What does Red-Blue Synthetic-Customer Sandboxes conclude, in numbers, about “Alternating Offers: Rubinstein's Discounted Equilibrium, the Last Round and Fairness Thresholds”?
Answer: Program p31 gives the Rubinstein split: with symmetric patience of 0.90 the opener keeps 0.5263, and as the interval between offers tends to zero the share depends only on the ratio of patience. Program p32 shows that a finite number of rounds creates a huge last-round advantage, with rounds 2 and 3 differing by 0.7200 of the surplus. Program p33 shows that once fairness thresholds are added, the equilibrium offer may persuade nobody at all. So how much margin will a crowd of demanding buyers, each with their own patience, budget and sense of fairness, carry away from different concession policies?
Scope of the numbers: Parameters are illustrative; all calculations are generated by the book's programs, which call no model interface. This is not individual business advice.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.5263, 0.90
| seller d1 buyer d2 seller x* buyer 1-x* | |
| 0.90 | 0.90 0.5263 0.4737 |
| 0.90 | 0.80 0.7143 0.2857 |
| 0.90 | 0.95 0.3448 0.6552 |
| 0.80 | 0.95 0.2083 0.7917 |
| 0.95 | 0.99 0.1681 0.8319 |
| 0.99 | 0.95 0.8403 0.1597 |
| equal patience d | 0.9: opener keeps 10/19 = 0.5263 |
| rates r1 | 0.05, r2 = 0.20 per round |
| step h | 1.00: seller share 0.8195 |
| step h | 0.50: seller share 0.8099 |
| step h | 0.10: seller share 0.8020 |
| step h | 0.01: seller share 0.8002 |
| limit r2 / (r1 + r2) | 0.8000 |
| list 1280, cost 700: buyer d2 | 0.95 wins 380.00 of surplus 580 |
Show the full program
# Chapter 3. p31: the Rubinstein split and what patience is worth.
# Rubinstein (1982, Econometrica): two players alternate offers over a
# surplus of size 1; player 1 (here the seller, who opens) discounts a
# round of delay by d1, player 2 (the buyer) by d2. The unique subgame
# perfect split gives the opener x* = (1 - d2) / (1 - d1 d2), accepted
# at once. With d_i = exp(-r_i h) and h -> 0 the opener's share tends
# to r2 / (r1 + r2). Surplus = list price minus seller cost; values
# are illustrative. Exact fractions where the inputs are exact.
import math
from fractions import Fraction as F
def share(d1, d2):
return (1 - d2) / (1 - d1 * d2)
print("seller d1 buyer d2 seller x* buyer 1-x*")
for d1, d2 in ((F(9, 10), F(9, 10)), (F(9, 10), F(8, 10)),
(F(9, 10), F(95, 100)), (F(8, 10), F(95, 100)),
(F(95, 100), F(99, 100)), (F(99, 100), F(95, 100))):
x = share(d1, d2)
print(" %.2f %.2f %.4f %.4f"
% (d1, d2, x, 1 - x))
print("equal patience d = 0.9: opener keeps %s = %.4f"
% (share(F(9, 10), F(9, 10)), share(F(9, 10), F(9, 10))))
r1, r2 = 0.05, 0.20
print("rates r1 = %.2f, r2 = %.2f per round" % (r1, r2))
for h in (1.0, 0.5, 0.1, 0.01):
x = share(math.exp(-r1 * h), math.exp(-r2 * h))
print(" step h = %.2f: seller share %.4f" % (h, x))
print(" limit r2 / (r1 + r2) = %.4f" % (r2 / (r1 + r2)))
surplus = 1280 - 700
x = share(F(9, 10), F(95, 100))
print("list 1280, cost 700: buyer d2 = 0.95 wins %.2f of surplus %d"
% (float((1 - x) * surplus), surplus))Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Red-Blue Synthetic-Customer Sandboxes: Multi-Round Bargaining against Parameterised Demanding Buyers and Pre-Launch Leak Detection (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 3: Alternating Offers: Rubinstein's Discounted Equilibrium, the Last Round and Fairness Thresholds. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-259 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026259,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Red-Blue Synthetic-Customer Sandboxes: Multi-Round Bargaining against Parameterised Demanding Buyers and Pre-Launch Leak Detection},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · The Average Buyer's Blind Spot: Latin Hypercube Crowds and Combination Coverage
- Chapter 2 · Dissent and Limits: Pairwise Covering Designs, Over-Tidy Synthetic Personas and the Average-Buyer Fallacy
- Chapter 4 · Parameterised Demanding Buyers: a Multi-Round Haggling Sandbox, Concession Ladders and the Margin Floor
- Chapter 5 · The Leak Discovery Curve: Unseen Probability, Species Estimates and Stopping Rules
- Chapter 6 · Four Kinds of Leak: Factual Errors, Invented Scarcity, Undue Pressure and Dodged Questions
- Chapter 7 · The Classics Examined: Sunzi on Knowing the Other Side and Oneself, and Reisswitz's War Game of 1824
- Chapter 8 · Closing the Loop: Extended Persona Dimensions, the Synthetic Customer Coverage Sampler and a Pre-Registered Test