What does Cascades, Curiosity and Paywalls conclude, in numbers, about “Pareto Willingness to Pay, One Price and the Revenue Ceiling”?
Answer: Chapter 5 shows under Pareto willingness to pay that at a tail index of 1.5 the ceiling of perfect discrimination is 3.00 times one price, but that for one good no menu beats one price (2.961 against 3.000); a multi-tier paywall takes more because it sells several goods, raising the share of the ceiling from 0.150 to 0.339.
Scope of the numbers: It is not business, legal or investment advice; all data are synthetic, generated by its programs. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (16 programs), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. printed values that match the answer: 1.5, 2.961, 3.00, 3.000
tail a best price revenue full surplus ceiling ratio
3.0 3.00 3.000 4.500 1.50
2.0 3.00 3.000 6.000 2.00
1.5 3.00 3.000 9.000 3.00
1.1 3.00 3.000 33.000 11.00
0.8* 998.55 9.585 35.937 3.75
(* values capped at 1,000)
a = 1.5: best two-option menu earns 2.961 against 3.000 for one price
Reading: with a heavy tail the gap between one price and full
extraction is large - three times at a = 1.5, and without bound
as a falls to 1; below 1 the best single price chases the few
buyers at the very top. For a single reading no menu closes the
gap: splitting one good into tiers or chances cannot beat one
price.Show the full program
# Chapter 5. Pareto willingness to pay, one price, and the ceiling.
# Among visitors who would pay anything, willingness to pay v is Pareto:
# P(v > x) = (3 / x)^a for x >= 3 (minimum 3, tail index a). Marginal cost
# of a digital reading is taken as 0.
# Part 1. Revenue per buyer-candidate from the best single price, against
# the full surplus E[v] that perfect (first-degree) discrimination would
# take. For a > 1 every price above 3 loses more buyers than it gains in
# price, so the best single price is 3; E[v] = 3a / (a - 1). For a <= 1
# E[v] is infinite; here values are capped at 1,000 to show the size.
# Part 2. Riley and Zeckhauser: for ONE good no menu - not even a menu of
# lotteries "get the reading with probability x for price t" - beats the
# best posted price. A grid search over two-option menus (x, t; 1, p)
# with a = 1.5 checks this, with revenue computed in closed form.
def tail(x, a, cap=None):
if x <= 3:
return 1.0
if cap is not None and x >= cap:
return 0.0
return (3 / x) ** a
def mean_v(a, cap=None):
if cap is None:
return 3 * a / (a - 1)
n, lo = 200000, 3.0
h = (cap - lo) / n
return lo + sum(tail(lo + (i + 0.5) * h, a, cap) * h for i in range(n))
def best_price(a, cap=None):
top = cap if cap else 1000.0
grid = [3 * (top / 3) ** (i / 4000) for i in range(4000)]
return max((p * tail(p, a, cap), p) for p in grid)
def menu_revenue(x, t, p, a):
v_low = t / x # indifferent between lottery and nothing
v_high = (p - t) / (1 - x) # indifferent between lottery and good
if v_low >= v_high: # lottery never chosen: posted price p
return p * tail(p, a)
return t * (tail(v_low, a) - tail(v_high, a)) + p * tail(v_high, a)
if __name__ == "__main__":
print(" tail a best price revenue full surplus ceiling ratio")
for a, cap in ((3.0, None), (2.0, None), (1.5, None), (1.1, None),
(0.8, 1000.0)):
rev, p = best_price(a, cap)
ev = mean_v(a, cap)
print(" {:4.1f}{} {:7.2f} {:6.3f} {:8.3f} {:6.2f}"
.format(a, "*" if cap else " ", p, rev, ev, ev / rev))
print(" (* values capped at 1,000)")
best = (0.0, None)
for i in range(1, 40):
x = i / 40
for j in range(1, 60):
t = 0.25 * j * x
for k in range(1, 60):
p = 3 + 0.25 * k
r = menu_revenue(x, t, p, 1.5)
if r > best[0]:
best = (r, (x, t, p))
print("\n a = 1.5: best two-option menu earns {:.3f} against {:.3f}"
" for one price".format(best[0], best_price(1.5)[0]))
print("\nReading: with a heavy tail the gap between one price and full")
print("extraction is large - three times at a = 1.5, and without bound")
print("as a falls to 1; below 1 the best single price chases the few")
print("buyers at the very top. For a single reading no menu closes the")
print("gap: splitting one good into tiers or chances cannot beat one")
print("price.")Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Supercritical Viral Cascades, Information-Gap Hazard Rates and Multi-Tier Paywall Optimization (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 5: Pareto Willingness to Pay, One Price and the Revenue Ceiling. 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090174
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.24090174 · Read the monograph · 5DL-B-063 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026063,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Supercritical Viral Cascades, Information-Gap Hazard Rates and Multi-Tier Paywall Optimization},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
doi = {10.5281/zenodo.24090174},
url = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090174}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · The Branching Process of "Invite to Unlock"
- Chapter 2 · A Finite Audience, a Clustered Network and an Acquisition Cost That Is Not Zero
- Chapter 3 · Commissions, Share-to-Unlock and the Incentives of Fake Accounts
- Chapter 4 · Information Gaps, Purchase Hazards and the Feeling of "So Accurate"
- Chapter 6 · Bundles, Decoy Tiers and Paying per Question
- Chapter 7 · "Rub It with Its Own Kind", "Lift Then Clamp" and "Gather When Light"
- Chapter 8 · A Four-Step Check, a Compliance Checklist and a Pre-Registered Paywall Test