What does Cascades, Curiosity and Paywalls conclude, in numbers, about “Commissions, Share-to-Unlock and the Incentives of Fake Accounts”?

Answer: Chapter 3 shows that commissions hardly change who pays but raise K and total revenue per seed; when fake accounts are cheap the platform measures K at 1.992 while the real K is 0.065, and a 50 % commission becomes a 50 % discount.

Scope of the numbers: It is not business, legal or investment advice; all data are synthetic, generated by its programs. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (16 programs), classical sources and the author's hypotheses.

中文版

Data table

The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.065, 1.992, 50

   f      fake unlock   self-referral   K measured   K real   take per payer
    0.5      0.963          1.000         1.992      0.065       4.95
    2.0      0.796          1.000         1.357      0.253       4.95
    5.0      0.000          0.000         0.487      0.487       9.90
   10.0      0.000          0.000         0.487      0.487       9.90
Reading: when fake accounts are cheap the funnel's own metrics
lie - the measured K exceeds 1 while the real K is far lower -
and every payer self-refers, so a 50 % commission becomes a 50 %
discount. Above f = 4.95 both shortcuts stop in this example:
two fake accounts then cost more than simply paying.
Show the full program
# Chapter 3. When a fake account is cheaper than a friend.
# Same 100,000 users and funnel as p05, commission alpha = 0.5. Now a user
# can also open fake accounts at a cost f each (a spare phone number, the
# time it takes). Two shortcuts:
#   fake unlock    a would-be sharer opens m = 2 fake accounts instead of
#                  inviting friends, if 2 f < 13.3 e (their invitation cost)
#   self-referral  a payer buys through a fake account's commission link
#                  and pockets 0.5 x 9.9 = 4.95, if f < 4.95
# Fake joiners are counted as new users by the platform but bring no one.
# For f from 0.5 to 10 the program reports the share of sharers who fake,
# the share of payers who self-refer, the K the platform measures against
# the real K, and the seller's net take per payer.
import math
import random

PRICE, Q, M, ALPHA = 9.9, 0.15, 2, 0.5
JOIN = sum(min(k, M) * math.comb(20, k) * Q ** k * (1 - Q) ** (20 - k)
           for k in range(21))
N2 = 20 * ALPHA

if __name__ == "__main__":
    rng = random.Random(63005)
    users = [(3.0 * (1 - rng.random()) ** (-1 / 1.5), rng.uniform(0, 2))
             for _ in range(100000)]
    rebate = ALPHA * PRICE
    pay_cost = PRICE - ALPHA * PRICE * N2 * 0.10 * 0.05
    print("   f      fake unlock   self-referral   K measured   K real"
          "   take per payer")
    for f in (0.5, 2.0, 5.0, 10.0):
        sharers = fakers = payers = 0
        for v, e in users:
            sc = min(e * M / Q, M * f)
            pc = pay_cost - (rebate - f if f < rebate else 0.0)
            if v < min(sc, pc):
                continue
            if sc <= pc:
                sharers += 1
                fakers += M * f < e * M / Q
            else:
                payers += 1
        n = len(users)
        real_share = (sharers - fakers) / n
        k_real = real_share * JOIN + payers / n * N2 * 0.10
        k_meas = k_real + fakers / n * M
        self_ref = 1.0 if f < rebate else 0.0
        take = PRICE * (1 - ALPHA * self_ref)
        print("   {:4.1f}      {:5.3f}          {:5.3f}         {:5.3f}"
              "      {:5.3f}      {:5.2f}".format(
                  f, fakers / max(sharers, 1), self_ref, k_meas, k_real,
                  take))
    print("\nReading: when fake accounts are cheap the funnel's own metrics")
    print("lie - the measured K exceeds 1 while the real K is far lower -")
    print("and every payer self-refers, so a 50 % commission becomes a 50 %")
    print("discount. Above f = 4.95 both shortcuts stop in this example:")
    print("two fake accounts then cost more than simply paying.")

Single source and citation

Fan, Y. (2026). Supercritical Viral Cascades, Information-Gap Hazard Rates and Multi-Tier Paywall Optimization (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 3: Commissions, Share-to-Unlock and the Incentives of Fake Accounts. 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090174

DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.24090174 · Read the monograph · 5DL-B-063 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026063,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Supercritical Viral Cascades, Information-Gap Hazard Rates and Multi-Tier Paywall Optimization},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  doi       = {10.5281/zenodo.24090174},
  url       = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090174}
}

Other chapter answers in this book