What does Password Entropy and Least Privilege conclude, in numbers, about “The Forced-Rotation Paradox: Predictable Variants and an Overrated Attack Window”?

Answer: Chapter 1 shows that an attacker who needs one day of access still succeeds with probability 0.991 under a 90-day forced change, corrects the blueprint's "no longer recommends" to the "shall not" of Revision 4, and sets out the counter-evidence of a study of self-reported behaviour.

Scope of the numbers: Its firms, accounts and probabilities are illustrative, and all calculations are generated by its programs; it is not personalised business, legal, financial or compliance advice, and its audit routine and tool never touch a real password. Chapter 6 uses minimum role covers and the recovery graph to show that the illustrative firm expects to lose 0.4972 accounts a year, and 0.1899 after hardening the main mailbox alone.

中文版

Data table

The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.991, 90

P(attacker keeps access for D days), compromise at random time
online q=0.17
rotate everyD=1D=7D=30D=90
never1.0001.0001.0001.000
180 days0.9950.9680.8620.585
90 days0.9910.9350.7230.170
30 days0.9720.8060.1700.005
offline q=0.41
rotate everyD=1D=7D=30D=90
never1.0001.0001.0001.000
180 days0.9970.9770.9020.705
90 days0.9930.9540.8030.410
30 days0.9800.8620.4100.069
with persistence s=0.5 (forwarding rule survives a change)
90 days0.9950.9680.8620.585
30 days0.9860.9030.5850.502

Key formula

\[P = \sum_{k \ge 0} (1-q)\,q^k \, \Pr(U \ge D - kT).\]
Show the full program
# Chapter 1. p11: does forced rotation shorten a stolen password's life?
# Model: the attacker obtains a password at a random moment; the time U
# to the next forced change is uniform on [0, T). After each change the
# user picks, with probability q, a variant derivable from the old one,
# so the attacker gets back in. The attacker needs D days of access.
# q = 0.17 is the online result (under 5 guesses) and q = 0.41 the
# offline result of Zhang, Monrose and Reiter (2010), from a dataset of
# over 7700 accounts (sourced); the persistence probability s is
# illustrative: a forwarding rule or app token planted after entry that
# survives the password change.
# Exact: P = s + (1 - s) * sum_k (1 - q) q^k P(U >= D - kT).
import math

Q_ONLINE = 0.17      # Zhang et al. 2010, under 5 online guesses
Q_OFFLINE = 0.41     # Zhang et al. 2010, offline, under 3 s per account


def p_reach(days, period, q, persist=0.0, kmax=400):
    """Probability that the attacker holds access for `days` days."""
    if period is None:
        return 1.0
    terms = []
    for k in range(kmax):
        need = days - k * period          # U must be at least this
        frac = min(1.0, max(0.0, 1.0 - need / period))
        terms.append((1.0 - q) * q ** k * frac)
    return persist + (1.0 - persist) * math.fsum(terms)


DAYS = (1, 7, 30, 90)
print("P(attacker keeps access for D days), compromise at random time")
for q, tag in ((Q_ONLINE, "online q=0.17"), (Q_OFFLINE, "offline q=0.41")):
    print(tag)
    print("  rotate every   " + "".join("D={:<5d}".format(d) for d in DAYS))
    for per in (None, 180, 90, 30):
        lab = "never" if per is None else "{} days".format(per)
        row = "".join("{:<7.3f}".format(p_reach(d, per, q)) for d in DAYS)
        print("  {:<14s}{}".format(lab, row))
print("with persistence s=0.5 (forwarding rule survives a change)")
for per in (90, 30):
    row = "".join("{:<7.3f}".format(p_reach(d, per, Q_ONLINE, 0.5))
                  for d in DAYS)
    print("  {:<14s}{}".format("{} days".format(per), row))

Single source and citation

Fan, Y. (2026). Password Entropy and Credential Stuffing, the Forced-Rotation Paradox and Least-Privilege Accounts for One-Person Firms (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 1: The Forced-Rotation Paradox: Predictable Variants and an Overrated Attack Window. 5D Library. DOI pending

DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-218 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026218,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Password Entropy and Credential Stuffing, the Forced-Rotation Paradox and Least-Privilege Accounts for One-Person Firms},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  note      = {DOI pending}
}

Other chapter answers in this book