What does Password Entropy and Least Privilege conclude, in numbers, about “The Credential-Stuffing Funnel: Reuse Rates, Breach Corpora and Second Factors”?
Answer: Chapter 4 computes the stuffing funnel: ten accounts sharing one password expose 4.37 times as many accounts as unique passwords, and going from half to full second-factor coverage cuts residual risk 28.3 times.
Scope of the numbers: Its firms, accounts and probabilities are illustrative, and all calculations are generated by its programs; it is not personalised business, legal, financial or compliance advice, and its audit routine and tool never touch a real password. Chapter 6 uses minimum role covers and the recovery graph to show that the illustrative firm expects to lose 0.4972 accounts a year, and 0.1899 after hardening the main mailbox alone.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 4.37
| leak chance per site over 5 years: 0.0961 | ||||
| strategy | P(mail) | P(bank) | E[exposed of 10] | vs unique |
| one shared | 0.4196 | 0.4196 | 4.196 | 4.37 x |
| three groups | 0.1395 | 0.1808 | 2.110 | 2.20 x |
| unique | 0.0961 | 0.0961 | 0.961 | 1.00 x |
Show the full program
# Chapter 4. p42: a one-person firm's ten accounts and password reuse.
# Each site leaks its password store in a given year with probability
# b = 0.02 (illustrative); horizon Y = 5 years. A leak at site i exposes
# account i, and every other account sharing that password with
# probability t = 0.5 (the stuffing attempt reaches it; illustrative).
# Strategies: one password everywhere; three passwords shared by group;
# a unique password per account (password manager). Exact, assuming
# independent leaks. Das et al. (2014) estimated that 43 to 51 percent
# of users reuse one password across sites.
import math
B, Y, T = 0.02, 5, 0.5
ACCOUNTS = ["mail", "bank", "store", "cloud", "domain", "books",
"social", "chat", "design", "forum"]
STRATEGIES = {
"one shared": [0] * 10,
"three groups": [0, 1, 2, 1, 0, 1, 2, 2, 2, 2],
"unique": list(range(10)),
}
def exposure(groups):
leak = 1.0 - (1.0 - B) ** Y
probs = []
for j, gj in enumerate(groups):
safe = 1.0 - leak # its own store
for i, gi in enumerate(groups):
if i != j and gi == gj:
safe *= 1.0 - leak * T
probs.append(1.0 - safe)
return probs
leak5 = 1.0 - (1.0 - B) ** Y
print("leak chance per site over {} years: {:.4f}".format(Y, leak5))
print("strategy P(mail) P(bank) E[exposed of 10] vs unique")
base = math.fsum(exposure(STRATEGIES["unique"]))
for name, groups in STRATEGIES.items():
p = exposure(groups)
e = math.fsum(p)
print("{:<13s} {:.4f} {:.4f} {:>16.3f} {:>7.2f} x".format(
name, p[0], p[1], e, e / base))Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Password Entropy and Credential Stuffing, the Forced-Rotation Paradox and Least-Privilege Accounts for One-Person Firms (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 4: The Credential-Stuffing Funnel: Reuse Rates, Breach Corpora and Second Factors. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-218 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026218,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Password Entropy and Credential Stuffing, the Forced-Rotation Paradox and Least-Privilege Accounts for One-Person Firms},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · The Forced-Rotation Paradox: Predictable Variants and an Overrated Attack Window
- Chapter 2 · The Entropy Ledger: log2(N^L), Random Long Passphrases and Complex Short Passwords
- Chapter 3 · Guessing under a Zipf Law: Why Shannon Entropy Overrates Human-Chosen Passwords
- Chapter 5 · Throttling, Blocklists and Hash Prefixes: the Ceiling on Online Guessing
- Chapter 6 · The Permission Graph and its Minimum Cover: a One-Person Firm's Blast Radius
- Chapter 8 · The Permission-Matrix Audit Sheet: an Empirical Loop and a Falsification Plan