Red-Blue Synthetic-Customer Sandboxes: Multi-Round Bargaining against Parameterised Demanding Buyers and Pre-Launch Leak Detection: chapter answers
Before a sales page or chat script goes live, owners often stress-test it on one imagined average buyer. This book tests the opposite founding claim: the average buyer misses leaks in the tail, a Latin hypercube crowd of synthetic buyers covers more persona combinations for the same number of tests (McKay, Beckman and Conover, Technometrics, 1979), and multi-round haggling has the discounted equilibrium Rubinstein gave in 1982. Checking the originals corrects the claim. The original promise of the Latin hypercube is a steadier estimate of the mean; with 24 buyers it gives full one-way coverag…
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-259 · 中文版
- Chapter 1 · The Average Buyer's Blind Spot: Latin Hypercube Crowds and Combination Coverage
Program p11 shows that the average buyer finds nothing among twelve illustrative flaws, while a synthetic crowd of 24 finds about 7. Program p12 shows that the Latin hypercube achieves full one-way coverage, wins narrow… - Chapter 2 · Dissent and Limits: Pairwise Covering Designs, Over-Tidy Synthetic Personas and the Average-Buyer Fallacy
Program p21 shows that covering all 392 two-way combinations takes a greedy covering array 51 buyers and random crowds more than two hundred. Program p22 shows that a generator shrinking the standard deviation to 0.6 cu… - Chapter 3 · Alternating Offers: Rubinstein's Discounted Equilibrium, the Last Round and Fairness Thresholds
Program p31 gives the Rubinstein split: with symmetric patience of 0.90 the opener keeps 0.5263, and as the interval between offers tends to zero the share depends only on the ratio of patience. Program p32 shows that a… - Chapter 4 · Parameterised Demanding Buyers: a Multi-Round Haggling Sandbox, Concession Ladders and the Margin Floor
Chapter 4 uses 240 parameterised demanding buyers to compare one price, a concession ladder and real tiers: the ladder hands an average discount of 0.0512 to buyers who would have paid in full, and while the average buy… - Chapter 5 · The Leak Discovery Curve: Unseen Probability, Species Estimates and Stopping Rules
Chapter 5 draws the leak discovery curve and derives stopping rules from Good's estimate and Chao's lower bound; 24 clean buyers bound the leak rate no lower than 0.1173. - Chapter 6 · Four Kinds of Leak: Factual Errors, Invented Scarcity, Undue Pressure and Dodged Questions
Program p61 uses one fact sheet and four rules to stop four of five illustrative scripts, and shows that keyword rules can be fooled by an invented countdown. Program p62 shows that a script answering only price passes… - Chapter 7 · The Classics Examined: Sunzi on Knowing the Other Side and Oneself, and Reisswitz's War Game of 1824
Chapter 7 examines Sunzi on knowing the other side and oneself and Reisswitz's war game of 1824, showing that an informed umpire lets a script with no advantage win 0.5215 of comparisons. - Chapter 8 · Closing the Loop: Extended Persona Dimensions, the Synthetic Customer Coverage Sampler and a Pre-Registered Test
Chapter 8 gives an eight-step loop from the owner's seat, the Synthetic Customer Coverage Sampler and a pre-registered test. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (22 programs), classica…
Illustrative model calculation, not a live quote