关于「信息不对称与买卖价差:格罗斯滕—米尔格罗姆与凯尔」,《订单簿微观结构与毒流》给出的定量结论是什么?

结论:价差的一部分是与知情者交易的代价。格罗斯滕—米尔格罗姆模型中,价差完全来自逆向选择,在先验 1/2 时等于知情比例乘以价值的差,并随交易中信息的揭示而收窄;做市商对噪声交易者的盈利恰好抵消对知情者的亏损,低估知情比例则带来系统性亏损。凯尔模型中,知情交易者把订单藏在噪声里;连续拍卖的价格冲击系数 \(\sqrt{\Sigma_0}/\sigma_u\) 是单期的两倍,信息线性地进入价格。作者框架中的人名已改正为格罗斯滕。

数据口径:做市商为什么要留出买卖价差?订单为什么成簇到来?能否从成交数据中度量「有毒」的订单流?本书是教学与研究用的数学模型,不是投资或交易建议。 第八章给出逆向选择、订单流、库存与执行四步核查表,以及一项预注册的模拟撮合实验方案:在独立第三方冻结的模拟器中,比较库存偏置的阿韦拉内达—斯托伊科夫报价与固定对称报价在毒性脉冲下的跨会话夏普比率(唯一主要结局为二者之差,最小关注效应 0.31,8,600 个配对会话,双盲运行,判定规则写成代码)。

English version

对照数据表

下表数字由本章 Python 程序原样打印,可重新运行复现。 程序只用 Python 标准库

spread at the prior (pi1/2) equals mu x (V_H - V_L):
mu bid ask spread
0.0100.000 100.000 0.000
0.199.900 100.100 0.200
0.399.700 100.300 0.600
0.599.500 100.500 1.000
0.999.100 100.900 1.800
60 trades, true value V_H, 20,000 sessions per row (dealer knows mu):
mean spread at trade P(pi_60 dealer P&L per trade
mu t1 t=10 t=30 t=60 > 0.99) informed noise total
0.10.200 0.183 0.153 0.120 0.012 -0.0698 +0.0694 -0.0003
0.30.600 0.307 0.092 0.018 0.930 -0.0526 +0.0526 +0.0001
0.51.000 0.169 0.006 0.000 1.000 -0.0234 +0.0232 -0.0002
dealer underestimates toxicity (true mu 0.3; V_H and V_L equally often):
dealer's mu 0.30: P&L per trade -0.0001 (s.e. 0.0002)
dealer's mu 0.20: P&L per trade -0.0216 (s.e. 0.0002)
dealer's mu 0.10: P&L per trade -0.0761 (s.e. 0.0002)
dealer's mu 0.05: P&L per trade -0.1494 (s.e. 0.0003)

核心公式

\[a = E[V \mid \text{买}] = \frac{\pi\,(\mu + \tfrac{1-\mu}{2})\,V_H + (1-\pi)\,\tfrac{1-\mu}{2}\,V_L}{\pi\mu + \tfrac{1-\mu}{2}}, \qquad b = E[V \mid \text{卖}] .\]
查看完整验算程序
# Glosten-Milgrom (1985) sequential-trade model. The asset is worth V_H = 101 or V_L = 99
# (prior 1/2). Each period one trader arrives: informed with probability mu (buys if V_H,
# sells if V_L) or uninformed (buys or sells with probability 1/2 each). A competitive,
# risk-neutral dealer sets ask = E[V | buy] and bid = E[V | sell] and updates her belief.
import random, statistics

VH, VL = 101.0, 99.0

def quotes(pi, mu):
    pbh, pbl = mu + (1 - mu) / 2, (1 - mu) / 2          # P(buy | V_H), P(buy | V_L)
    pb = pi * pbh + (1 - pi) * pbl
    ask = (pi * pbh * VH + (1 - pi) * pbl * VL) / pb
    psh, psl = 1 - pbh, 1 - pbl
    ps = pi * psh + (1 - pi) * psl
    bid = (pi * psh * VH + (1 - pi) * psl * VL) / ps
    return bid, ask, pi * pbh / pb, pi * psh / ps          # posteriors after buy / sell

def session(rng, mu, mu_dealer, n=60, v=VH):
    pi, pnl_inf, pnl_noise, spreads = 0.5, 0.0, 0.0, []
    for _ in range(n):
        bid, ask, pi_b, pi_s = quotes(pi, mu_dealer)
        spreads.append(ask - bid)
        if rng.random() < mu:                              # informed trader
            side, who = (1 if v == VH else -1), "inf"
        else:
            side, who = (1 if rng.random() < 0.5 else -1), "noise"
        gain = (ask - v) if side == 1 else (v - bid)        # dealer's gain on this trade
        if who == "inf":
            pnl_inf += gain
        else:
            pnl_noise += gain
        pi = pi_b if side == 1 else pi_s
    return spreads, pnl_inf, pnl_noise, pi

if __name__ == "__main__":
    print("spread at the prior (pi = 1/2) equals mu x (V_H - V_L):")
    print("   mu     bid      ask    spread")
    for mu in (0.0, 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.9):
        b, a, _, _ = quotes(0.5, mu)
        print(f"  {mu:.1f}  {b:7.3f}  {a:7.3f}  {a - b:6.3f}")
    rng = random.Random(1985)
    print("60 trades, true value V_H, 20,000 sessions per row (dealer knows mu):")
    print("            mean spread at trade        P(pi_60    dealer P&L per trade")
    print("   mu    t=1   t=10   t=30   t=60   > 0.99)  informed   noise    total")
    for mu in (0.1, 0.3, 0.5):
        S, I, N, P = [], [], [], []
        for _ in range(20_000):
            sp, pi_, pn, pf = session(rng, mu, mu)
            S.append(sp); I.append(pi_ / 60); N.append(pn / 60); P.append(pf > 0.99)
        m = [statistics.fmean(s[t] for s in S) for t in (0, 9, 29, 59)]
        i, nn = statistics.fmean(I), statistics.fmean(N)
        print(f"  {mu:.1f}  " + "  ".join(f"{x:.3f}" for x in m)
              + f"   {statistics.fmean(P):.3f}   {i:+.4f}  {nn:+.4f}  {i + nn:+.4f}")
    print("dealer underestimates toxicity (true mu 0.3; V_H and V_L equally often):")
    for md in (0.3, 0.2, 0.1, 0.05):
        tot = []
        for k in range(20_000):
            v = VH if k % 2 == 0 else VL
            _, pi_, pn, _ = session(rng, 0.3, md, v=v)
            tot.append((pi_ + pn) / 60)
        se = statistics.stdev(tot) / len(tot) ** 0.5
        print(f"   dealer's mu {md:.2f}: P&L per trade {statistics.fmean(tot):+.4f}"
              f" (s.e. {se:.4f})")

唯一数据源与引用

范雅福(Fan, Y.). (2026). 《高频限价订单簿微观结构、霍克斯自激点过程与逆向选择毒流》第 1 章「信息不对称与买卖价差:格罗斯滕—米尔格罗姆与凯尔」(版本 1.0.0). 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23828065

DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23828065 · 阅读本章所在专著 · 5DL-B-045 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026045,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {High-Frequency Limit Order Book Microstructure, Hawkes Self-Exciting Point Processes and Adverse-Selection Flow Toxicity},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  doi       = {10.5281/zenodo.23828065},
  url       = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23828065}
}

本书其他章节结论