.11       11.06            87.94          -3.94
#    with self-referral, resale beats referral from k = 2
#    firm net per slot below zero (blow-through) from k = 6
#    referral net per reading for comparison: 34.50
#
# Reading: paying commission on a partner's own purchase halves
# the cost of arbitrage: two extra slots already make resale
# beat referral, and from six the firm pays to serve a reading.
每位客户的转售利润与分销佣金:不允许与允许自购返佣。

允许自购返佣时,附赠 2 个名额,转售就胜过推荐(每位客户 65.83 对第三章 p05 中的 49.5);附赠 6 个名额时,公司每服务一个被转售的名额净亏 0.79,而一位正常推荐来的客户能给公司留下 34.50。自购返佣把第三章的门槛从 4 个名额拉低到 2 个,并在 6 个名额处让公司真正亏本。

推导

穿仓条件。 允许自购返佣、附赠 kk 个名额时,公司每个转售名额的净额为 (1−γ)Pk+1−c,\frac{(1-\gamma)P}{k+1} – c , 它小于零当且仅当 k+1>(1−γ)P/ck + 1 > (1-\gamma)P / c。本书参数下,从 k=6k = 6 起穿仓。防穿仓的两条规则彼此独立:佣金不付给本人购买(身份锁的第二个用途),或者附赠名额不可转让。

渠道伙伴会模仿谁

套利一旦比推荐划算,它不会只停留在少数人身上。设有 400 位渠道伙伴,每人每月服务 10 位客户;每个月,每位伙伴随机看一位同行,若对方上个月赚得更多,就以与差距成比例的概率改用对方的做法。这是演化博弈中的成对模仿规则,其平均动态就是复制者动态 (Weibull 1995)。转售还要承担客户投诉的流失(每月 10%)。起点是 2% 的伙伴在转售。

推导

# Chapter 4. [p08] Partner dynamics: how fast does a channel turn into
# resellers? 400 channel partners each serve 10 clients a month. Each
# month a partner compares her last-month payoff with that of a random
# other partner and copies the better strategy with probability
# gap / (referral payoff) (pairwise imitation, a discrete replicator
# rule), seed 68. Referral pays g * p2 = 49.5 per client. Resale pays
# p2 - slot cost, slot cost from p05/p07; resale also loses a share of
# clients each month to complaints (10%). Start: 2% resellers.
import random

P2, CARD, G, PARTNERS, CLIENTS = 99.0, 199.0, 0.5, 400, 10

def resale_pay(k, self_ref):
    cost = (1 - G) * CARD if self_ref else CARD
    return P2 - cost / (k + 1)

def run(k, self_ref, months=24, seed=68):
    rng = random.Random(seed)
    resell = [rng.random() < 0.02 for _ in range(PARTNERS)]
    pay_r = 0.9 * CLIENTS * resale_pay(k, self_ref)
    pay_a = CLIENTS * G * P2
    scale = pay_a
    for _ in range(months):
        new = resell[:]
        for i in range(PARTNERS):
            j = rng.randrange(PARTNERS)
            mine = pay_r if resell[i] else pay_a
            theirs = pay_r if resell[j] else pay_a
            if theirs > mine and rng.random() < (theirs - mine) / scale:
                new[i] = resell[j]
        resell = new
    return sum(resell) / PARTNERS

if __name__ == "__main__":
    print("   share of partners reselling after 6, 12 and 24 months")
    print("   card                         6 mo   12 mo   24 mo")
    cases = (("identity lock (k = 0)", 0, False),
             ("k = 3, no self-referral", 3, False),
             ("k = 5, no self-referral", 5, False),
             ("k = 3, self-referral paid", 3, True))
    for name, k, sr in cases:
        out = [run(k, sr, m) for m in (6, 12, 24)]
        print("   {:26s} {:6.3f} {:7.3f} {:7.3f}".format(name, *out))
    print("\nReading: once resale pays more than referral, imitation")
    print("spreads it, slowly at first and then fast: most of the channel")
    print("within two years when self-referral is paid. With the lock, or")
    print("whenever resale pays less, the first resellers die out.")
#    share of partners reselling after 6, 12 and 24 months
#    card                         6 mo   12 mo   24 mo
#    identity lock (k = 0)       0.000   0.000   0.000
#    k = 3, no self-referral     0.010   0.003   0.000
#    k = 5, no self-referral     0.020   0.062   0.380
#    k = 3, self-referral paid   0.028   0.122   0.877
#
# Reading: once resale pays more than referral, imitation
# spreads it, slowly at first and then fast: most of the channel
# within two years when self-referral is paid. With the lock, or
# whenever resale pays less, the first resellers die out.
渠道伙伴中转售者的比例随月份的变化。

有身份锁时,起初那 2% 的转售者很快消失;附赠 3 个名额、不许自购返佣时,转售比推荐少赚,转售者同样消失。附赠 5 个名额时,转售略胜推荐,扩散起初很慢,第 12 个月才到 0.062,第 24 个月已到 0.380。附赠 3 个名额而允许自购返佣时,24 个月后 0.877 的伙伴在转售:分销渠道已经变成了一个转售渠道。

假说 · 尚未验证

作者的诠释(尚未验证): 渠道里的转售不是个别人的道德问题,而是价格结构的结果:只要转售比推荐划算,它就会通过同行之间的模仿扩散,而且扩散在一年之内往往看不出来。什么会证明这一判断错:若在保留附赠名额与自购返佣的渠道中,连续两年观察到的转售伙伴比例一直很低(例如低于 5%),说明伙伴之间的模仿远比本模型弱,或者有本模型没有计入的成本(例如名誉)在起作用。

小结

允许自购返佣会让套利成本减半:附赠 2 个名额,转售就胜过推荐;附赠 6 个名额,公司开始为每个转售名额倒贴。渠道伙伴之间的模仿会把有利可图的转售扩散开来:附赠 3 个名额并允许自购返佣时,两年后 0.877 的伙伴在转售。身份锁与「不对本人购买付佣金」两条规则合起来,使转售在一开始就无利可图。

参考文献

Weibull, Jörgen W. 1995. Evolutionary Game Theory. MIT Press.

Fan, Y. (2026). Unbundling Economics, Anti-Arbitrage Identity Locking and Multi-Tier Licensing Ladders: Orthogonal Demand Partitioning, Resale Cannibalization Bounds, Affiliate Margin Preservation and Five-Figure B2B Upsell Equilibria [分拆经济学、防套利身份锁定与多阶授权阶梯] (Version 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090184 · Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).