关于「迟缴之博弈:条件合作、惩罚门槛与临界迟缴率」,《分层公地与储备金精算》给出的定量结论是什么?
结论:第一章用公共物品实验与门槛模型,说明罚则低于私人收益等于没有罚则,罚则过线后缴费比例升到 0.9320,平均门槛低过 0.2275,迟缴率就跳到一半以上。
数据口径:大修支出块状、时点随机、偶有重尾意外;示意大楼即使管理费随通胀上调,按一成计提,三十年内见底机会仍有 0.5715,计提恰好等于平均支出,也有 0.3479。 书中楼盘、线索与参数全为合成或示意;全部计算由书中程序生成;本书是非个人化分析,不构成法律、税务或投资建议,法条与比例以上架前人工复核为准;线索只处理经同意者。
对照数据表
下表数字由本章 Python 程序原样打印,可重新运行复现。 与结论吻合的打印值: 0.9320
| threshold s* = 1 - a = 0.60 | |||
| no-sanction fixed point m* = 0.1774 | |||
| round | s = 0.00 | s = 0.30 | s = 0.80 |
| 1 | 0.7000 | 0.7000 | 0.7000 |
| 2 | 0.3995 | 0.3995 | 0.9320 |
| 3 | 0.2718 | 0.2718 | 0.9320 |
| 4 | 0.2175 | 0.2175 | 0.9320 |
| 5 | 0.1944 | 0.1944 | 0.9320 |
| 6 | 0.1846 | 0.1846 | 0.9320 |
| 7 | 0.1805 | 0.1805 | 0.9320 |
| 8 | 0.1787 | 0.1787 | 0.9320 |
| 9 | 0.1779 | 0.1779 | 0.9320 |
| 10 | 0.1776 | 0.1776 | 0.9320 |
| start m0 | paid share after 30 rounds, s = 0 | ||
| 0.95 | 0.1774 | ||
| 0.70 | 0.1774 | ||
| 0.40 | 0.1774 |
查看完整验算程序
# Chapter 1. p12: conditional cooperation, decay and a sanction threshold.
# Mean-field model of a large owner body; the paid share m of what is
# due is public each period.
# Types (shares follow Fischbacher, Gachter and Fehr 2001 in round
# numbers: about half conditional cooperators, about a third free
# riders; the rest are lumped as "others"):
# C, share 0.50: pay b * m_prev of what is due, b = 0.85 (illustrative
# self-serving slope below one)
# F, share 0.33: pay nothing unless the sanction s per unpaid unit
# exceeds the private gain g of not paying; then pay in full
# O, share 0.17: pay a fixed 0.60 of what is due (illustrative)
# A sanction s >= g also moves C to full payment (the due amount is a
# fixed by-law sum, not a voluntary gift). Private gain g = 1 - a with
# a = 0.4 in the laboratory game, so the threshold is s* = 0.60.
SC, SF, SO = 0.50, 0.33, 0.17
B_SLOPE, O_PAY, A = 0.85, 0.60, 0.4
def step(m, s):
gain = 1.0 - A
if s >= gain:
c_pay, f_pay = 1.0, 1.0
else:
c_pay, f_pay = min(1.0, B_SLOPE * m), 0.0
return SC * c_pay + SF * f_pay + SO * O_PAY
def path(m0, s, rounds=10):
out = [m0]
for _ in range(rounds - 1):
out.append(step(out[-1], s))
return out
if __name__ == "__main__":
print("threshold s* = 1 - a = {:.2f}".format(1.0 - A))
fixed = SO * O_PAY / (1.0 - SC * B_SLOPE)
print("no-sanction fixed point m* = {:.4f}".format(fixed))
print("round s = 0.00 s = 0.30 s = 0.80")
runs = [path(0.70, s) for s in (0.0, 0.3, 0.8)]
for t in range(10):
print("{:>5} {:>8.4f} {:>8.4f} {:>8.4f}".format(
t + 1, runs[0][t], runs[1][t], runs[2][t]))
print("start m0 paid share after 30 rounds, s = 0")
for m0 in (0.95, 0.70, 0.40):
print("{:>8.2f} {:.4f}".format(m0, path(m0, 0.0, 30)[-1]))唯一数据源与引用
范雅福(Fan, Y.). (2026). 《分层地契公地博弈、储备金破产精算与高意向置业线索派单母典》第 1 章「迟缴之博弈:条件合作、惩罚门槛与临界迟缴率」(版本 1.0.0). 5D Library. DOI 待发布
DOI 待发布 · 专著页正式发布后上线(本站暂无专著页) · 5DL-B-335 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026335,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Strata-Title Commons Games, Sinking-Fund Ruin Actuarial Science and High-Intent Property Lead Routing},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}