What does Order Books, Hawkes Processes and Toxic Flow conclude, in numbers, about “Information Asymmetry and the Bid–Ask Spread: Glosten–Milgrom and Kyle”?
Answer: Part of the spread is the cost of trading with the informed. In the Glosten–Milgrom model the spread comes entirely from adverse selection; with a prior of one-half it equals the informed share times the difference in values, and it narrows as trading reveals information. The dealer's gains from noise traders exactly offset her losses to the informed, and underestimating the informed share brings systematic losses. In Kyle's model the insider hides his orders in the noise; the price-impact coefficient of the continuous auction, \(\sqrt{\Sigma_0}/\sigma_u\), is twice the one-period value, and information enters the price linearly. The name in the author's framework has been corrected to Glosten.
Scope of the numbers: Why does a market maker quote a spread? Why do orders arrive in clusters? Can "toxic" order flow be measured from trade data? This book presents mathematical models for teaching and research and is not investment or trading advice. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (16 programs), classical sources and the author's models and hypotheses; all data in the book are fictional or simulated.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python only
| spread at the prior (pi | 1/2) equals mu x (V_H - V_L): |
| mu bid ask spread | |
| 0.0 | 100.000 100.000 0.000 |
| 0.1 | 99.900 100.100 0.200 |
| 0.3 | 99.700 100.300 0.600 |
| 0.5 | 99.500 100.500 1.000 |
| 0.9 | 99.100 100.900 1.800 |
| 60 trades, true value V_H, 20,000 sessions per row (dealer knows mu): | |
| mean spread at trade P(pi_60 dealer P&L per trade | |
| mu t | 1 t=10 t=30 t=60 > 0.99) informed noise total |
| 0.1 | 0.200 0.183 0.153 0.120 0.012 -0.0698 +0.0694 -0.0003 |
| 0.3 | 0.600 0.307 0.092 0.018 0.930 -0.0526 +0.0526 +0.0001 |
| 0.5 | 1.000 0.169 0.006 0.000 1.000 -0.0234 +0.0232 -0.0002 |
| dealer underestimates toxicity (true mu 0.3; V_H and V_L equally often): | |
| dealer's mu 0.30: P&L per trade -0.0001 (s.e. 0.0002) | |
| dealer's mu 0.20: P&L per trade -0.0216 (s.e. 0.0002) | |
| dealer's mu 0.10: P&L per trade -0.0761 (s.e. 0.0002) | |
| dealer's mu 0.05: P&L per trade -0.1494 (s.e. 0.0003) |
Key formula
Show the full program
# Glosten-Milgrom (1985) sequential-trade model. The asset is worth V_H = 101 or V_L = 99
# (prior 1/2). Each period one trader arrives: informed with probability mu (buys if V_H,
# sells if V_L) or uninformed (buys or sells with probability 1/2 each). A competitive,
# risk-neutral dealer sets ask = E[V | buy] and bid = E[V | sell] and updates her belief.
import random, statistics
VH, VL = 101.0, 99.0
def quotes(pi, mu):
pbh, pbl = mu + (1 - mu) / 2, (1 - mu) / 2 # P(buy | V_H), P(buy | V_L)
pb = pi * pbh + (1 - pi) * pbl
ask = (pi * pbh * VH + (1 - pi) * pbl * VL) / pb
psh, psl = 1 - pbh, 1 - pbl
ps = pi * psh + (1 - pi) * psl
bid = (pi * psh * VH + (1 - pi) * psl * VL) / ps
return bid, ask, pi * pbh / pb, pi * psh / ps # posteriors after buy / sell
def session(rng, mu, mu_dealer, n=60, v=VH):
pi, pnl_inf, pnl_noise, spreads = 0.5, 0.0, 0.0, []
for _ in range(n):
bid, ask, pi_b, pi_s = quotes(pi, mu_dealer)
spreads.append(ask - bid)
if rng.random() < mu: # informed trader
side, who = (1 if v == VH else -1), "inf"
else:
side, who = (1 if rng.random() < 0.5 else -1), "noise"
gain = (ask - v) if side == 1 else (v - bid) # dealer's gain on this trade
if who == "inf":
pnl_inf += gain
else:
pnl_noise += gain
pi = pi_b if side == 1 else pi_s
return spreads, pnl_inf, pnl_noise, pi
if __name__ == "__main__":
print("spread at the prior (pi = 1/2) equals mu x (V_H - V_L):")
print(" mu bid ask spread")
for mu in (0.0, 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.9):
b, a, _, _ = quotes(0.5, mu)
print(f" {mu:.1f} {b:7.3f} {a:7.3f} {a - b:6.3f}")
rng = random.Random(1985)
print("60 trades, true value V_H, 20,000 sessions per row (dealer knows mu):")
print(" mean spread at trade P(pi_60 dealer P&L per trade")
print(" mu t=1 t=10 t=30 t=60 > 0.99) informed noise total")
for mu in (0.1, 0.3, 0.5):
S, I, N, P = [], [], [], []
for _ in range(20_000):
sp, pi_, pn, pf = session(rng, mu, mu)
S.append(sp); I.append(pi_ / 60); N.append(pn / 60); P.append(pf > 0.99)
m = [statistics.fmean(s[t] for s in S) for t in (0, 9, 29, 59)]
i, nn = statistics.fmean(I), statistics.fmean(N)
print(f" {mu:.1f} " + " ".join(f"{x:.3f}" for x in m)
+ f" {statistics.fmean(P):.3f} {i:+.4f} {nn:+.4f} {i + nn:+.4f}")
print("dealer underestimates toxicity (true mu 0.3; V_H and V_L equally often):")
for md in (0.3, 0.2, 0.1, 0.05):
tot = []
for k in range(20_000):
v = VH if k % 2 == 0 else VL
_, pi_, pn, _ = session(rng, 0.3, md, v=v)
tot.append((pi_ + pn) / 60)
se = statistics.stdev(tot) / len(tot) ** 0.5
print(f" dealer's mu {md:.2f}: P&L per trade {statistics.fmean(tot):+.4f}"
f" (s.e. {se:.4f})")Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). High-Frequency Limit Order Book Microstructure, Hawkes Self-Exciting Point Processes and Adverse-Selection Flow Toxicity (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 1: Information Asymmetry and the Bid–Ask Spread: Glosten–Milgrom and Kyle. 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23828065
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23828065 · Read the monograph · 5DL-B-045 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026045,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {High-Frequency Limit Order Book Microstructure, Hawkes Self-Exciting Point Processes and Adverse-Selection Flow Toxicity},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
doi = {10.5281/zenodo.23828065},
url = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23828065}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 2 · Inventory Risk and Optimal Market Making: the Avellaneda–Stoikov Equations
- Chapter 3 · Why Orders Arrive in Clusters: Hawkes Processes, the Signature Plot and the Epps Effect
- Chapter 4 · Measuring Toxicity: the Probability of Informed Trading, VPIN and the Flash-Crash Dispute
- Chapter 5 · Book Imbalance and Queues: Order Flow Imbalance, Queue Imbalance and Queue Position
- Chapter 6 · How to Split a Large Order: Almgren–Chriss Optimal Execution
- Chapter 7 · Reading the Classics: the Market Director, the Conspicuous Mound and the Market Exchange
- Chapter 8 · Practice and a Pre-Registered Test