What does Mission Communities: Seats and Volunteers conclude, in numbers, about “The Community Governance Contract: Design Principles, Protection Against Capture by Payers, Refund Reserves and Single-Tier Referral”?

Answer: Ostrom's eight design principles can be written directly into a community contract: clear boundaries, rules that fit conditions, members taking part in changing the rules, independent monitoring, graduated sanctions, low-cost resolution of disputes, outside recognition and nested governance. Program p61 shows that allocating votes by money lets payers pass 0.999 of the proposals most members oppose, that a cap at a third still leaves 0.715, and that only a cap at a tenth or one member one vote suppresses capture. Program p62 shows that the refund reserve should be set at the 99th percentile, 0.182 of the fund. Program p63 shows that a single-tier referral ledger has only one level, that all rewards come to 0.084 of kept sales, and that a reward depends only on what was sold.

Scope of the numbers: All parameters are illustrative, all calculations come from its programs, and revenue figures are illustrative arithmetic, not forecasts or guarantees. It is general guidance, not legal, tax or investment advice.

中文版

Data table

The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.715, 0.999

proposals that most members oppose: 1,793 of 2,000
rulepayer share of weightcapture rate
money0.5980.999
seat x100.3900.894
cap 1/30.3330.715
cap 1/100.1000.070
one each0.0600.000
Show the full program
# Chapter 6. p61: how often payers outvote a majority of members, by voting rule.
# 1,000 members (illustrative): 40 founding seats (RM 1,000), 20 patron
# seats (RM 5,000), 940 members without a seat. 2,000 proposals on which
# payers' interest diverges from the rest: each payer backs the proposal
# with probability 0.8; each other member backs it with a probability
# drawn uniformly from 0.30 to 0.50 for that proposal. "Capture" means the
# proposal passes although most members (heads) oppose it. Rules:
#   money     one vote per RM 100 paid, one vote for members without seats
#   seat x10  ten votes per seat holder, one for everyone else
#   cap 1/3   money weights, but the payer bloc is scaled down to at most
#             a third of all weight
#   cap 1/10  the same with at most a tenth of all weight
#   one each  one member, one vote
import math
import random

RNG = random.Random(20261120)
paid = [5000] * 20 + [1000] * 40 + [0] * 940
payer = [p > 0 for p in paid]
RULES = ("money", "seat x10", "cap 1/3", "cap 1/10", "one each")


def weights(rule):
    if rule == "money":
        return [p / 100 if p else 1.0 for p in paid]
    if rule == "seat x10":
        return [10.0 if p else 1.0 for p in paid]
    if rule == "one each":
        return [1.0] * len(paid)
    w = [p / 100 if p else 1.0 for p in paid]
    bsum = math.fsum(x for x, b in zip(w, payer) if b)
    rsum = math.fsum(x for x, b in zip(w, payer) if not b)
    cap = 1 / 3 if rule == "cap 1/3" else 1 / 10
    scale = min(1.0, (rsum * cap / (1 - cap)) / bsum)
    return [x * scale if b else x for x, b in zip(w, payer)]


W = {r: weights(r) for r in RULES}
captured = {r: 0 for r in RULES}
cases = 0
for _ in range(2000):
    q = RNG.uniform(0.30, 0.50)
    votes = [RNG.random() < (0.8 if b else q) for b in payer]
    heads_for = len([v for v in votes if v])
    if heads_for * 2 >= len(votes):
        continue
    cases += 1
    for r in RULES:
        ys = math.fsum(w for w, v in zip(W[r], votes) if v)
        ns = math.fsum(w for w, v in zip(W[r], votes) if not v)
        if ys > ns:
            captured[r] += 1
print("proposals that most members oppose: %s of 2,000" % "{:,}".format(cases))
print("rule       payer share of weight   capture rate")
for r in RULES:
    w = W[r]
    ps = math.fsum(x for x, b in zip(w, payer) if b)
    ts = math.fsum(w)
    print("%-10s %16.3f %18.3f" % (r, ps / ts, captured[r] / cases))

Single source and citation

Fan, Y. (2026). Mission-Driven Co-Creation Networks, Paid-Seat Identity Commitment and Voluntary Contribution Flywheels (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 6: The Community Governance Contract: Design Principles, Protection Against Capture by Payers, Refund Reserves and Single-Tier Referral. 5D Library. DOI pending

DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-360 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

BibTeX
@book{fan2026360,
  author    = {Fan, Yafu},
  title     = {Mission-Driven Co-Creation Networks, Paid-Seat Identity Commitment and Voluntary Contribution Flywheels},
  year      = {2026},
  publisher = {5D Library},
  edition   = {1.0.0},
  note      = {DOI pending}
}

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