What does Mission Communities: Seats and Volunteers conclude, in numbers, about “The Community Governance Contract: Design Principles, Protection Against Capture by Payers, Refund Reserves and Single-Tier Referral”?
Answer: Ostrom's eight design principles can be written directly into a community contract: clear boundaries, rules that fit conditions, members taking part in changing the rules, independent monitoring, graduated sanctions, low-cost resolution of disputes, outside recognition and nested governance. Program p61 shows that allocating votes by money lets payers pass 0.999 of the proposals most members oppose, that a cap at a third still leaves 0.715, and that only a cap at a tenth or one member one vote suppresses capture. Program p62 shows that the refund reserve should be set at the 99th percentile, 0.182 of the fund. Program p63 shows that a single-tier referral ledger has only one level, that all rewards come to 0.084 of kept sales, and that a reward depends only on what was sold.
Scope of the numbers: All parameters are illustrative, all calculations come from its programs, and revenue figures are illustrative arithmetic, not forecasts or guarantees. It is general guidance, not legal, tax or investment advice.
Data table
The numbers below are printed verbatim by the chapter's Python program and can be reproduced by running it. standard-library Python onlyprinted values that match the answer: 0.715, 0.999
| proposals that most members oppose: 1,793 of 2,000 | ||
| rule | payer share of weight | capture rate |
| money | 0.598 | 0.999 |
| seat x10 | 0.390 | 0.894 |
| cap 1/3 | 0.333 | 0.715 |
| cap 1/10 | 0.100 | 0.070 |
| one each | 0.060 | 0.000 |
Show the full program
# Chapter 6. p61: how often payers outvote a majority of members, by voting rule.
# 1,000 members (illustrative): 40 founding seats (RM 1,000), 20 patron
# seats (RM 5,000), 940 members without a seat. 2,000 proposals on which
# payers' interest diverges from the rest: each payer backs the proposal
# with probability 0.8; each other member backs it with a probability
# drawn uniformly from 0.30 to 0.50 for that proposal. "Capture" means the
# proposal passes although most members (heads) oppose it. Rules:
# money one vote per RM 100 paid, one vote for members without seats
# seat x10 ten votes per seat holder, one for everyone else
# cap 1/3 money weights, but the payer bloc is scaled down to at most
# a third of all weight
# cap 1/10 the same with at most a tenth of all weight
# one each one member, one vote
import math
import random
RNG = random.Random(20261120)
paid = [5000] * 20 + [1000] * 40 + [0] * 940
payer = [p > 0 for p in paid]
RULES = ("money", "seat x10", "cap 1/3", "cap 1/10", "one each")
def weights(rule):
if rule == "money":
return [p / 100 if p else 1.0 for p in paid]
if rule == "seat x10":
return [10.0 if p else 1.0 for p in paid]
if rule == "one each":
return [1.0] * len(paid)
w = [p / 100 if p else 1.0 for p in paid]
bsum = math.fsum(x for x, b in zip(w, payer) if b)
rsum = math.fsum(x for x, b in zip(w, payer) if not b)
cap = 1 / 3 if rule == "cap 1/3" else 1 / 10
scale = min(1.0, (rsum * cap / (1 - cap)) / bsum)
return [x * scale if b else x for x, b in zip(w, payer)]
W = {r: weights(r) for r in RULES}
captured = {r: 0 for r in RULES}
cases = 0
for _ in range(2000):
q = RNG.uniform(0.30, 0.50)
votes = [RNG.random() < (0.8 if b else q) for b in payer]
heads_for = len([v for v in votes if v])
if heads_for * 2 >= len(votes):
continue
cases += 1
for r in RULES:
ys = math.fsum(w for w, v in zip(W[r], votes) if v)
ns = math.fsum(w for w, v in zip(W[r], votes) if not v)
if ys > ns:
captured[r] += 1
print("proposals that most members oppose: %s of 2,000" % "{:,}".format(cases))
print("rule payer share of weight capture rate")
for r in RULES:
w = W[r]
ps = math.fsum(x for x, b in zip(w, payer) if b)
ts = math.fsum(w)
print("%-10s %16.3f %18.3f" % (r, ps / ts, captured[r] / cases))Single source and citation
Fan, Y. (2026). Mission-Driven Co-Creation Networks, Paid-Seat Identity Commitment and Voluntary Contribution Flywheels (Version 1.0.0), Chapter 6: The Community Governance Contract: Design Principles, Protection Against Capture by Payers, Refund Reserves and Single-Tier Referral. 5D Library. DOI pending
DOI pending · monograph page goes live after publication · 5DL-B-360 · v1.0.0 · CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0
BibTeX
@book{fan2026360,
author = {Fan, Yafu},
title = {Mission-Driven Co-Creation Networks, Paid-Seat Identity Commitment and Voluntary Contribution Flywheels},
year = {2026},
publisher = {5D Library},
edition = {1.0.0},
note = {DOI pending}
}Other chapter answers in this book
- Chapter 1 · A Seat Is Not Sold on Perks: How Much of Willingness to Pay Is Identity, Recognition and Mission
- Chapter 2 · The IKEA Effect and the Ratchet of Sunk Investment: Effort Raises Value, and Also Breeds Regret
- Chapter 3 · Honours That Cost No Money: Honour Ladders, Public Plaques and the Saturation of Honours
- Chapter 4 · Does Money Crowd Out Enthusiasm? The Boundaries of Crowding Out
- Chapter 5 · The Dual-Track Funnel: Free Contributors, Paid Seats and Fairness Between the Tracks
- Chapter 7 · East-West Classical Sources: The Record of Rites on the Great Unity, the Platform Sutra, Mauss's Essay on the Gift and Franklin's Subscription Library
- Chapter 8 · System Architecture and the Operating Loop: Registries, Ledgers, the Honour Engine, the Seat Lifecycle and Pre-Registered Tests