What does Password Entropy and Least Privilege conclude, in numbers, about “The Entropy Ledger: log2(N^L), Random Long Passphrases and Complex Short Passwords”?
Answer: Chapter 2 computes entropy: eight random printable characters carry 52.44 bits, four random words 51.70 and five random words 64.62, and human-chosen phrases cannot be scored by the formula.
Scope of the numbers: Its firms, accounts and probabilities are illustrative, and all calculations are generated by its programs; it is not personalised business, legal, financial or compliance advice, and its audit routine and tool never touch a real password. Chapter 6 uses minimum role covers and the recovery graph to show that the illustrative firm expects to lose 0.4972 accounts a year, and 0.1899 after hardening the main mailbox alone.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 51.70, 52.44, 64.62
| secret | alphabet | length | bits |
|---|---|---|---|
| 6 digits | 10 | 6 | 19.93 |
| 8 lowercase | 26 | 8 | 37.60 |
| 8 printable | 94 | 8 | 52.44 |
| 12 printable | 94 | 12 | 78.66 |
| 15 lowercase | 26 | 15 | 70.51 |
| 16 lowercase | 26 | 16 | 75.21 |
| 3 words | 7776 | 3 | 38.77 |
| 4 words | 7776 | 4 | 51.70 |
| 5 words | 7776 | 5 | 64.62 |
| 6 words | 7776 | 6 | 77.55 |
| 7 words | 7776 | 7 | 90.47 |
| bits per word 12.925; per printable character 6.555 | |||
| words to beat 8 printable: 5 | |||
| words to beat 12 printable: 7 |
Key formula
Show the full program
# Chapter 2. p21: entropy log2(N^L) of randomly generated secrets.
# For a secret drawn uniformly from an alphabet of N symbols, L symbols
# long, the entropy is L * log2(N) bits. Alphabets: 10 digits, 26
# lowercase letters, 94 printable ASCII characters, and a 7776-word list
# (6^5 words, one word per five dice). These are exact for machine- or
# dice-generated secrets only; human choice is the subject of Ch. 3.
import math
ROWS = [
("6 digits", 10, 6),
("8 lowercase", 26, 8),
("8 printable", 94, 8),
("12 printable", 94, 12),
("15 lowercase", 26, 15),
("16 lowercase", 26, 16),
("3 words", 7776, 3),
("4 words", 7776, 4),
("5 words", 7776, 5),
("6 words", 7776, 6),
("7 words", 7776, 7),
]
def bits(n, length):
return length * math.log2(n)
print("secret alphabet length bits")
for name, n, length in ROWS:
print("{:<15s} {:>8d} {:>6d} {:6.2f}".format(
name, n, length, bits(n, length)))
per_word = math.log2(7776)
target = bits(94, 8)
need = math.ceil(target / per_word)
print("bits per word {:.3f}; per printable character {:.3f}".format(
per_word, math.log2(94)))
print("words to beat 8 printable: {}".format(need))
print("words to beat 12 printable: {}".format(
math.ceil(bits(94, 12) / per_word)))Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Password Entropy and Credential Stuffing, the Forced-Rotation Paradox and Least-Privilege Accounts for One-Person Firms (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 2: The Entropy Ledger: log2(N^L), Random Long Passphrases and Complex Short Passwords. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-218 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026218,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Password Entropy and Credential Stuffing, the Forced-Rotation Paradox and Least-Privilege Accounts for One-Person Firms},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · The Forced-Rotation Paradox: Predictable Variants and an Overrated Attack Window
- Chapter 3 · Guessing under a Zipf Law: Why Shannon Entropy Overrates Human-Chosen Passwords
- Chapter 4 · The Credential-Stuffing Funnel: Reuse Rates, Breach Corpora and Second Factors
- Chapter 5 · Throttling, Blocklists and Hash Prefixes: the Ceiling on Online Guessing
- Chapter 6 · The Permission Graph and its Minimum Cover: a One-Person Firm's Blast Radius
- Chapter 8 · The Permission-Matrix Audit Sheet: an Empirical Loop and a Falsification Plan