5D Library › Multistage Ultimatum Bargaining, Accounts-Receivable Decay Kinetics and Optimal Escalation Sequences · 中文
Chapter 6. Raises and Price Increases: Building the Alternative
A raise as a Nash bargain
Fisher and Ury taught a generation of negotiators that one’s power lies in the best alternative to a negotiated agreement, the BATNA (Fisher and Ury 1981). Nash’s bargaining solution makes the point precise: the agreement splits the surplus between the two sides’ alternatives (Nash 1950). p11 applies it to a raise. An employee earning 5,000 a month is worth 7,000 to the employer, counting what it would cost to replace them; the agreed wage is the employee’s alternative plus a share of the gap.
Calculation
# Chapter 6. p11: A raise as Nash bargaining. An employee earns 5,000
# a month. To the employer the employee is worth V = 7,000 a month
# (replacing them would cost that much in output, hiring and
# training). The employee's best alternative (BATNA) is w0. The
# symmetric Nash bargaining wage splits the surplus between the two
# alternatives: w = w0 + 0.5 (V - w0). With no outside offer, w0 is
# the current wage; with an outside offer of 6,000, w0 = 6,000. An
# employee with bargaining weight beta < 0.5 gets w0 + beta (V - w0).
def wage(w0, v=7000.0, beta=0.5):
return w0 + beta * (v - w0) if v > w0 else w0
if __name__ == "__main__":
print(" outside offer bargaining weight wage raise")
for w0 in (5000, 6000, 6500):
for beta in (0.5, 0.3):
w = wage(w0, beta=beta)
print(" {:13,d} {:17.1f} {:5,.0f} {:5.1%}".format(
w0, beta, w, w / 5000 - 1))
print(" offer of 7,500 (above V): the employer cannot match it, and")
print(" the employee leaves for {:,}".format(7500))
# outside offer bargaining weight wage raise
# 5,000 0.5 6,000 20.0%
# 5,000 0.3 5,600 12.0%
# 6,000 0.5 6,500 30.0%
# 6,000 0.3 6,300 26.0%
# 6,500 0.5 6,750 35.0%
# 6,500 0.3 6,650 33.0%
# offer of 7,500 (above V): the employer cannot match it, and
# the employee leaves for 7,500With no outside offer and an even split of bargaining power, the model wage is 6,000, a 20% raise; with weaker bargaining (0.3), 5,600. An outside offer of 6,000 moves the wage to 6,500 or 6,300; an offer of 6,500 to 6,750 or 6,650. An offer of 7,500, above the employee’s value to the employer, cannot be matched, and the employee leaves for it. The same arithmetic governs a supplier’s price increase: the client’s alternative is the cost of switching, and the supplier’s is the value of its next-best client.
Building an alternative, or bluffing
An alternative has to be built, and building it costs time. p12 compares a real search with a bluff.
Calculation
# Chapter 6. p12: Building a real alternative or bluffing about one.
# Searching costs 1,500 (time and effort) and yields an offer of 6,000
# with chance q. With a real offer the p11 wage is 6,500; without one
# it is 6,000 (a raise from 5,000 in an ordinary review). A bluff ("I
# have an offer of 6,000") works with chance 0.5; if the employer calls
# it, the employee keeps 5,000 and loses goodwill worth 2,000. Values
# over 12 months.
if __name__ == "__main__":
base = 12 * 6000
print(" staying with the ordinary raise: {:,}".format(base))
print(" chance of an offer q value of searching gain over none")
for q in (0.2, 0.5, 0.8):
v = q * 12 * 6500 + (1 - q) * base - 1500
print(" {:20.1f} {:18,.0f} {:14,.0f}".format(q, v, v - base))
bluff = 0.5 * 12 * 6500 + 0.5 * (12 * 5000 - 2000)
print(" bluffing: {:,.0f}, gain over none {:,.0f}".format(
bluff, bluff - base))
# staying with the ordinary raise: 72,000
# chance of an offer q value of searching gain over none
# 0.2 71,700 -300
# 0.5 73,500 1,500
# 0.8 75,300 3,300
# bluffing: 68,000, gain over none -4,000Over a year, staying put with the ordinary raise is worth 72,000. A search that costs 1,500 is worth 71,700 if it yields an offer only one time in five, 73,500 at an even chance and 75,300 at four in five. A bluff about an offer one does not have is worth 68,000, a loss of 4,000, because when the employer calls it the employee keeps the old wage and loses goodwill. A real alternative strengthens the hand even if it is never used; an invented one weakens it the moment it is tested.
Hypothesis · not established
The author’s interpretation (not yet tested): employees who obtain a genuine outside offer before a pay negotiation obtain larger raises than comparable employees who claim an offer they do not have, once performance is held fixed. What would show it wrong: in a pre-registered survey with verified offers, raises do not differ between employees with genuine and with claimed outside offers.
Summary
The terms of a raise or a price increase are set mostly by the two sides’ alternatives. Building a real one is worth its cost when it has a fair chance of producing an offer; inventing one is a gamble that usually loses.
References
Fan, Y. (2026). Multistage Ultimatum Bargaining, Accounts-Receivable Decay Kinetics and Optimal Escalation Sequences: Ackerman Concession Curves, Credible Threat Thresholds and Default Recovery Bounds [多阶段最后通牒议价、应收账款衰减动力学与最优施压序列] (Version 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090245 · Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).