What does Strata Commons and Sinking-Fund Ruin conclude, in numbers, about “The Game of Late Payment: Conditional Cooperation, the Sanction Threshold and the Critical Arrears Rate”?

Answer: Chapter 1 uses public goods experiments and threshold models to show that a sanction below the private gain is no sanction, that above it the paid share rises to 0.9320, and that once the mean threshold falls below 0.2275 arrears jump past one half.

Scope of the numbers: All data are synthetic or illustrative, all calculations come from its programs, and it is general analysis, not legal, tax or investment advice; statutes await human review. Boxes separate evidence, runnable calculations (20 programs), classical sources and hypotheses.

中文版

Data table

The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. printed values that match the answer: 0.9320

threshold s* = 1 - a = 0.60
no-sanction fixed point m* = 0.1774
rounds = 0.00s = 0.30s = 0.80
10.70000.70000.7000
20.39950.39950.9320
30.27180.27180.9320
40.21750.21750.9320
50.19440.19440.9320
60.18460.18460.9320
70.18050.18050.9320
80.17870.17870.9320
90.17790.17790.9320
100.17760.17760.9320
start m0paid share after 30 rounds, s = 0
0.950.1774
0.700.1774
0.400.1774
Show the full program
# Chapter 1. p12: conditional cooperation, decay and a sanction threshold.
# Mean-field model of a large owner body; the paid share m of what is
# due is public each period.
# Types (shares follow Fischbacher, Gachter and Fehr 2001 in round
# numbers: about half conditional cooperators, about a third free
# riders; the rest are lumped as "others"):
#   C, share 0.50: pay b * m_prev of what is due, b = 0.85 (illustrative
#      self-serving slope below one)
#   F, share 0.33: pay nothing unless the sanction s per unpaid unit
#      exceeds the private gain g of not paying; then pay in full
#   O, share 0.17: pay a fixed 0.60 of what is due (illustrative)
# A sanction s >= g also moves C to full payment (the due amount is a
# fixed by-law sum, not a voluntary gift). Private gain g = 1 - a with
# a = 0.4 in the laboratory game, so the threshold is s* = 0.60.
SC, SF, SO = 0.50, 0.33, 0.17
B_SLOPE, O_PAY, A = 0.85, 0.60, 0.4


def step(m, s):
    gain = 1.0 - A
    if s >= gain:
        c_pay, f_pay = 1.0, 1.0
    else:
        c_pay, f_pay = min(1.0, B_SLOPE * m), 0.0
    return SC * c_pay + SF * f_pay + SO * O_PAY


def path(m0, s, rounds=10):
    out = [m0]
    for _ in range(rounds - 1):
        out.append(step(out[-1], s))
    return out


if __name__ == "__main__":
    print("threshold s* = 1 - a = {:.2f}".format(1.0 - A))
    fixed = SO * O_PAY / (1.0 - SC * B_SLOPE)
    print("no-sanction fixed point m* = {:.4f}".format(fixed))
    print("round  s = 0.00  s = 0.30  s = 0.80")
    runs = [path(0.70, s) for s in (0.0, 0.3, 0.8)]
    for t in range(10):
        print("{:>5}  {:>8.4f}  {:>8.4f}  {:>8.4f}".format(
            t + 1, runs[0][t], runs[1][t], runs[2][t]))
    print("start m0   paid share after 30 rounds, s = 0")
    for m0 in (0.95, 0.70, 0.40):
        print("{:>8.2f}   {:.4f}".format(m0, path(m0, 0.0, 30)[-1]))

Single source and citation

Fan, Y. (2026). Strata-Title Commons Games, Sinking-Fund Ruin Actuarial Science and High-Intent Property Lead Routing (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 1: The Game of Late Payment: Conditional Cooperation, the Sanction Threshold and the Critical Arrears Rate. 5D Library. DOI pending

DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-335 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026335,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Strata-Title Commons Games, Sinking-Fund Ruin Actuarial Science and High-Intent Property Lead Routing},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  note      = {DOI pending}
}

Other chapter answers in this book