5D Library › Multistage Ultimatum Bargaining, Accounts-Receivable Decay Kinetics and Optimal Escalation Sequences · 中文
Chapter 8. Practice: A Collection Playbook, an Opening Offer and Knowing a Client
A small firm’s playbook
p14 simulates fifty years of a small firm’s overdue invoices, of sizes from 500 to 20,000, under three policies. The second applies the timetable of Chapter 4 to every invoice; the third replaces the lawyer’s letter for small invoices, where the threat would be empty (Chapter 5), with a small-claims filing that makes it credible.
Calculation
# Chapter 8. p14: A small firm's collection playbook, simulated. 200
# overdue invoices a year with sizes from 500 to 20,000 (log-uniform),
# debtors and stages as in p07 (stop service day 60, lawyer's letter
# day 105; lost margin 0.3 of the amount for a prompt customer still
# unpaid at either step). The letter costs 5% of the amount. Debtors
# ignore a letter whose threat is empty (amount below 4,762 in an
# ordinary court, p09), so it adds nothing beyond stage 2. Policies:
# 1 reminders only;
# 2 the timetable for every invoice;
# 3 the timetable, but below 4,762 a small-claims filing (cost 300)
# replaces the letter, which makes the threat credible.
# Net recovery as a share of the amount owed over 50 simulated years.
# Seed 94.
import random
from math import exp, log
KINDS = ((0.6, 1 / 15, 0.0, "prompt"), (0.3, 1 / 90, 0.0, "slow"),
(0.1, 1 / 400, 1 / 250, "distressed"))
MULT = {"prompt": (1.5, 3.0, 3.0), "slow": (1.5, 3.0, 6.0),
"distressed": (1.5, 1.5, 3.0)}
NEVER = 10 ** 6
def invoice(rng, policy):
amt = exp(rng.uniform(log(500), log(20000)))
u, i = rng.random(), 0
while u >= KINDS[i][0]:
u -= KINDS[i][0]
i += 1
_, h0, fail, kind = KINDS[i]
t2, t3 = (NEVER, NEVER) if policy == 1 else (60, 105)
credible = amt > 4762 or policy == 3
fee = 0.05 * amt if amt > 4762 else (300.0 if policy == 3
else 0.05 * amt)
cost = 0.0
for d in range(365):
if d == t2 and kind == "prompt":
cost += 0.3 * amt
if d == t3:
cost += fee + (0.3 * amt if kind == "prompt" else 0.0)
m = MULT[kind]
stage3 = d >= t3 and credible
k = m[2] if stage3 else m[1] if d >= t2 else m[0]
if rng.random() < h0 * k:
return amt, amt - cost
if rng.random() < fail:
return amt, -cost
return amt, -cost
if __name__ == "__main__":
rng = random.Random(94)
seeds = [rng.random() for _ in range(50 * 200)]
print(" policy net recovery / owed")
for p, lab in ((1, "reminders only"), (2, "timetable for all"),
(3, "timetable, credible threats")):
owed = net = 0.0
for s in seeds:
a, n = invoice(random.Random(s), p)
owed += a
net += n
print(" {:<28} {:19.4f}".format(lab, net / owed))
# policy net recovery / owed
# reminders only 0.9457
# timetable for all 0.9490
# timetable, credible threats 0.9492Reminders alone recover 0.9457 of what is owed, net of costs; the timetable for every invoice 0.9490; the timetable with credible threats 0.9492. For a healthy book the difference between a good and a mediocre collection policy is a fraction of a percentage point; the big losses come from mistakes such as escalating early against good customers (Chapter 4). A firm whose book is riskier, like book B of Chapter 3, gains more from the same discipline.
Choosing an opening offer
Calculation
# Chapter 8. p15: Is there a deal at all, and where to open? A seller
# whose own floor is 80 does not know the buyer's ceiling, which she
# guesses as normal with mean m and sd s. A deal is possible if the
# ceiling exceeds 80. If she opens at price x and the buyer accepts
# when x is below the ceiling (else talks fail), her expected gain over
# the floor is (x - 80) P(ceiling > x). Best opening by grid (step
# 0.5), and the cost of an overconfident guess (s 5 when the truth is
# s 15).
from math import erf, sqrt
def p_above(x, m, s):
return 0.5 * (1 - erf((x - m) / (s * sqrt(2))))
def best(m, s):
xs = [80 + i / 2 for i in range(0, 161)]
return max(xs, key=lambda x: (x - 80) * p_above(x, m, s))
if __name__ == "__main__":
print(" guess (m, s) P(deal possible) best opening expected gain")
for m, s in ((100, 5), (100, 15), (90, 15)):
x = best(m, s)
print(" ({:3d}, {:2d}) {:16.3f} {:12.1f} {:13.2f}".format(
m, s, p_above(80, m, s), x, (x - 80) * p_above(x, m, s)))
x = best(100, 5)
print(" open at {:.1f} (from s 5) when truth is s 15: gain {:.2f}"
.format(x, (x - 80) * p_above(x, 100, 15)))
# guess (m, s) P(deal possible) best opening expected gain
# (100, 5) 1.000 95.5 12.65
# (100, 15) 0.909 99.5 10.01
# ( 90, 15) 0.748 95.0 5.54
# open at 95.5 (from s 5) when truth is s 15: gain 9.58A seller with a floor of 80 who guesses the buyer’s ceiling at 100 with a spread of 5 thinks a deal is certain (1.000) and should open at 95.5, expecting a gain of 12.65. With a spread of 15 the chance of any deal is 0.909, the best opening is 99.5 and the expected gain 10.01; if her guess of the ceiling were only 90, the chance of a deal would fall to 0.748 and the gain to 5.54. Opening at 95.5 out of overconfidence when the truth is the wider spread yields 9.58 instead of 10.01. The cost of overconfidence here is small; the cost of misjudging the centre of the other side’s range is large.
Knowing a client from a few invoices
Calculation
# Chapter 8. p16: How many invoices before a client is known? A client
# pays on time with chance r. Starting from a uniform prior, k on-time
# payments out of n give a Beta(k + 1, n - k + 1) posterior. The chance
# that r is below 0.7 (a client to put on stricter terms), and the
# posterior mean, after a few histories. Exact, by numerical
# integration on a grid of 20,000 points.
def post(k, n, cut=0.7, m=20000):
xs = [(i + 0.5) / m for i in range(m)]
w = [x ** k * (1 - x) ** (n - k) for x in xs]
z = sum(w)
below = sum(wi for x, wi in zip(xs, w) if x < cut) / z
mean = sum(x * wi for x, wi in zip(xs, w)) / z
return below, mean
if __name__ == "__main__":
print(" on time / invoices P(r < 0.7) mean r")
for k, n in ((1, 2), (3, 4), (8, 10), (16, 20), (80, 100)):
b, mu = post(k, n)
print(" {:>7} / {:<9} {:10.3f} {:6.3f}".format(k, n, b, mu))
# on time / invoices P(r < 0.7) mean r
# 1 / 2 0.784 0.500
# 3 / 4 0.528 0.667
# 8 / 10 0.313 0.750
# 16 / 20 0.198 0.773
# 80 / 100 0.014 0.794After one on-time payment out of two, the chance that a client’s true on-time rate is below 0.7 is 0.784; after three out of four, 0.528; after eight out of ten, 0.313; after sixteen out of twenty, 0.198; only after eighty out of a hundred does it fall to 0.014. A few invoices cannot classify a client. New clients are better given moderate terms and watched than put on strict terms after one late payment, which in a sound client is mostly bad luck.
Disclosure
Statement: this book is about the mathematics of bargaining, collection and escalation. It is not legal, financial or employment advice, and its parameters are illustrative. Debt collection, credit reporting and threats of legal action are regulated; consult a qualified lawyer under the law that applies, and never threaten an action that cannot legally be taken or is not intended.
Note
Pre-registered tests: the hypotheses of Chapter 1 on concession patterns and of Chapter 3 on the ageing of receivables should each be registered, with data sources, definitions and analysis, before data are collected, and the results published whether positive or negative.
Summary
For a sound book of debtors the main gains come from not harming good customers and from making real threats affordable; an opening offer should rest on an honest estimate of the other side’s range; and a client should not be judged on a handful of invoices.
Fan, Y. (2026). Multistage Ultimatum Bargaining, Accounts-Receivable Decay Kinetics and Optimal Escalation Sequences: Ackerman Concession Curves, Credible Threat Thresholds and Default Recovery Bounds [多阶段最后通牒议价、应收账款衰减动力学与最优施压序列] (Version 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090245 · Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).