5D Library › Multistage Ultimatum Bargaining, Accounts-Receivable Decay Kinetics and Optimal Escalation Sequences · 中文
Chapter 7. Zhu Zhiwu, “Mou gong” and the Tang Code’s Ladder for Unpaid Debt
Why read these sources here
The earlier chapters had three themes: changing the other side’s estimate of its own alternatives; escalating pressure step by step and only as far as needed; and penalties that rise with the time a debt is overdue. Chinese sources record all three. This chapter quotes the texts and asks which correspondences can be computed. Two points come out of the check: Zhu Zhiwu’s speech to the Duke of Qin, often attributed to the Zhanguo ce, is in the Zuo zhuan under the thirtieth year of Duke Xi; and the “gong yan” of the Tang and Song were official certificates (for example for travel), not a system of debt recovery, which the Tang code treats in its “Za lu” section.
Zhu Zhiwu: reframing the other side’s alternative
Source text
Zuo zhuan, Duke Xi, year 30
秦、晉圍鄭,鄭既知亡矣。若亡鄭而有益於君,敢以煩執事。越國以鄙遠,君知其難也。焉用亡鄭以陪鄰?鄰之厚,君之薄也。若舍鄭以為東道主,行李之往來,共其乏困,君亦無所害。
(杨伯峻 1981)
“Qin and Jin besiege Zheng, and Zheng knows it is lost. If losing Zheng would profit you, my lord, it would be worth troubling your officers. But to hold a distant border across another state, you know how hard that is. Why destroy Zheng to enlarge your neighbour? Your neighbour’s gain is your loss. If you spare Zheng and make it host on the eastern road, supplying your envoys as they come and go, it will do you no harm.” Zhu Zhiwu offered the Duke of Qin no threat and no bribe; he changed the Duke’s estimate of what each choice was worth. Part (b) of p13 puts numbers on it.
Calculation
# Chapter 7. p13: Three old ladders as arithmetic.
# (a) Tang code, "Za lu": a debt unpaid 20 days past the contract gets
# 20 strokes of the light stick; each further 20 days adds one grade,
# up to 60 strokes of the heavy stick; 30 bolts or more add two grades,
# 100 bolts or more three grades more; and the debt must still be
# repaid. Grades: light stick 10 to 50, heavy stick 60 to 100, then
# penal servitude of 1 year, 1.5 years and so on.
# (b) Zhu Zhiwu to the Duke of Qin: Qin and Jin each have strength 10
# and Zheng 4. If Zheng is destroyed, Jin takes its land (strength 14)
# because Qin cannot hold land beyond Jin; if Zheng is spared, it
# serves Qin as a host on the eastern road (worth 1 a year to Qin).
# Qin's strength relative to Jin under each choice.
# (c) Sunzi, "Mou gong": the four levels of attack with illustrative
# costs 1, 3, 10, 30 and chances of success 0.3, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8. Trying
# the levels in order, stopping at the first success.
GRADES = ["light 10", "light 20", "light 30", "light 40", "light 50",
"heavy 60", "heavy 70", "heavy 80", "heavy 90", "heavy 100",
"1 yr", "1.5 yrs"]
def tang(days, bolts):
if days < 20:
return "none"
g = min(1 + (days - 20) // 20, 5) # base: 20 strokes .. 60
if bolts >= 30:
g += 2
if bolts >= 100:
g += 3
return GRADES[g]
if __name__ == "__main__":
print(" (a) days late 1 bolt 30 bolts 100 bolts")
for d in (20, 40, 60, 80, 100, 140):
print(" {:13d} {:<9} {:<10} {}".format(
d, tang(d, 1), tang(d, 30), tang(d, 100)))
print(" (b) Qin / Jin if Zheng destroyed: {:.3f}".format(10 / 14))
print(" Qin / Jin if Zheng spared (5 years): {:.3f}".format(
(10 + 5) / 10))
costs, wins = (1, 3, 10, 30), (0.3, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8)
left, exp_cost = 1.0, 0.0
for c, w in zip(costs, wins):
exp_cost += left * c
left *= 1 - w
print(" (c) in order: expected cost {:.2f}, failure {:.3f}".format(
exp_cost, left))
print(" straight to the walls: cost 30, failure {:.3f}".format(
0.2))
# (a) days late 1 bolt 30 bolts 100 bolts
# 20 light 20 light 40 heavy 70
# 40 light 30 light 50 heavy 80
# 60 light 40 heavy 60 heavy 90
# 80 light 50 heavy 70 heavy 100
# 100 heavy 60 heavy 80 1 yr
# 140 heavy 60 heavy 80 1 yr
# (b) Qin / Jin if Zheng destroyed: 0.714
# Qin / Jin if Zheng spared (5 years): 1.500
# (c) in order: expected cost 12.34, failure 0.034
# straight to the walls: cost 30, failure 0.200If Qin and Jin each have strength 10 and Jin absorbs Zheng’s 4, Qin’s strength relative to Jin falls to 0.714; if Zheng is spared and supplies Qin, the ratio after five years is 1.500 in this illustration. The Duke withdrew. This is the move of Chapter 6 in reverse: instead of improving one’s own alternative, one shows the other side that its alternative is worse than it thought.
Sunzi: the ladder of escalation
“To win a hundred battles out of a hundred is not the highest skill; to subdue the enemy without fighting is the highest skill. So the best is to attack the enemy’s plans, the next to attack his alliances, the next to attack his army, and the worst to besiege walled cities.” Part (c) of p13 gives the four levels illustrative costs of 1, 3, 10 and 30 and rising chances of success. Trying them in order and stopping at the first success costs 12.34 on average and fails 0.034 of the time; going straight to the walls costs 30 and fails 0.200 of the time. The ladder of Chapter 4 has the same shape: begin with what is cheap and preserves the relationship, and climb only as far as needed.
The Tang code: a ladder in law
“Whoever fails to repay a debt in breach of contract: for one bolt or more, twenty days overdue, twenty strokes of the light stick; each further twenty days adds one degree, up to sixty strokes of the heavy stick; for thirty bolts, two degrees more; for a hundred bolts, three degrees more again. In every case repayment in full is ordered.” Part (a) of p13 lays out the ladder. A small debt reaches the cap of sixty strokes at 100 days; a debt of thirty bolts starts two degrees higher and is capped two degrees higher; a debt of a hundred bolts rises from seventy strokes to a year of penal servitude. The penalty rises with both time and amount, and it never replaces repayment: the same two features this book recommends for a modern escalation sequence, within the law of today.
Hypothesis · not established
The author’s interpretation (not yet tested): the Tang ladder of penalties for unpaid debt was designed to make the creditor’s threat credible at small amounts, where private enforcement would not pay, much as small-claims procedures do today. What would show it wrong: in surviving Tang and Dunhuang contract documents, small debts show no more reliance on official penalties than large ones, or the contracts rely on private guarantees instead.
Summary
Zhu Zhiwu won by changing the Duke of Qin’s view of his own alternative; the Sunzi ranks the cheap and indirect above the costly and direct; the Tang code escalates with time and amount while always ordering repayment. Two common attributions, to the Zhanguo ce and to a “gong yan” debt system, do not hold.
References
Fan, Y. (2026). Multistage Ultimatum Bargaining, Accounts-Receivable Decay Kinetics and Optimal Escalation Sequences: Ackerman Concession Curves, Credible Threat Thresholds and Default Recovery Bounds [多阶段最后通牒议价、应收账款衰减动力学与最优施压序列] (Version 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090245 · Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).