What does Red-Blue Synthetic-Customer Sandboxes conclude, in numbers, about “The Average Buyer's Blind Spot: Latin Hypercube Crowds and Combination Coverage”?
Answer: Program p11 shows that the average buyer finds nothing among twelve illustrative flaws, while a synthetic crowd of 24 finds about 7. Program p12 shows that the Latin hypercube achieves full one-way coverage, wins narrowly in two dimensions and ties simple random sampling in three. Program p13 shows that its real strength lies in estimating smooth averages, with a variance ratio as high as 336.86, and that it does nothing for corner flaws. How many buyers, then, does it take to cover every two-way combination on purpose? And will synthetic buyers turn out tidier than real ones, wearing down the very tail we want to reach?
Scope of the numbers: Parameters are illustrative; all calculations are generated by the book's programs, which call no model interface. This is not individual business advice.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 24, 336.86
| output method mean sd | |
| A SRS | 0.47669 0.02459 |
| A LHS | 0.47648 0.00134 |
| B SRS | 0.00771 0.01765 |
| B LHS | 0.00808 0.01774 |
| variance ratio SRS/LHS, smooth output | 336.86 |
| variance ratio SRS/LHS, corner output | 0.99 |
| crowds that never meet the corner: SRS 0.829, LHS 0.818 | |
| exact SRS miss chance (1 - 0.008)^24 | 0.825 |
Show the full program
# Chapter 1. p13: where LHS pays off and where it does not.
# McKay, Beckman and Conover (1979, Technometrics) proved that LHS
# lowers the variance of the sample mean when the output is monotone
# in each input. Three buyer traits on [0, 1] (budget room, patience,
# trust; illustrative). Output A: a smooth, monotone chance of buying,
# logistic in the traits. Output B: a corner leak that fires only when
# all three traits exceed 0.8 (true rate 0.008). Crowd of 24, 6000
# seeded replications; variance ratio SRS / LHS above 1 favours LHS.
import math
import random
import statistics
N, REPS, K = 24, 6000, 3
def conv(x):
z = -1.6 + 1.2 * x[0] + 0.8 * x[1] + 1.0 * x[2]
return 1 / (1 + math.exp(-z))
def corner(x):
return 1.0 if min(x) > 0.8 else 0.0
def srs(rng):
return [[rng.random() for _ in range(K)] for _ in range(N)]
def lhs(rng):
cols = []
for _ in range(K):
perm = list(range(N))
rng.shuffle(perm)
cols.append([(perm[i] + rng.random()) / N for i in range(N)])
return [[c[i] for c in cols] for i in range(N)]
rng = random.Random(20261113)
est = {(f, m): [] for f in ("A", "B") for m in ("SRS", "LHS")}
miss = {"SRS": 0, "LHS": 0}
for _ in range(REPS):
for m, gen in (("SRS", srs), ("LHS", lhs)):
crowd = gen(rng)
est[("A", m)].append(math.fsum(map(conv, crowd)) / N)
b = math.fsum(map(corner, crowd)) / N
est[("B", m)].append(b)
miss[m] += b == 0
print("output method mean sd")
for f in ("A", "B"):
for m in ("SRS", "LHS"):
v = est[(f, m)]
print("%-6s %-6s %.5f %.5f"
% (f, m, statistics.fmean(v), statistics.pstdev(v)))
for f, label in (("A", "smooth"), ("B", "corner")):
r = (statistics.pvariance(est[(f, "SRS")])
/ statistics.pvariance(est[(f, "LHS")]))
print("variance ratio SRS/LHS, %s output: %.2f" % (label, r))
print("crowds that never meet the corner: SRS %.3f, LHS %.3f"
% (miss["SRS"] / REPS, miss["LHS"] / REPS))
print("exact SRS miss chance (1 - 0.008)^24: %.3f" % (0.992 ** 24))Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Red-Blue Synthetic-Customer Sandboxes: Multi-Round Bargaining against Parameterised Demanding Buyers and Pre-Launch Leak Detection (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 1: The Average Buyer's Blind Spot: Latin Hypercube Crowds and Combination Coverage. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-259 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026259,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Red-Blue Synthetic-Customer Sandboxes: Multi-Round Bargaining against Parameterised Demanding Buyers and Pre-Launch Leak Detection},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 2 · Dissent and Limits: Pairwise Covering Designs, Over-Tidy Synthetic Personas and the Average-Buyer Fallacy
- Chapter 3 · Alternating Offers: Rubinstein's Discounted Equilibrium, the Last Round and Fairness Thresholds
- Chapter 4 · Parameterised Demanding Buyers: a Multi-Round Haggling Sandbox, Concession Ladders and the Margin Floor
- Chapter 5 · The Leak Discovery Curve: Unseen Probability, Species Estimates and Stopping Rules
- Chapter 6 · Four Kinds of Leak: Factual Errors, Invented Scarcity, Undue Pressure and Dodged Questions
- Chapter 7 · The Classics Examined: Sunzi on Knowing the Other Side and Oneself, and Reisswitz's War Game of 1824
- Chapter 8 · Closing the Loop: Extended Persona Dimensions, the Synthetic Customer Coverage Sampler and a Pre-Registered Test