What does Password Entropy and Least Privilege conclude, in numbers, about “The Credential-Stuffing Funnel: Reuse Rates, Breach Corpora and Second Factors”?

Answer: Chapter 4 computes the stuffing funnel: ten accounts sharing one password expose 4.37 times as many accounts as unique passwords, and going from half to full second-factor coverage cuts residual risk 28.3 times.

Scope of the numbers: Its firms, accounts and probabilities are illustrative, and all calculations are generated by its programs; it is not personalised business, legal, financial or compliance advice, and its audit routine and tool never touch a real password. Chapter 6 uses minimum role covers and the recovery graph to show that the illustrative firm expects to lose 0.4972 accounts a year, and 0.1899 after hardening the main mailbox alone.

中文版

Data table

The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 4.37

leak chance per site over 5 years: 0.0961
strategyP(mail)P(bank)E[exposed of 10]vs unique
one shared0.41960.41964.1964.37 x
three groups0.13950.18082.1102.20 x
unique0.09610.09610.9611.00 x
Show the full program
# Chapter 4. p42: a one-person firm's ten accounts and password reuse.
# Each site leaks its password store in a given year with probability
# b = 0.02 (illustrative); horizon Y = 5 years. A leak at site i exposes
# account i, and every other account sharing that password with
# probability t = 0.5 (the stuffing attempt reaches it; illustrative).
# Strategies: one password everywhere; three passwords shared by group;
# a unique password per account (password manager). Exact, assuming
# independent leaks. Das et al. (2014) estimated that 43 to 51 percent
# of users reuse one password across sites.
import math

B, Y, T = 0.02, 5, 0.5
ACCOUNTS = ["mail", "bank", "store", "cloud", "domain", "books",
            "social", "chat", "design", "forum"]
STRATEGIES = {
    "one shared": [0] * 10,
    "three groups": [0, 1, 2, 1, 0, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2],
    "unique": list(range(10)),
}


def exposure(groups):
    leak = 1.0 - (1.0 - B) ** Y
    probs = []
    for j, gj in enumerate(groups):
        safe = 1.0 - leak                    # its own store
        for i, gi in enumerate(groups):
            if i != j and gi == gj:
                safe *= 1.0 - leak * T
        probs.append(1.0 - safe)
    return probs


leak5 = 1.0 - (1.0 - B) ** Y
print("leak chance per site over {} years: {:.4f}".format(Y, leak5))
print("strategy       P(mail)  P(bank)  E[exposed of 10]  vs unique")
base = math.fsum(exposure(STRATEGIES["unique"]))
for name, groups in STRATEGIES.items():
    p = exposure(groups)
    e = math.fsum(p)
    print("{:<13s}  {:.4f}   {:.4f}   {:>16.3f}  {:>7.2f} x".format(
        name, p[0], p[1], e, e / base))

Single source and citation

Fan, Y. (2026). Password Entropy and Credential Stuffing, the Forced-Rotation Paradox and Least-Privilege Accounts for One-Person Firms (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 4: The Credential-Stuffing Funnel: Reuse Rates, Breach Corpora and Second Factors. 5D Library. DOI pending

DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-218 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026218,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Password Entropy and Credential Stuffing, the Forced-Rotation Paradox and Least-Privilege Accounts for One-Person Firms},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  note      = {DOI pending}
}

Other chapter answers in this book