关于「迟缴之博弈:条件合作、惩罚门槛与临界迟缴率」,《分层公地与储备金精算》给出的定量结论是什么?

结论:第一章用公共物品实验与门槛模型,说明罚则低于私人收益等于没有罚则,罚则过线后缴费比例升到 0.9320,平均门槛低过 0.2275,迟缴率就跳到一半以上。

数据口径:大修支出块状、时点随机、偶有重尾意外;示意大楼即使管理费随通胀上调,按一成计提,三十年内见底机会仍有 0.5715,计提恰好等于平均支出,也有 0.3479。 书中楼盘、线索与参数全为合成或示意;全部计算由书中程序生成;本书是非个人化分析,不构成法律、税务或投资建议,法条与比例以上架前人工复核为准;线索只处理经同意者。

English version

对照数据表

下表数字由本章 Python 程序原样打印,可重新运行复现。 与结论吻合的打印值: 0.9320

threshold s* = 1 - a = 0.60
no-sanction fixed point m* = 0.1774
rounds = 0.00s = 0.30s = 0.80
10.70000.70000.7000
20.39950.39950.9320
30.27180.27180.9320
40.21750.21750.9320
50.19440.19440.9320
60.18460.18460.9320
70.18050.18050.9320
80.17870.17870.9320
90.17790.17790.9320
100.17760.17760.9320
start m0paid share after 30 rounds, s = 0
0.950.1774
0.700.1774
0.400.1774
查看完整验算程序
# Chapter 1. p12: conditional cooperation, decay and a sanction threshold.
# Mean-field model of a large owner body; the paid share m of what is
# due is public each period.
# Types (shares follow Fischbacher, Gachter and Fehr 2001 in round
# numbers: about half conditional cooperators, about a third free
# riders; the rest are lumped as "others"):
#   C, share 0.50: pay b * m_prev of what is due, b = 0.85 (illustrative
#      self-serving slope below one)
#   F, share 0.33: pay nothing unless the sanction s per unpaid unit
#      exceeds the private gain g of not paying; then pay in full
#   O, share 0.17: pay a fixed 0.60 of what is due (illustrative)
# A sanction s >= g also moves C to full payment (the due amount is a
# fixed by-law sum, not a voluntary gift). Private gain g = 1 - a with
# a = 0.4 in the laboratory game, so the threshold is s* = 0.60.
SC, SF, SO = 0.50, 0.33, 0.17
B_SLOPE, O_PAY, A = 0.85, 0.60, 0.4


def step(m, s):
    gain = 1.0 - A
    if s >= gain:
        c_pay, f_pay = 1.0, 1.0
    else:
        c_pay, f_pay = min(1.0, B_SLOPE * m), 0.0
    return SC * c_pay + SF * f_pay + SO * O_PAY


def path(m0, s, rounds=10):
    out = [m0]
    for _ in range(rounds - 1):
        out.append(step(out[-1], s))
    return out


if __name__ == "__main__":
    print("threshold s* = 1 - a = {:.2f}".format(1.0 - A))
    fixed = SO * O_PAY / (1.0 - SC * B_SLOPE)
    print("no-sanction fixed point m* = {:.4f}".format(fixed))
    print("round  s = 0.00  s = 0.30  s = 0.80")
    runs = [path(0.70, s) for s in (0.0, 0.3, 0.8)]
    for t in range(10):
        print("{:>5}  {:>8.4f}  {:>8.4f}  {:>8.4f}".format(
            t + 1, runs[0][t], runs[1][t], runs[2][t]))
    print("start m0   paid share after 30 rounds, s = 0")
    for m0 in (0.95, 0.70, 0.40):
        print("{:>8.2f}   {:.4f}".format(m0, path(m0, 0.0, 30)[-1]))

唯一数据源与引用

范雅福(Fan, Y.). (2026). 《分层地契公地博弈、储备金破产精算与高意向置业线索派单母典》第 1 章「迟缴之博弈:条件合作、惩罚门槛与临界迟缴率」(版本 1.0.0). 5D Library. DOI 待发布

DOI 待发布 · 专著页正式发布后上线(本站暂无专著页) · 5DL-B-335 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026335,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Strata-Title Commons Games, Sinking-Fund Ruin Actuarial Science and High-Intent Property Lead Routing},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  note      = {DOI pending}
}

本书其他章节结论