关于「帕累托支付意愿、单一价格与收益上界」,《裂变、好奇心与付费墙》给出的定量结论是什么?

结论:第五章在帕累托支付意愿下说明,尾指数 1.5 时完全价格歧视的上界是单一价格的 3.00 倍,但对一件商品任何菜单都胜不过单一价格(2.961 对 3.000);多层付费墙多收钱是因为它卖多件商品,收入占上界的比例从 0.150 升到 0.339。

数据口径:本书不是经营、法律或投资建议;全部数据为程序生成的合成数据。 书中以标注框区分已发表的证据、可运行的 Python 计算(16 段程序)、原典与作者的假说。

English version

对照数据表

下表数字由本章 Python 程序原样打印,可重新运行复现。 与结论吻合的打印值: 1.5, 2.961, 3.00, 3.000

   tail a   best price   revenue   full surplus   ceiling ratio
    3.0        3.00     3.000        4.500         1.50
    2.0        3.00     3.000        6.000         2.00
    1.5        3.00     3.000        9.000         3.00
    1.1        3.00     3.000       33.000        11.00
    0.8*     998.55     9.585       35.937         3.75
   (* values capped at 1,000)
   a = 1.5: best two-option menu earns 2.961 against 3.000 for one price
Reading: with a heavy tail the gap between one price and full
extraction is large - three times at a = 1.5, and without bound
as a falls to 1; below 1 the best single price chases the few
buyers at the very top. For a single reading no menu closes the
gap: splitting one good into tiers or chances cannot beat one
price.
查看完整验算程序
# Chapter 5. Pareto willingness to pay, one price, and the ceiling.
# Among visitors who would pay anything, willingness to pay v is Pareto:
# P(v > x) = (3 / x)^a for x >= 3 (minimum 3, tail index a). Marginal cost
# of a digital reading is taken as 0.
# Part 1. Revenue per buyer-candidate from the best single price, against
# the full surplus E[v] that perfect (first-degree) discrimination would
# take. For a > 1 every price above 3 loses more buyers than it gains in
# price, so the best single price is 3; E[v] = 3a / (a - 1). For a <= 1
# E[v] is infinite; here values are capped at 1,000 to show the size.
# Part 2. Riley and Zeckhauser: for ONE good no menu - not even a menu of
# lotteries "get the reading with probability x for price t" - beats the
# best posted price. A grid search over two-option menus (x, t; 1, p)
# with a = 1.5 checks this, with revenue computed in closed form.
def tail(x, a, cap=None):
    if x <= 3:
        return 1.0
    if cap is not None and x >= cap:
        return 0.0
    return (3 / x) ** a

def mean_v(a, cap=None):
    if cap is None:
        return 3 * a / (a - 1)
    n, lo = 200000, 3.0
    h = (cap - lo) / n
    return lo + sum(tail(lo + (i + 0.5) * h, a, cap) * h for i in range(n))

def best_price(a, cap=None):
    top = cap if cap else 1000.0
    grid = [3 * (top / 3) ** (i / 4000) for i in range(4000)]
    return max((p * tail(p, a, cap), p) for p in grid)

def menu_revenue(x, t, p, a):
    v_low = t / x                  # indifferent between lottery and nothing
    v_high = (p - t) / (1 - x)     # indifferent between lottery and good
    if v_low >= v_high:            # lottery never chosen: posted price p
        return p * tail(p, a)
    return t * (tail(v_low, a) - tail(v_high, a)) + p * tail(v_high, a)

if __name__ == "__main__":
    print("   tail a   best price   revenue   full surplus   ceiling ratio")
    for a, cap in ((3.0, None), (2.0, None), (1.5, None), (1.1, None),
                   (0.8, 1000.0)):
        rev, p = best_price(a, cap)
        ev = mean_v(a, cap)
        print("   {:4.1f}{}    {:7.2f}    {:6.3f}     {:8.3f}       {:6.2f}"
              .format(a, "*" if cap else " ", p, rev, ev, ev / rev))
    print("   (* values capped at 1,000)")
    best = (0.0, None)
    for i in range(1, 40):
        x = i / 40
        for j in range(1, 60):
            t = 0.25 * j * x
            for k in range(1, 60):
                p = 3 + 0.25 * k
                r = menu_revenue(x, t, p, 1.5)
                if r > best[0]:
                    best = (r, (x, t, p))
    print("\n   a = 1.5: best two-option menu earns {:.3f} against {:.3f}"
          " for one price".format(best[0], best_price(1.5)[0]))
    print("\nReading: with a heavy tail the gap between one price and full")
    print("extraction is large - three times at a = 1.5, and without bound")
    print("as a falls to 1; below 1 the best single price chases the few")
    print("buyers at the very top. For a single reading no menu closes the")
    print("gap: splitting one good into tiers or chances cannot beat one")
    print("price.")

唯一数据源与引用

范雅福(Fan, Y.). (2026). 《超临界病毒级联、信息缺口风险率与多层付费墙优化》第 5 章「帕累托支付意愿、单一价格与收益上界」(版本 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090174

DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.24090174 · 阅读本章所在专著 · 5DL-B-063 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026063,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Supercritical Viral Cascades, Information-Gap Hazard Rates and Multi-Tier Paywall Optimization},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  doi       = {10.5281/zenodo.24090174},
  url       = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.24090174}
}

本书其他章节结论