What does Order Books, Hawkes Processes and Toxic Flow conclude, in numbers, about “Reading the Classics: the Market Director, the Conspicuous Mound and the Market Exchange”?
Answer: The call auction executes 96 units, with traders' surplus of 4,858. The monopolist middleman cuts volume to 52 units, bidding 22.9 and asking 71.8; he earns 2,543, traders keep only 1,335, and the total surplus lost is 980. After a tax of 10 on the middleman, volume falls further to 40 and the loss rises to 1,625, with only 400 in tax: in this model, taxing the monopolist does not correct the monopoly but makes trade even thinner. Extending the tax to all trades lowers volume from 96 to 83, raises 830 in tax and loses only 60. The middleman who sees every reservation price executes all 96 units with no loss of efficiency, but takes the whole surplus of 4,858. This last row comes closest to the theme of this book: an information advantage need not reduce trade, but it decides who gets the gains from it.
Scope of the numbers: Why does a market maker quote a spread? Why do orders arrive in clusters? Can "toxic" order flow be measured from trade data? This book presents mathematical models for teaching and research and is not investment or trading advice. Marked boxes separate published evidence, runnable Python calculations (16 programs), classical sources and the author's models and hypotheses; all data in the book are fictional or simulated.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 10, 1335, 1625, 22.9, 2543, 40
| arrangement | volume | bid / ask | traders | middleman | tax | lost |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| A call auction (one price) | 96 | 49.1 (one) | 4858 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| B mound monopolist | 52 | 22.9 / 71.8 | 1335 | 2543 | 0 | 980 |
| C monopolist, taxed 10 per unit | 40 | 17.7 / 79.9 | 746 | 2087 | 400 | 1625 |
| D call auction, all trades taxed | 83 | 53.2 (one) | 3967 | 0 | 830 | 60 |
| E discriminating middleman | 96 | own values | 0 | 4858 | 0 | 0 |
| (traders = buyers' plus sellers' surplus; lost = call-auction surplus minus what | ||||||
| traders, middleman and tax collector receive together) |
Show the full program
# Author's toy model for Chapter 7 (an analogy, not a historical reconstruction): 200
# buyers with values and 200 sellers with costs drawn uniformly from 0..100 (one unit
# each). Five arrangements:
# A a single-price call auction (officials "settle the price", cheng jia): the price
# maximising executed volume; each buyer with value >= p meets a seller with cost <= p
# B a monopolist intermediary on the "conspicuous mound" (longduan) who posts one bid
# b and one ask a and keeps the spread on min(sellers <= b, buyers >= a)
# C B, after a per-unit tax t = 10 on the intermediary's trades (cong er zheng zhi)
# D A, after the same tax is extended to every trade (zheng shang zi ci ... shi)
# E an intermediary who "looks left and right" and sees every reservation value:
# he pays each seller her cost and charges each buyer his value (perfect price
# discrimination)
import random
def draw(rng, n=200):
return sorted(rng.uniform(0, 100) for _ in range(n)), sorted(rng.uniform(0, 100)
for _ in range(n))
def auction(vals, costs, tax=0.0):
best = (0, None)
for p in [x / 10 for x in range(0, 1001)]: # buyers pay p, sellers get p - tax
q = min(sum(v >= p for v in vals), sum(c <= p - tax for c in costs))
if q > best[0]:
best = (q, p)
q, p = best
bs = sum(v - p for v in sorted(vals)[-q:]); ss = sum(p - tax - c for c in costs[:q])
return q, p, bs + ss, q * tax
def monopolist(vals, costs, tax=0.0):
best = (-1, 0, 0, 0)
for q in range(1, len(vals) + 1): # choose the quantity; a, b clear it
a = sorted(vals)[-q]; b = costs[q - 1]
prof = q * (a - b - tax)
if prof > best[0]:
best = (prof, q, a, b)
prof, q, a, b = best
bs = sum(v - a for v in sorted(vals)[-q:]); ss = sum(b - c for c in costs[:q])
return q, a, b, bs + ss, prof, q * tax
if __name__ == "__main__":
rng = random.Random(1077); vals, costs = draw(rng)
full = auction(vals, costs)[2]
print("arrangement volume bid / ask traders middleman tax"
" lost")
def row(lab, q, b, a, tr, mid, tx):
pr = f"{a:5.1f} (one)" if b is None else f"{b:4.1f} / {a:4.1f}"
print(f"{lab:31s} {q:4d} {pr:11s} {tr:6.0f} {mid:6.0f} {tx:4.0f}"
f" {full - tr - mid - tx:4.0f}")
q, p, s, _ = auction(vals, costs)
row("A call auction (one price)", q, None, p, s, 0, 0)
q, a, b, s, prof, _ = monopolist(vals, costs)
row("B mound monopolist", q, b, a, s, prof, 0)
q, a, b, s, prof, tx = monopolist(vals, costs, tax=10)
row("C monopolist, taxed 10 per unit", q, b, a, s, prof, tx)
q, p, s, tx = auction(vals, costs, tax=10)
row("D call auction, all trades taxed", q, None, p, s, 0, tx)
q0 = auction(vals, costs)[0]
e = sum(sorted(vals)[-q0:]) - sum(costs[:q0])
print(f"{'E discriminating middleman':31s} {q0:4d} own values 0 {e:6.0f}"
f" 0 {full - e:4.0f}")
print("(traders = buyers' plus sellers' surplus; lost = call-auction surplus minus"
" what\n traders, middleman and tax collector receive together)")Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). High-Frequency Limit Order Book Microstructure, Hawkes Self-Exciting Point Processes and Adverse-Selection Flow Toxicity (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 7: Reading the Classics: the Market Director, the Conspicuous Mound and the Market Exchange. 5D Library. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23828065
DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.23828065 · Read the monograph · 5DL-B-045 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026045,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {High-Frequency Limit Order Book Microstructure, Hawkes Self-Exciting Point Processes and Adverse-Selection Flow Toxicity},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
doi = {10.5281/zenodo.23828065},
url = {https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.23828065}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · Information Asymmetry and the Bid–Ask Spread: Glosten–Milgrom and Kyle
- Chapter 2 · Inventory Risk and Optimal Market Making: the Avellaneda–Stoikov Equations
- Chapter 3 · Why Orders Arrive in Clusters: Hawkes Processes, the Signature Plot and the Epps Effect
- Chapter 4 · Measuring Toxicity: the Probability of Informed Trading, VPIN and the Flash-Crash Dispute
- Chapter 5 · Book Imbalance and Queues: Order Flow Imbalance, Queue Imbalance and Queue Position
- Chapter 6 · How to Split a Large Order: Almgren–Chriss Optimal Execution
- Chapter 8 · Practice and a Pre-Registered Test