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Chapter 5. Credible Threats and the Value of Following Through

When is a threat to sue credible?

Schelling observed that a threat works only if the one who makes it would carry it out when the time came, or has arranged matters so that they must (Schelling 1960). A creditor’s threat to sue is credible only if suing is worth it after the debtor has refused. p09 writes this as a comparison: suing costs CC; the creditor wins with chance 0.9 and can then collect 0.7 of the judgment, so suing pays only if 0.63A>C0.63 A > C.

Calculation

# Chapter 5. p09: When is the threat to sue credible? An unpaid invoice
# of amount A. Suing costs C; the creditor wins with chance 0.9 and can
# then collect 0.7 of the judgment. Suing is worth doing after the
# debtor refuses only if 0.9 x 0.7 x A > C, so a debtor who knows the
# numbers can ignore the threat below A* = C / 0.63. Three regimes:
# ordinary litigation (C = 3,000), a small-claims track (C = 300), and
# a lawyer already paid on retainer, so that only 1,000 more is spent.
if __name__ == "__main__":
    regimes = (("ordinary court", 3000), ("small claims", 300),
               ("retainer paid", 1000))
    for lab, c in regimes:
        print("   {:<15} threshold A* = {:8,.0f}".format(lab, c / 0.63))
    print("   amount     ordinary   small claims   retainer paid")
    for a in (500, 2000, 5000, 20000):
        row = ["credible" if 0.63 * a > c else "empty" for _, c in regimes]
        print("   {:6,d}     {:>8}   {:>12}   {:>13}".format(a, *row))
#    ordinary court  threshold A* =    4,762
#    small claims    threshold A* =      476
#    retainer paid   threshold A* =    1,587
#    amount     ordinary   small claims   retainer paid
#       500        empty       credible           empty
#     2,000        empty       credible        credible
#     5,000     credible       credible        credible
#    20,000     credible       credible        credible

In ordinary litigation costing 3,000, the threat is credible only for invoices above 4,762; a debtor who owes 2,000 and knows the numbers can ignore it. A small-claims track costing 300 lowers the threshold to 476. A lawyer already paid on a retainer, so that only 1,000 more is spent, lowers it to 1,587. Making a threat credible is mostly a matter of lowering the cost of carrying it out, or of having already paid it.

Note

A threat must be real. In the United States, the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act forbids a collector of consumer debts to threaten “any action that cannot legally be taken or that is not intended to be taken” (United States Congress 1977); similar rules exist elsewhere. In consumer collection an empty threat is not a tactic but a breach of the law. The arithmetic of this chapter is about which real steps are worth taking.

Reputation

A creditor who faces many debtors can gain from following through even where a single suit loses money, because other debtors learn that the threat is real. p10 compares the cost of such suits with the extra payments they induce.

Calculation

# Chapter 5. p10: Following through to be believed. A firm has N
# overdue invoices a year of amount 2,000 each. Suing on one costs
# 3,000 and recovers 0.63 x 2,000 on average, a loss of 1,740 per suit.
# If the firm is known to sue whenever an invoice reaches the last
# stage, the share of debtors who pay before that stage rises from 0.60
# to 0.75; it must then sue the 10 a year who still do not pay (fewer
# when N is small: 10% of N). Net yearly gain from a reputation for
# following through, by N.
if __name__ == "__main__":
    loss = 3000 - 0.63 * 2000
    print("   loss per suit: {:,.0f}".format(loss))
    print("   invoices N   extra paid   suits   net gain")
    for n in (20, 50, 100, 300):
        extra = n * 2000 * (0.75 - 0.60)
        suits = min(10, 0.1 * n)
        print("   {:10d}   {:10,.0f}   {:5.0f}   {:8,.0f}".format(
            n, extra, suits, extra - suits * loss))
    print("   break-even N with 10 suits: {:.1f}".format(
        10 * loss / (2000 * 0.15)))
#    loss per suit: 1,740
#    invoices N   extra paid   suits   net gain
#            20        6,000       2      2,520
#            50       15,000       5      6,300
#           100       30,000      10     12,600
#           300       90,000      10     72,600
#    break-even N with 10 suits: 58.0

Each suit on a 2,000 invoice loses 1,740 on average. But if the reputation for following through raises the share of debtors who pay before the last stage from 0.60 to 0.75, a firm with 20 overdue invoices a year gains 2,520 net; with 100, 12,600; with 300, 72,600. If the firm had to bring 10 such suits a year regardless of its size, it would break even at 58.0 invoices a year. Following through is an investment in the credibility of every later reminder; it pays for creditors with many debtors who talk to one another, and much less for one-off claims.

Hypothesis · not established

The author’s interpretation (not yet tested): among small firms, those known to pursue unpaid invoices through to a court filing see a higher share of overdue invoices paid before the final stage. What would show it wrong: in a pre-registered study matching firms by sector and customer base, the share paid before the final stage is unrelated to the firm’s record of court filings.

Summary

A threat is credible when carrying it out pays at the moment it would be carried out; lower costs and prepaid commitments make it so. For a creditor with many debtors, following through on unprofitable cases can pay through reputation, and in consumer collection an unintended threat is not allowed at all.

References

Schelling, Thomas C. 1960. The Strategy of Conflict. Harvard University Press.
United States Congress. 1977. Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692e (False or Misleading Representations).

Fan, Y. (2026). Multistage Ultimatum Bargaining, Accounts-Receivable Decay Kinetics and Optimal Escalation Sequences: Ackerman Concession Curves, Credible Threat Thresholds and Default Recovery Bounds [多阶段最后通牒议价、应收账款衰减动力学与最优施压序列] (Version 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090245 · Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International (CC BY-NC-ND 4.0).